LAMBINO V. COMELEC: REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION

EN BANC

G.R. No. 174153             October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

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ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.

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ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.

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ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.

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BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA represented by its Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human Rights,Intervenors.

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LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,Intervenors.

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ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.

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TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.

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LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.

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PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, Intervenors.

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RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA, Intervenors.

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PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Intervenors.

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SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Intervenor.

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SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor.

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JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and RANDALL TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.

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INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE CHAPTERS, Intervenors.

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SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON, Intervenors.

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JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, Intervenors.

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G.R. No. 174299             October 25, 2006

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe,, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.

Antecedent Facts

On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups¹ and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)² and Section 7³ of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)⁴ and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)⁵ and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions."⁶ These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:

DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.⁷

The Ruling of the COMELEC

On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections⁸ declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.⁹

In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people."

In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification of signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention.

In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement the system of initiative."

Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino Group's petition. The supporting intervenors¹⁰ uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors¹¹ hold the contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;¹² (4) the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.

The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving the parties' memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for resolution.

The Issues

The petitions raise the following issues:

1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and

3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition.

The Ruling of the Court

There is no merit to the petition.

The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition," thus:

MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?

MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?

MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to them and they are asked whether or not they want to propose this constitutional amendment.

MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.¹³ (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature."

The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.

The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed¹⁴ the concept of people's initiative from the United States where various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States¹⁵ which allow initiative petitions, the unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.¹⁶

The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:

[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to the signer's liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot.¹⁷ (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,¹⁸ the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:

The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative commonly are described in similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition."); x x x (publication of full text of amended constitutional provision required because it is "essential for the elector to have x x x the section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many instances he would be required to vote in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.¹⁹

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."

The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.

Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet²⁰ after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral arguments was the signature sheet attached²¹ to the opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.

The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to the Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:

Province:	City/Municipality:	No. of Verified Signatures:
Legislative District:	Barangay:

PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"

I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.

	Precinct Number	Name Last Name, First Name, M.I.	Address	Birthdate MM/DD/YY	Signature	Verification
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

_________________ Barangay Official (Print Name and Sign)

_________________ Witness (Print Name and Sign)

__________________ Witness (Print Name and Sign)

There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.

The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from February to August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked if his group also circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and stated that what his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.

The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:

I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal capacity as a registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)

The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition. However, the "Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines"²² has posted the full text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:

RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02

RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common stand on the approach to support the proposals of the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change;

WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;

WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in December 2005;

WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which militates against the use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;

WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of Congress to amend the Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the same;

WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;

DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the Century Park Hotel, Manila.²³ (Underscoring supplied)

ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change through people's initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of the Consultative Commission²⁴ are vastly different from the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.

For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the existing Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound impact on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution, including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions.

The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before the filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation of the draft petition, together with the signature sheets, six months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition together with the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed changes.

In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:

After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments alleged in the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended petition was what they had shown to the people during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments."

The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before this Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. The signature sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.

It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first claimed that they circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:

[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated together with the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis supplied)

The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that they circulated "the petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral arguments that what they circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30 August 2006.

The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a proposed change attached to the petition signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself.

Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris Secundumpulls the rug from under their feet.

It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to August 2006 during the signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated claim that they printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or amended petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group circulated the amended petition during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating only very limited copies of the petition.

During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the draft petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked other supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he could not state with certainty how many additional copies the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused the printing of these 100,000 copies.

Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x x x."²⁵ This admission binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of the people who signed the signature sheets.

Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.

With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets.

In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the constitutional requirement that the amendment must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition." The signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.

For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes, among which are:

1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;²⁶

2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost all the present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of office; ²⁷

3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.²⁸

These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.

During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the people during the signature-gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007 local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local elections. However, the text of the proposed changes belies this.

The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition, states:

Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held simultaneously with the 2007 local elections. This section merely requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the local elections without specifying the year.

Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have easily written the word "next" before the phrase "election of all local government officials." This would have insured that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next local elections following the ratification of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word "next" allows the interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with any future local elections.

Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of office. This allows incumbent members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year term of office, and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of the Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation.

This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.

The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:

Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)

During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.

Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.

Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,²⁹ the Supreme Court of Florida declared:

Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed amendment amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the amendment's proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of the proposal makes it impossible to state what it will affect and effect and violates the requirement that proposed amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis supplied)

Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,³⁰ the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling:

Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and there is a greater opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate independently of any structured or supervised process. They often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters typically use simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative before the election. More importantly, there is no process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to propose an amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.

Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion whether to amend or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the Constitution.

However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again so soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further amendments or revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because the people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.

There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August 2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:

Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.

After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no counterpart provision for the present members of the House of Representatives even if their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will remain members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.

The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present members of the House of Representatives to the exclusion of the present Senators.

The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known that their signatures would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of Representatives.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition" - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.

The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition.

In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or

(2) A constitutional convention.

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's initiative.

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:

MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.

May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x

x x x x

MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?

MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.

MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.

MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.

x x x x

MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?

MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."

MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.³¹ (Emphasis supplied)

There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.

This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan,³²the Supreme Court of California ruled:

The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x x applies only to the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws and amendments to the Constitution' and does not purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed 'the measure') now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention, and the writ sought by petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:³³

It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may be amended or revised, it can be altered by those who favor amendments, revision, or other change only through the use of one of the specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a difference between an amendment and a revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the measure here in question that it is not an amendment as that term is generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be based in large part on the revision of the constitution drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision' authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses required by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of adoption, x x x.

While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x.

To call it an amendment is a misnomer.

Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be submitted to the people through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x

Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.

As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:³⁴

It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in the manner prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a constitution in a manner other than the one provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated as extra-constitutional and revolutionary. x x x x "While it is universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have power to adopt a constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly manner and according to the settled principles of constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed the method by which the people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the fundamental law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution ― that a people's initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.

The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:

[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.³⁵ (Emphasis supplied)

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.

In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions."³⁶ The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.

The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision."³⁷ Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches."³⁸ A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances."³⁹

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.⁴⁰Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government.

The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.

By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution.⁴¹ (Emphasis supplied)

In Adams v. Gunter,⁴² an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State constitution to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was defective and unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect several other provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:

The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been in existence in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of government. It would not only radically change the whole pattern of government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on government.

x x x x

We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by the people at the General Election and if the Legislature at its next session should fail to submit further amendments to revise and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result, or if after submission of appropriate amendments the people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the government of this State. The same result would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to provide for only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly to the answer.

The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and many sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-date document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we were to hold that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition here.⁴³(Emphasis supplied)

The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The Lambino Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the executive department.

In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that would be affected by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's present initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on the count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.⁴⁴ There is no doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative seeks far more radical changes in the structure of government than the initiative in Adams.

The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions" because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. However, the same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called "amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an "occupation, profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor.

Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:

99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly provide for both "amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while the same provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of the people. It would seem that the apparent distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that on one hand the common people in general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution because that is not their occupation, profession or vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional convention delegates are expected to work full-time on the same matter because that is their occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the difference between the words "revision" and "amendment" pertain only to the process or procedure of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the constitutional provisions.

100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably be in the substance or extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)

The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the same proposed changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed changes in the present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the changes. However, since the Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law of the land.

The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.⁴⁵ Any theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.

The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions have attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,⁴⁶ the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory, thus:

Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution proposed by initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by which the legislature can propose a revision of the constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions initiated by the people.

Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the constitution that cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They assert that the distinction between amendment and revision is determined by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot measure proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of the original instrument, including profound impacts on existing fundamental rights and radical restructuring of the government's relationship with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot measure "will refashion the most basic principles of Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.

We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the constitution may not be accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII, section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:

"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use as a means of revising the constitution." x x x x

It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of the constitution which provides the means for constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an individual, through the initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate." x x x x

Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to constitutional revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution.

We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at the other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the Constitution.

Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years⁴⁷ is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a revision.⁴⁸ Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.⁴⁹

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision sought by the present petition is located.

However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article II⁵⁰ of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people's initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.

In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:

Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails. This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government." The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended," which requires a future separate constitutional amendment.

Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded during the oral arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the later provision automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.

The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the "Parliamentary system of government," and the inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of government."

Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's proposed changes refer to ― the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among the few countries with unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of government ― the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of government?

This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.

In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this Constitution."

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.

This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds.⁵¹

Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.

Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."

The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.

The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the present initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.

4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative

In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.⁵² For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.

5. Conclusion

The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself.

To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this country.

An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes cast⁵³ − approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will. That approval included the prescribed modes for amending or revising the Constitution.

No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which means subverting the people's sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of the people.

Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot override the specific modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution ― the people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society ― becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.

The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice" or "sovereign will" in the present initiative.

This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

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EN BANC

G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ET AL.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

PANGANIBAN, CJ.:

Without the rule of law, there can be no lasting prosperity and certainly no liberty.

Beverley McLachlin 1 Chief Justice of Canada

After a deep reflection on the issues raised and a careful evaluation of the parties' respective arguments -- both oral and written -- as well as the enlightened and enlightening Opinions submitted by my esteemed colleagues, I am fully convinced that the present Petition must be dismissed.

I write, however, to show that my present disposition is completely consistent with my previous Opinions and votes on the two extant Supreme Court cases involving an initiative to change the Constitution.

In my Separate Opinion in Santiago v. Comelec,² I opined "that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), Republic Act 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient

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'SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.'

"With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping and all too extremist. It is equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain. What Citizen Delfin wants the Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not thereby preempt any future effort to exercise the right of initiative correctly and judiciously. The fact that the Delfin Petition proposes a misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against its proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time and for the right reason.

