THIRD DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC G.R. No. 217656
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,
Petitioner,
-versus EDDIE MANALO, RODRIGO
Respondent
Promulgated:
November 16, 2020
LEONEN,
J.:
The mandate of our
Constitution is clear: "Urban or rural poor dwellers
shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished, except in accordance with
law and in a just and humane manner.
The Facts
On
September 13, 2010, Manalo, et al. filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial
Complaint of Quezon City, seeking the determination and payment of just
compensation from the Department of Public Works and Highways.
WHEREAS, to implement these proposed
projects, there is a need to relocate the affected squatters and to acquire the
needed road right of way;
Thus, Manalo, et al. prayed for the determination of just
compensation due to them, and that they be entitled to rights accruing to
individuals whose properties were expropriated for public use, .and to moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
On
November 15, 2010, the Quezon City Task Force Control
and
Prevention of Illegal Structures and Squatting issued a Notice of Demolition;
asking Manalo, et al. to vacate the land and remove the structures within
seven days of receiving the notice. This came with financial assistance
worth P21,000.00 per family. Despite notice, Manalo, et al. refused to
vacate the property and accept the financial aid.
On January 19, 2011, the Department of Public Works and Highways
filed its Answer praying
that the Complaint be dismissed. It alleged that
Manalo, et al. were admittedly squatting on a government-owned
property
without the owner's express consent. As such, the structures they built may
be demolished under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 7279.
The Department of Public Works and Highways also noted that it had
already offered Manalo, et al. cash compensation to show good faith and
honest intention to help them. It likewise refuted their claim of entitlement
to replacement costs, noting that they were only entitled to financial
assistance under Section 28 of Republic Act No. 7279. It also asserted that
expropriation was not the proper remedy, and that it may avail of summary
eviction and demolition under Republic Act No. 7279.
Finally, the Department of Public Works and Highways asserted that
since Manalo, et al. admitted that the land was not their own, they were
builders in bad faith who, under Article 449 of the Civil Code, had no right
of reimbursement for the value of their structures.
In a May 5, 2011 Order, the Regional Trial
Court denied the Department of Public Works and Highways' prayer to dismiss
Manalo, et al.'s case. This, after it had found that
the allegations in the Complaint had a cause of action.23 It disposed:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the prayer for the dismissal of this
case is denied.
The Department of Public Works and Highways sought reconsideration,
but this was denied in the Regional Trial Court's June 30, 2011 Order.25 Thus, it filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
In
its March 19, 2015 Decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the Regional Trial Court's findings. It held
that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion when it relied on the
Memorandum of Agreement in denying the prayer for the case's dismissal. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Orders of respondent Judge Alexander S. Balut of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City are hereby AFFIRMED.
Thus, the Department of Public Works and Highways filed
a Petition for Review on Certiorari before
this Court.
On July 5, 2016, respondents Manalo, et al. filed their Comment. Petitioner then filed its Reply.
Petitioner insists that respondents' Complaint failed to state a
cause of
action. It notes that the trial court
should not have considered the
Memorandum of Agreement because it "was never identified, marked in
evidence and formally offered during the hearing" for its motion to
dismiss. In any case, petitioner claims that the
Memorandum of
Agreement actually weakened respondents' case, because it revealed that the
obligation to relocate respondents rested with the Quezon City government,
not petitioner.
Citing Republic Act No. 7279, petitioner maintains that
respondents '
are only entitled to financial assistance and not just compensation equivalent
to the replacement costs. It reasons that respondents were professional
squatters who may be summarily evicted and whose illegal structures may
be demolished. It reiterates that respondents were builders in bad faith who
are not entitled to any reimbursement.
On the other hand, respondents claim that their cause of action
remains undeniable, as they owned the structures that petitioner demolished
for the C-5 extension project. They also argue that the issue they raised was·
whether they were entitled to just compensation, over which the trial court had
jurisdiction. They also insist that they are entitled either to the
payment of just compensation or to a suitable relocation.
In rebuttal, petitioner merely reiterated the same arguments it
had
raised in its Petition.
Issues
First, whether or not the
Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Regional Trial Court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying petitioner Department of Public Works and Highways' prayer to dismiss respondents Eddie Manalo, et al.'s Complaint;
Second, whether or not
petitioner can extra judicially and summarily evict respondents and demolish their structures; and
Finally, whether or not respondents are entitled to just compensation for their structures or for a relocation.
While often
interchanged, failure to state a
cause of action and lack
of cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss an
action. Failure to state a cause of action, on one hand, "refers to the insufficiency of allegations
in the pleading," and is a ground for a motion to dismiss. On the other hand, lack
of cause of action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the
cause of action alleged in the pleading, or there 1s "insufficiency of the
factual basis for the action.
Moreover, failure to state a cause of action "may be raised
at the earliest stages" of an
action, but lack of cause of action "may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented.
Thus, in cases of dismissal for failure to state a cause of
action, as in this case, "the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the
material allegations" in the
complaint. It delves into "whether the material allegations, assuming these to be true, state ultimate facts which constitute plaintiffs cause of action" The test for determining whether a complaint states a cause of action is "whether or not, admitting hypothetically the
truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint, the judge may validly grant
the relief demanded in the complaint."
