The constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws is aimed against the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.

 Likewise, we do not agree with the Ombudsman’s declaration that Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be applied retroactively to the questioned transactions because to do so would violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a) which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant;¹² or (e) which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when exercised was lawful; or (f) which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.¹³

The constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws is aimed against the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.¹⁴

Administrative Order No. 13 does not mete out a penalty for the act of granting behest loans. It merely creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding Committee on Behest Loans and provides for its composition and functions. Memorandum Order No. 61, on the other hand, simply provides the frame of reference in determining the existence of behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex-post facto laws.

Furthermore, in Estarija v. Ranada,¹⁵ in which petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 in his motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s decision, we had occasion to state that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a law. The Ombudsman, therefore, acted in excess of its jurisdiction in delving into the constitutionality of the subject administrative and memorandum orders.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 145184               March 14, 2008

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, represented by PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT through ATTY. ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as OMBUDSMAN; DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES' MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND OFFICERS AT THE TIME - RAFAEL SISON, JOSEPH TENGCO, ALICE REYES, VICENTE PATERNO, JOSEPH EDRALIN, ROBERTO ONGPIN, VERDEN DANGILAN, RODOLFO MANALO; BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS PHILIPPINES, INC. QUERUBE MAKALINTAL,* AMBROSIO MAKALINTAL, VICENTE JAYME, ANTONIO SANTIAGO, EDGAR QUINTO, HORACIO MAKALINTAL, ALFREDO DE LOS ANGELES, JOSE REY D. RUEDA, RAMONCITO MODESTO, GERARDO LIMJUCO, Respondents.