Taken Together and Interpreted Properly,
the Constitution, R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution
2300 Are Sufficient to Implement Constitutional Initiatives

"While R.A. 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was — as the majority openly concedes — intended by the legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to effectuate an initiative on the Constitution. I completely agree with the inspired and inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative, sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with this Court's unanimous en banc rulings in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on Elections, that "provisions for initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights granted thereby"; and in Garcia vs. Comelec, that any "effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected."

"No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In recognition of this, R.A. 6735 wisely empowered the Commission on Election "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the Comelec issued its Resolution 2300 on 16 January 1991. Such Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated "to govern the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws," not by the incumbent Commission on Elections but by one then composed of Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac, Comms. Alfredo

authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution."

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E. Abueg, Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of these Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission, and thus we cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other than an honest, sincere and exemplary effort to give life to a cherished right of our people.

"The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws and local legislations, it is void in reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis for such differentiation. The source of and authority for the Resolution is the same law, R.A. 6735.

"I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution.

Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa
Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled

"I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and the Spouses Pedrosa from exercising their right of initiative. In fact, I believe that such restraining order as against private respondents should not have been issued, in the first place. While I agree that the Comelec should be stopped from using public funds and government resources to help them gather signatures, I firmly believe that this Court has no power to restrain them from exercising their right of initiative. The right to propose amendments to the Constitution is really a species of the right of free speech and free assembly. And certainly, it would be tyrannical and despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and persuading others to conform to his/her beliefs. As the eminent Voltaire once said, 'I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.' After all, freedom is not really for the thought we agree with, but as Justice Holmes wrote, 'freedom for the thought that we hate.'

Epilogue

"By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate Opinion. Initiative, like referendum and recall, is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. All three are institutionalized legacies of the world-admired EDSA people power. Like elections and plebiscites, they are hallowed expressions of popular sovereignty. They are sacred democratic rights of our people to be used as

Six months after, in my Separate Opinion in People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Comelec,³ I joined the rest of the members of the Court in ruling "by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the Comelec in dismissing the petition filed by

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Constitution x x x." While concededly, petitioners in this case were not direct parties in Santiago, nonetheless the Court's injunction against the Comelec covered ANY petition, not just the Delfin petition which was the immediate subject of said case. As a dissenter in Santiago, I believed, and still do, that the majority gravely erred in rendering such a sweeping injunction, but I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decision's ratio decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion. Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the Comelec. Any other mode of action would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.

Second Issue:
Sufficiency of RA 6735

"I repeat my firm legal position that RA 6735 is adequate to cover initiatives on the Constitution, and that whatever administrative details may have been omitted in said law are satisfactorily provided by Comelec Resolution 2300. The promulgation of Resolution 2300 is sanctioned by Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which vests upon the Comelec the power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." The Omnibus Election Code likewise empowers the electoral body to "promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer x x x." Finally and most relevantly, Section 20 of Ra 6735 specifically authorizes Comelec "to promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act."

"In my dissent in Santiago, I wrote that "there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time and for the right reason." Let me explain further.

The Right Thing

"A people's initiative is direct democracy in action. It is the right thing that citizens may avail themselves of to articulate their will. It is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. Even the majority implicitly conceded its value and worth in our legal firmament when it implored Congress "not to tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for implementation of the right (of initiative) of the people x x x." Hence, in the en banc case of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Comelec, [G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996], this Court unanimously held that "(l)ike elections, initiative and referendum are powerful and valuable modes of expressing popular

PIRMA therein," since the Commission had "only complied" with the Santiago Decision.

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sovereignty. And this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture, protect and promote their legitimate exercise."

The Right Way

"From the outset, I have already maintained the view that "taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), RA 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution." Let me now demonstrate the adequacy of RA 6735 by outlining, in concrete terms, the steps to be taken – the right way – to amend the Constitution through a people's initiative.

"Pursuant to Section 3(f) of the law, the Comelec shall prescribe the form of the petition which shall contain the proposition and the required number of signatories. Under Sec. 5(c) thereof, the petition shall state the following:

'c.1 contents or text of the [provision or provisions] sought to be x x x amended, x x x;

c.2 the proposition [in full text];

c.3 the reason or reasons therefor [fully and clearly explained];

c.4 that it is not one of exceptions provided herein;

c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6 an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.'

"Section 8(f) of Comelec Resolution 2300 additionally requires that the petition include a formal designation of the duly authorized representatives of the signatories.

"Being a constitutional requirement, the number of signatures becomes a condition precedent to the filing of the petition, and is jurisdictional. Without such requisite signatures, the Commission shall motu proprio reject the petition.

"Where the initiators have substantially complied with the above requirements, they may thence file the petition with the Comelec which is tasked to determine the sufficiency thereof and to verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards. In deciding whether the petition is sufficient, the Comelec shall also determine if the proposition is proper for an initiative, i.e., if it consists of an amendment, not a revision, of the Constitution. Any decision of the electoral body may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice.

I added "that my position upholding the adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 will not ipso

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"Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, and after the determination of its sufficiency, the Comelec shall publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation, and set the date of the plebiscite. The conduct of the plebiscite should not be earlier than sixty (60) days, but not later than ninety (90) days after certification by the Comelec of the sufficiency of the petition. The proposition, if approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite, becomes effective as of the day of the plebiscite.