There are,
however, exceptions to the rule that the allegations are hypothetically admitted as true, namely: (a) if the falsity of the allegations "is subject to judicial notice"; (b) "if such allegations are
legally impossible"; or (c) "if these refer to facts which are inadmissible
in evidence"; or (d) "if by the record or document included in the
pleading these allegations appear unfounded." None of these exceptions were
alleged to be present here.
Since the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations in the complaint, then generally, the "analysis should be confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other."51 Here, in moving to dismiss the case, petitioner alleged that respondents' Complaint failed to state a cause of action. Thus, an examination of the Complaint is necessary. Its pertinent portions read:
Plaintiffs who are informal settlers
and not owners of the lots
are residence and owners of residential
structures located at Luzon
Avenue, Quezon City, whose houses
[were] situated directly along the
path of DPWH's ambitious
Circumferential Road also known as C-5
extension project that will finally
link South Luzon Express way to North
Luzon Express way.
Yet, defendant DPWH
aware of its constitutional obligation to
plaintiffs as owners of
the residential structures has made a voluntary offer of financial aid package. But the amount offered by defendant DPWH
tothe affected plaintiffs whose houses and homes will soon to be gobbled upby
the C-5 highway was notoriously small to pass the criteria of just compensation. Evidently, the idea of just compensation does not
make any sense at all with the defendant DPWH
since its voluntary offer was termed "financial assistance".
Consequently, defendant DPWH's offer offinancial assistance was graciously
turned down by plaintiffs;
Based on the allegations, and as aptly found by the lower courts,
the
Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action. All the elements are
present,
namely: (1) respondents owned the residential structures on Luzon Avenue,
Quezon City, and they have rights embodied in the August 6, 2008
Memorandum of Agreement; (2 ) petitioner has the obligation to respect such
rights as it still has to comply with due process; and (3) petitioner's
inaction
to give respondents what is due to them violates their rights.
In any case, when petitioner offered
respondents financial assistance,
respondents' right has already been acknowledged to have been violated. It
is of no moment that petitioner denied respondents' entitlement to just compensation due to their being professional squatters.
Second issue, whether or not petitioner can extra judicially and
summarily evict respondents and demolish their structures; and
Article XIII, Section 10 of the
Constitution provides:
SECTION
10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor
their dwellings demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and
humane manner.
In relation, Section 9 (Squatter Relocation) of Republic Act No. 8974, or An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-Of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and for Other Purposes, states:
The government through the National Housing Authority, in coordination with the local government units and implementing agencies concerned, shall establish and develop squatter relocation sites, including the provision of adequate utilities and services, in anticipation of squatters that have to be removed from the right-of-way or site of future infrastructure projects. Whenever applicable, the concerned local government units shall provide and administer the relocation sites.
In case the expropriated land is occupied by squatters, the court shall issue the necessary writ of demolition for the purpose of dismantling any and all structures found within the subject property. The implementing agency shall take into account and observe diligently the procedure provided for in Sections 28 and 29 of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of1992.
Funds for the relocation sites shall come from appropriations for the purpose under the General Appropriations Act, as well as from appropriate infrastructure projects funds of the implementing agency concerned. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, whether or not respondents are entitled to just compensation for their structures or for a relocation.
SECTION 29 R.A. No. 7279. Resettlement.
Within two (2) years from the effectivity of this Act, the local
government units, in coordination with the National Housing Authority, shall
implement the relocation and resettlement of persons living in danger areas
such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, river banks, shorelines,
waterways, and in other public places as sidewalks, roads, parks, and
playgrounds. The local government unit, in coordination with the National
Housing Authority, shall provide relocation or resettlement sites with basic
services and facilities and access to employment and livelihood opportunities
sufficient to meet the basic needs of the affected families.
Here, there is no allegation that a writ of demolition was procured from the court, or that the procedures provided in Sections 28 and 29 of Republic Act No. 7279 were observed, as mandated by Republic Act No. 8974. Instead, petitioner admits having offered financial assistance to respondents, pursuant to Section 28(8) of Republic Act No. 7279. By doing this, petitioner acknowledges that respondents are underprivileged and homeless citizens, entitled to due process of law, prior to their eviction and thus, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether respondents had been prejudiced by the eviction and demolition of their structures, and if properly substantiated, whether they are entitled to damages.
Petitioner, however, insists that respondents are professional
squatters who may be summarily evicted and their structures demolished under Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 7279. Section 3(m) of the law defines professional squatters as:
... individuals or groups who occupy lands
without the express consent of
the landowner and who have
sufficient income for legitimate housing.
The term shall also apply
to persons who have previously been awarded
home lots or housing units
by the Government but who sold, leased or
transferred the same to
settle illegally in the same place or in another
urban area, and non-bona
fide occupants and intruders of lands reserved
for socialized housing. The
term shall not apply to individuals or groups
who simply rent land and
housing from professional squatters or squatting
syndicates
Petitioner,
however, failed to substantiate this allegation.
Finally, this Court notes that the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, the owner of the land on which respondents' structures were built, was not impleaded here. Hence, this Court cannot rule on the issue of respondents' rights as builders in bad faith under the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE,
the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals'
March 19, 2015 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 121303 is AFFIRMED. This
case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
7 6 for appropriate action in accordance with this Decision, with due and
deliberate dispatch.
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Submitted to:
Constitutional Law 11
Professor: Judge
Ric S. Bastasa
Submitted by:
Fr. Cesar D. Tinga
JD-1
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