MARC DONNELLY AND ASSOCIATES VS. MANUEL AGREGADO
G.R. No. L-4510 May 31, 1954
FACTS:
Petition for review of the decision of the
Auditor General to reject the petition of the applicant to the Sugar Quota
Office in respect of the export fees charged by the applicant to the Sugar
Quota Office in the amount of P54,862.84.
July 2, 1946 – enacted Commonwealth Act No. 728:
'unlawful for any individual, company or organization to export agricultural or
industrial products, commodities, articles, materials and supplies without authorisation
from the President of the Philippines. Appoints the President with the power to
oversee, monitor and ban the sale of products abroad.
July 10, 1946 – President, promulgated Executive Order
No. 3 banning the exportation of such products mentioned therein, and permits
the exportation of other items.
April 24, 1947 – The Chief Executive Officer sent a
communication to the Philippine Sugar Administration approving the sale of
scrap metals on payment by the applicants of a charge of P10 per ton of the
metals to be shipped.
Over the time from December 1947 to September 1948, the
petitioner exported substantial quantities of scrap iron, brass, copper and
aluminum, for which the total amount of P54,862,84 was compensated by way of
royalties. Amount was obtained by the Sugar Quota Office under the authority
provided by the Chief Executive Officer and the above-mentioned Cabinet
resolution. The matter is currently before us by way of appeal from the
decision of the Auditor General, who rejected the offer for repayment of those
royalties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO is valid?
HELD:
Yeah,
according to Art. 6 sec. 22(2) of the Constitution, the Congress may, by
statute, permit the President, subject to certain restrictions, to set, under
the limits laid down, tariffs, import or export quotas and tonnage. The Congress enacted the Commonwealth Act No. 728, which confers on the
President the power to govern, ban, monitor and prevent the sale of scrap
metals and to set down such rules and regulations as may be appropriate for the
enforcement of its provisions. The resolution is perfectly legal because it was
done by authority of Commonwealth Act No. 728 and in pursuance of an express
provision of our Constitution. The fact that the resolution was enacted by the
Cabinet and the recovery of revenues was not decreed on the grounds of an order
given by the President himself does not, in our view, invalidate the resolution
because it cannot be denied that the act of the Cabinet is, and is ultimately,
the act of the President.
And this is so because, as this Court aptly said, the
secretaries of departments are mere assistants of the Chief Executive and “the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments and the acts of the
secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
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