"From the foregoing, it should be clear that my position upholding the adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 will not ipso facto validate the PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Far from it. Among others, PIRMA must still satisfactorily hurdle the following searching issues:

1. Does the proposed change – the lifting of the term limits of elective officials -- constitute a mere amendment and not a revision of the Constitution?

2. Which registry of voters will be used to verify the signatures in the petition? This question is relevant considering that under RA 8189, the old registry of voters used in the 1995 national elections was voided after the barangay elections on May 12, 1997, while the new list may be used starting only in the elections of May 1998.

3. Does the clamor for the proposed change in the Constitution really emanate from the people who signed the petition for initiative? Or it is the beneficiaries of term extension who are in fact orchestrating such move to advance their own political self-interest?

4. Are the six million signatures genuine and verifiable? Do they really belong to qualified warm bodies comprising at least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein?

"I shall expound on the third question in the next section, The Right Reason. Question Nos. 1 and 2 above, while important, are basically legal in character and can be determined by argumentation and memoranda. However, Question No. 4 involves not only legal issues but gargantuan hurdles of factual determination. This to my mind is the crucible, the litmus test, of a people's petition for initiative. If herein petitioners, led by PIRMA, succeed in proving -- not just alleging -- that six million voters of this country indeed want to amend the Constitution, what power on earth can stop them? Not this Court, not the Comelec, not even the President or Congress.

facto validate the PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Far from it." I stressed that PIRMA must show the following, among others:

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"It took only one million people to stage a peaceful revolution at EDSA, and the very rafters and foundations of the martial law society trembled, quaked and crumbled. On the other hand, PIRMA and its co-petitioners are claiming that they have gathered six million signatures. If, as claimed by many, these six million signatures are fraudulent, then let them be exposed and damned for all history in a signature-verification process conducted under our open system of legal advocacy.

"More than anything else, it is the truth that I, as a member of this Court and as a citizen of this country, would like to seek: Are these six million signatures real? By insisting on an entirely new doctrine of statutory inadequacy, the majority effectively suppressed the quest for that truth.

The Right Reason

"As mentioned, the third question that must be answered, even if the adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 were upheld by the majority is: Does the clamor for the proposed change to the Constitution really emanate from the people who signed the petition for initiative? Or is it the beneficiaries of term extension who are in fact orchestrating such move to advance their own political self-interests? In other words, is PIRMA's exercise of the right to initiative being done in accordance with our Constitution and our laws? Is such attempted exercise legitimate?

"In Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, we described initiative, along with referendum, as the 'ultimate weapon of the people to negate government malfeasance and misfeasance.' In Subic Bay, we specified that 'initiative is entirely the work of the electorate x x x a process of lawmaking by the people themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives.' As ponente of Subic Bay, I stand foursquare on this principle: The right to amend through initiative belongs only to the people – not to the government and its minions. This principle finds clear support from utterances of many constitutional commissioners like those quoted below:

"[Initiative is] a reserve power of the sovereign people, when they are dissatisfied with the National Assembly x x x [and] precisely a fallback position of the people in the event that they are dissatisfied." -- Commissioner Ople

"[Initiative is] a check on a legislative that is not responsive [and resorted to] only if the legislature is not as responsive to the vital and urgent needs of people." -- Commissioner Gascon

(1) The proposed change -- the lifting of term limits of elective officials -- "constitute[s] a mere amendment and not a revision of the Constitution."

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"[Initiative is an] extraordinary power given to the people [and] reserved for the people [which] should not be frivolously resorted to." -- Commissioner Romulo

"Indeed, if the powers-that-be desire to amend the Constitution, or even to revise it, our Charter itself provides them other ways of doing so, namely, by calling a constitutional convention or constituting Congress into a constituent assembly. These are officialdom's weapons. But initiative belongs to the people.

"In the present case, are PIRMA and its co-petitioners legitimate people's organizations or are they merely fronts for incumbents who want to extend their terms? This is a factual question which, unfortunately, cannot be judicially answered anymore, because the Supreme Court majority ruled that the law that implements it, RA 6735, is inadequate or insufficient insofar as initiatives to the Constitutions are concerned. With such ruling, the majority effectively abrogated a constitutional right of our people. That is why in my Separate Opinion in Santiago, I exclaimed that such precipitate action "is equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain." I firmly maintain that to defeat PIRMA's effort, there is no need to "burn" the constitutional right to initiative. If PIRMA's exercise is not "legitimate," it can be exposed as such in the ways I have discussed – short of abrogating the right itself. On the other hand, if PIRMA's position is proven to be legitimate – if it hurdles the four issues I outlined earlier – by all means, we should allow and encourage it. But the majority's theory of statutory inadequacy has pre-empted – unnecessarily and invalidly, in my view – any judicial determination of such legitimacy or illegitimacy. It has silenced the quest for truth into the interstices of the PIRMA petition.

