DIGEST/ BANAS, Mary Rovytte / Mun. of Paranaque vs VM Realty Corporation / 1989

DIGEST/ BANAS, Mary Rovytte / Mun. of Paranaque vs VM Realty Corporation / 1998

MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE, PETITIONER, VS. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

GR NO. 127820, July 20, 1998

Facts:

Municipality of Paranaque(Petitioner) filed a complaint for expropriation against private respondent V.M. Realty Corporation. The complaint was filed for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. 

However, respondent claimed that the complaint had failed to state the cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160, the Local Goverment Code.

Petitioner argued that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case so this substantially complies with the requirements of the law. Citing Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules of Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which provides: “If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.”

Issue: 

WON the resolution duly approved by the municipal council have the same force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action? 

Ruling:

No. Resolutions do not have the same force and effect of an ordinance since that it is a rule that the power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities.

An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control and restraints, imposed “through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.”

These are the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:

1.  An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.

2.  The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.

3.  There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4.  A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. Also, RA 7160, the present Local Government Code, which was already in force when the Complaint for expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose.

Moreover, Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it.

Therefore, the petitioner, relying on a resolution, has no authority exercising the power of eminent domain.

Case Principles: 

The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

Case Digest by: Mary Rovytte Banas