The Right Time

"The Constitution itself sets a time limitation on when changes thereto may be proposed. Section 2 of Article XVII precludes amendments "within five years following [its] ratification x x x nor oftener than once every five years thereafter." Since its ratification, the 1987 Constitution has never been amended. Hence, the five-year prohibition is now inoperative and amendments may theoretically be proposed at any time.

"Be that as it may, I believe – given the present circumstances – that there is no more time to lift term limits to enable incumbents to seek reelection in the May 11, 1998 polls. Between today and the next national

(2) The "six million signatures are genuine and verifiable"; and they "really belong to qualified warm bodies comprising at

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elections, less than eight (8) months remain. Santiago, where the single issue of the sufficiency of RA 6735 was resolved, took this Court three (3) months, and another two (2) months to decide the motion for reconsideration. The instant case, where the same issue is also raised by the petitioners, took two months, not counting a possible motion for reconsideration. These time spans could not be abbreviated any further, because due process requires that all parties be given sufficient time to file their pleadings.

"Thus, even if the Court were to rule now in favor of the adequacy of RA 6735 – as I believe it should – and allow the Comelec to act on the PIRMA petition, such eight-month period will not be enough to tackle the four weighty issues I mentioned earlier, considering that two of them involve tedious factual questions. The Comelec's decision on any of these issues can still be elevated to this Court for review, and reconsiderations on our decisions on each of those issues may again be sought.

"Comelec's herculean task alone of verifying each of the six million signatures is enormously time-consuming, considering that any person may question the authenticity of each and every signature, initially before the election registrar, then before the Comelec on appeal and finally, before this Court in a separate proceeding. Moreover, the plebiscite itself – assuming such stage can be reached – may be scheduled only after sixty (60) but not more than ninety (90) days, from the time the Comelec and this Court, on appeal, finally declare the petition to be sufficient.

"Meanwhile, under Comelec Resolution 2946, political parties, groups organizations or coalitions may start selecting their official candidates for President, Vice President and Senators on November 27, 1997; the period for filing certificates of candidacy is from January 11 to February 9, 1998; the election period and campaign for national officials start on February 10, 1998, while the campaign period for other elective officials, on March 17, 1998. This means, by the time PIRMA's proposition is ready – if ever – for submission directly to the voters at large, it will have been overcome by the elections. Time will simply run out on PIRMA, if the intention is to lift term limits in time for the 1998 elections.

"That term limits may no longer be lifted prior to the 1998 elections via a people's initiative does not detract one whit from (1) my firm conviction that RA 6735 is sufficient and adequate to implement this constitutional right and, more important, (2) my faith in the power of the people to initiate changes in local and national laws and the Constitution. In fact, I think the Court can deliberate on these two items even more serenely and wisely now that the debates will be free from the din and distraction of the 1998 elections. After all, jurisprudence is not merely for the here and now but, more so, for the hereafter and the morrow. Let me therefore stress, by way of epilogue, my unbending credo in favor of our people's right to initiative.

least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein."

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Epilogue

"I believe in democracy – in our people's natural right to determine our own destiny.

"I believe in the process of initiative as a democratic method of enabling our people to express their will and chart their history. Initiative is an alternative to bloody revolution, internal chaos and civil strife. It is an inherent right of the people – as basic as the right to elect, the right to self-determination and the right to individual liberties. I believe that Filipinos have the ability and the capacity to rise above themselves, to use this right of initiative wisely and maturely, and to choose what is best for themselves and their posterity.

"Such beliefs, however, should not be equated with a desire to perpetuate a particular official or group of officials in power. Far from it. Such perpetuation is anathema to democracy. My firm conviction that there is an adequate law implementing the constitutional right of initiative does not ipso facto result in the victory of the PIRMA petition or of any proposed constitutional change. There are, after all, sufficient safeguards to guarantee the proper use of such constitutional right and to forestall its misuse and abuse. First, initiative cannot be used to revise the Constitution, only to amend it. Second, the petitioners' signatures must be validated against an existing list of voters and/or voters' identification cards. Third, initiative is a reverse power of and by the people, not of incumbent officials and their machinators. Fourth and most important of all, the signatures must be verified as real and genuine; not concocted, fictitious or fabricated. The only legal way to do this is to enable the Commission on Elections to conduct a nationwide verification process as mandated by the Constitution and the law. Such verification, it bears stressing, is subject to review by this Court.

"There were, by the most generous estimate, only a million people who gathered at EDSA in 1986, and yet they changed the history of our country. PIRMA claims six times that number, not just from the National Capital Region but from all over the country. Is this claim through the invention of its novel theory of statutory insufficiency, the Court's majority has stifled the only legal method of determining whether PIRMA is real or not, whether there is indeed a popular clamor to lift term limits of elected officials, and whether six million voters want to initiate amendments to their most basic law. In suppressing a judicial answer to such questions, the Court may have unwittingly yielded to PIRMA the benefit of the legal presumption of legality and regularity. In its misplaced zeal to exterminate the rats, it burned down the whole house. It unceremoniously divested the people of a basic constitutional right.

In both Opinions, I concluded that we must implement "the right thing [initiative] in the right way at the right time and for the right reason."

In the present case, I steadfastly stand by my foregoing Opinions in Santiago and PIRMA. Tested against them, the present Petition of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado must be DISMISSED. Unfortunately, the right thing is being rushed in the wrong way and for the wrong reasons. Let me explain.

No Grave Abuse

of Discretion by Comelec

As in PIRMA, I find no grave abuse of discretion in Comelec's dismissal of the Lambino Petition. After all, the Commission merely followed the holding in Santiago permanently

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"In the ultimate, the mission of the judiciary is to discover truth and to make it prevail. This mission is undertaken not only to resolve the vagaries of present events but also to build the pathways of tomorrow. The sum total of the entire process of adversarial litigation is the verity of facts and the application of law thereto. By the majority cop-out in this mission of discovery, our country and our people have been deprived not only of a basic constitutional right, as earlier noted, but also of the judicial opportunity to verify the truth."

enjoining the poll body "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system."

Indeed, the Comelec did not violate the Constitution, the laws or any jurisprudence.⁴ Neither can whim, caprice, arbitrariness or personal bias be attributed to the Commission.⁵ Quite the contrary, it prudently followed this Court's jurisprudence in Santiago and PIRMA. Even assuming arguendo that Comelec erred in ruling on a very difficult and unsettled question of law, this Court still cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to the poll body with respect to that action.⁶

The present Lambino Petition is in exactly the same situation as that of PIRMA in 1997. The differences pointed out by Justice Reynato S. Puno are, with due respect, superficial. It is argued that, unlike the present Lambino Petition, PIRMA did not contain verified signatures. These are distinctions that do not make a difference. Precisely, Justice Puno is urging a remand, because the verification issue is "contentious" and remains unproven by petitioners. Clearly, both the PIRMA and the Lambino Petitions contain unverified signatures. Therefore, they both deserve the same treatment: DISMISSAL.

Besides, the only reason given in the unanimous Resolution on PIRMA v. Comelec was that the Commission had "only complied" with this Court's Decision in Santiago, the same reason given by Comelec in this case. The Separate Opinions in PIRMA gave no other reason. No one argued, even remotely, that the PIRMA Petition should have been dismissed because the signatures were unverified.

To stress, I adhere to my Opinion in PIRMA that, "[b]eing a constitutional requirement, the number of signatures becomes a condition precedent to the filing of the petition, and is jurisdictional.⁷ Without those signatures, the Comelec shall motu proprio reject the petition."

So, until and unless Santiago is revisited and changed by this Court or the legal moorings of the exercise of the right are substantially changed, the Comelec cannot be faulted for acting in accord with this Court's pronouncements. Respondent Commission has no discretion, under any guise, to refuse enforcement of any final decision of this Court.⁸ The refusal of the poll body to act on the Lambino Petition was its only recourse. Any other mode of action would appear not only presumptuous, but also contemptuous. It would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have surely been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of the supremacy of this Court as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.

Even assuming further that this Court rules, as I believe it should (for the reasons given in my Opinions in Santiago and PIRMA), that Republic Act 6735 is indeed sufficient to implement an initiative to amend the Constitution, still, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Comelec for merely following prevailing jurisprudence extant at the time it rendered its ruling in question.

Only Amendments,

Not Revisions

I reiterate that only amendments, not revisions, may be the proper subject of an initiative to change the Constitution. This principle is crystal clear from even a layperson's reading of the basic law.⁹

I submit that changing the system of government from presidential to parliamentary and the form of the legislature from bicameral to unicameral contemplates an overhaul of the structure of government. The ponencia has amply demonstrated that the merger of the legislative and the executive branches under a unicameral-parliamentary system, "[b]y any legal test and under any jurisdiction," will "radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the Constitution." Indeed, the proposed changes have an overall implication on the entire Constitution; they effectively rewrite its most important and basic provisions. The prolixity and complexity of the changes cannot be categorized, even by semantic generosity, as "amendments."

In addition, may I say that of the three modes of changing the Constitution, revisions (or amendments) may be proposed only through the first two: by Congress or by a constitutional convention. Under the third mode -- people's initiative -- only amendments are allowed. Many of the justices' Opinions have cited the historical, philosophical and jurisprudential bases of their respective positions. I will not add to the woes of the reader by reiterating them here.

Suffice it to say that, to me, the practical test to differentiate an amendment from a revision is found in the Constitution itself: a revision may be done only when the proposed change can be drafted, defined, articulated, discussed and agreed upon after a mature and democratic debate in a deliberative body like Congress or a Convention. The changes proposed must necessarily be scrutinized, as their adoption or non-adoption must result from an informed judgment.

Indeed, the constitutional bodies that drafted the 1935, the 1972 and the 1987 Constitutions had to spend many months of purposeful discussions, democratic debates and rounds of voting before they could agree on the wordings covering the philosophy, the underlying principles, and the structure of government of our Republic.

Verily, even bills creating or changing the administrative structure of local governments take several weeks or even months of drafting, reading, and debating before Congress can approve them. How much more when it comes to constitutional changes?

A change in the form of government of our country from presidential-bicameral to parliamentary-unicameral is monumental. Even the initiative proponents admit this fact. So, why should a revision be rammed down our people's throats without the benefit of intelligent discussion in a deliberative assembly?

Added to the constitutional mandate barring revisions is the provision of RA 6735 expressly prohibiting petitions for initiative from "embracing more than one subject matter."¹⁰ The present initiative covers at least two subjects: (1) the shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government; and (2) the change from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.¹¹ Thus, even under Republic Act 6735 -- the law that Justice Puno and I hold to be sufficient and valid -- the Lambino Petition deserves dismissal.

12 Percent and 3 Percent Thresholds
Not Proven by Petitioners

The litmus test of a people's petition for initiative is its ability to muster the constitutional requirement that it be supported by at least 12 percent of the registered voters nationwide, of which at least 3 percent of the registered voters in every legislative district must be represented. As pointed out by Intervenors One Voice, Inc., et al., however, records show that there was a failure to meet the minimum percentages required.¹²

Even Justice Puno concedes that the 12 percent and 3 percent constitutional requirements involve "contentious facts," which have not been proven by the Lambino Petition. Thus, he is urging a remand to the Comelec.

But a remand is both imprudent and futile. It is imprudent because the Constitution itself mandates the said requisites of an initiative petition. In other words, a petition that does not show the required percentages is fatally defective and must be dismissed, as the Delfin Petition was, in Santiago.

Furthermore, as the ponencia had discussed extensively, the present Petition is void and unconstitutional. It points out that the Petition dismally fails to comply with the constitutional requirement that an initiative must be directly proposed by the people. Specifically, the ponencia has amply established that petitioners were unable to show that the Lambino Petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed changes.

So, too, a remand is futile. Even if the required percentages are proven before the Commission, the Petition must still be dismissed for proposing a revision, not an amendment, in gross violation of the Constitution. At the very least, it proposes more than one subject, in violation of Republic Act 6735.

Summation

Petitioners plead with this Court to hear the voice of the people because, in the words of Justice Puno who supports them, the "people's voice is sovereign in a democracy."

I, too, believe in heeding the people's voice. I reiterate my Separate Opinion in PIRMA that "initiative is a democratic method of enabling our people to express their will and chart their history. x x x. I believe that Filipinos have the ability and the capacity to rise above themselves, to use this right of initiative wisely and maturely, and to choose what is best for themselves and their posterity."

This belief will not, however, automatically and blindly result in an initiative to change the Constitution, because the present Petition violates the following:

· The Constitution (specifically Article XVII, which allows only amendments, not revisions, and requires definite percentages of verified signatures)

· The law (specifically, Republic Act 6735, which prohibits petitions containing more than one subject)

· Jurisprudence (specifically, PIRMA v. Comelec, which dismissed the Petition then under consideration on the ground that, by following the Santiago ruling, the Comelec had not gravely abused its discretion).

I submit further that a remand of the Lambino Petition is both imprudent and futile. More tellingly, it is a cop-out, a hand-washing already discredited 2000 years ago. Instead of finger-pointing, I believe we must confront the issues head on, because the people expect no less from this august and venerable institution of supreme justice.

Epilogue

At bottom, the issue in this case is simply the Rule of Law.¹³ Initiative, like referendum and recall, is a treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. It was born out of our world-admired and often-imitated People Power, but its misuse and abuse must be resolutely rejected. Democracy must be cherished, but mob rule vanquished.

The Constitution is a sacred social compact, forged between the government and the people, between each individual and the rest of the citizenry. Through it, the people have solemnly expressed their will that all of them shall be governed by laws, and their rights limited by agreed-upon covenants to promote the common good. If we are to uphold the Rule of Law and reject the rule of the mob, we must faithfully abide by the processes the Constitution has ordained in order to bring about a peaceful, just and humane society. Assuming arguendo that six million people allegedly gave their assent to the proposed changes in the Constitution, they are nevertheless still bound by the social covenant -- the present Constitution -- which was ratified by a far greater majority almost twenty years ago.¹⁴ I do not denigrate the majesty of the sovereign will; rather, I elevate our society to the loftiest perch, because our government must remain as one of laws and not of men.

Upon assuming office, each of the justices of the Supreme Court took a solemn oath to uphold the Constitution. Being the protectors of the fundamental law as the highest expression of the sovereign will, they must subject to the strictest scrutiny any attempt to change it, lest it be trivialized and degraded by the assaults of the mob and of ill-conceived designs. The Court must single-mindedly defend the Constitution from bogus efforts falsely attributed to the sovereign people.

The judiciary may be the weakest branch of government. Nonetheless, when ranged against incessant voices from the more powerful branches of government, it should never cower in submission. On the other hand, I daresay that the same weakness of the Court becomes its strength when it speaks independently through decisions that rightfully uphold the supremacy of the Constitution and the Rule of Law. The strength of the judiciary lies not in its lack of brute power, but in its moral courage to perform its constitutional duty at all times against all odds. Its might is in its being right.¹⁵

During the past weeks, media outfits have been ablaze with reports and innuendoes about alleged carrots offered and sticks drawn by those interested in the outcome of this case.¹⁶ There being no judicial proof of these allegations, I shall not comment on them for the nonce, except to quote the Good Book, which says, "There is nothing hidden that will not be revealed, and nothing secret that will not be known and come to light."¹⁷

Verily, the Supreme Court is now on the crossroads of history. By its decision, the Court and each of its members shall be judged by posterity. Ten years, fifty years, a hundred years -- or even a thousand years -- from now, what the Court did here, and how each justice opined and voted, will still be talked about, either in shame or in pride. Indeed, the hand-washing of Pontius Pilate, the abomination of Dred Scott, and the loathing of Javellana still linger and haunt to this day.

Let not this case fall into the same damnation. Rather, let this Court be known throughout the nation and the world for its independence, integrity, industry and intelligence.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G.R. No. 174153             October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners, vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., Respondents.

G.R. No. 174299             October 25, 2006

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, Petitioners,vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, JR. and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

SEPARATE OPINION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

I agree with the opinion of our esteemed colleague, Justice Reynato Puno, that the Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC¹ is not a binding precedent. However, it is my position that even if Santiago were reversed and Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. 6735) be held as sufficient law for the purpose of people's initiative to amend the Constitution, the petition for initiative in this case must nonetheless be dismissed.

There is absolutely no showing here that petitioners complied with R.A. 6735, even as they blindly invoke the said law to justify their alleged people's initiative. Section 5(b) of R.A. 6735 requires that "[a] petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein." On the other hand, Section 5(c)² of the same law requires that the petition should state, among others, the proposition³ or the "contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed." If we were to apply Section 5(c) to an initiative to amend the Constitution, as petitioners submit, the petition for initiative signed by the required number of voters should incorporate therein a text of the proposed changes to the Constitution. However, such requirement was not followed in the case at bar.

During the oral arguments, petitioner Lambino admitted that they printed a mere 100,000 copies of the text of the proposed changes to the Constitution. According to him, these were subsequently distributed to their agents all over the country, for attachment to the sheets of paper on which the signatures were to be affixed. Upon being asked, however, if he in fact knew whether the text was actually attached to the signature sheets which were distributed for signing, he said that he merely assumed that they were. In other words, he could not tell the Court for certain whether their representatives complied with this requirement.

The petition filed with the COMELEC, as well as that which was shown to this Court, indubitably establish that the full text of the proposed changes was not attached to the signature sheets. All that the signature sheets contained was the general proposition and abstract, which falls short of the full text requirement of R.A. 6735.

The necessity of setting forth the text of the proposed constitutional changes in the petition for initiative to be signed by the people cannot be seriously disputed. To begin with, Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution unequivocally states that "[a]mendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein." Evidently, for the people to propose amendments to the Constitution, they must, in the first instance, know exactly what they are proposing. It is not enough that they merely possess a general idea of the proposed changes, as the Constitution speaks of a "direct" proposal by the people.

Although the framers of the Constitution left the matter of implementing the constitutional right of initiative to Congress, it might be noted that they themselves reasonably assumed that the draft of the proposed constitutional amendments would be shown to the people during the process of signature gathering. Thus –

MR. RODRIGO. Section 2 of the complete committee report provides: "upon petition of at least 10 percent of the registered voters." How will we determine that 10 percent has been achieved? How will the voters manifest their desire, is it by signature?

MR. SUAREZ. Yes, by signatures.

MR. RODRIGO. Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?

MR. SUAREZ. That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?

MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.⁴

It may thus be logically assumed that even without Section 5(c) of R.A. 6735, the full text of the proposed changes must necessarily be stated in or attached to the initiative petition. The signatories to the petition must be given an opportunity to fully comprehend the meaning and effect of the proposed changes to enable them to make a free, intelligent and well-informed choice on the matter.

Needless to say, the requirement of setting forth the complete text of the proposed changes in the petition for initiative is a safeguard against fraud and deception. If the whole text of the proposed changes is contained in or attached to the petition, intercalations and riders may be duly avoided. Only then can we be assured that the proposed changes are truly of the people and that the signatories have been fully apprised of its implications.

If a statutory provision is essential to guard against fraud, corruption or deception in the initiative and referendum process, such provision must be viewed as an indispensable requirement and failure to substantially comply therewith is fatal.⁵ The failure of petitioners in this case to comply with the full text requirement resultantly rendered their petition for initiative fatally defective.

The petition for initiative is likewise irretrievably infirm because it violates the one subject rule under Section 10(a) of R.A. 6735:

SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures.— The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition:

(a) No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x

The one subject rule, as relating to an initiative to amend the Constitution, has the same object and purpose as the one subject-one bill rule embodied in Article VI, Section 26(1)⁶ of the Constitution.⁷ To elaborate, the one subject-one bill rule was designed to do away with the practice of inserting two or more unrelated provisions in one bill, so that those favoring one provision would be compelled to adopt the others. By this process of log-rolling, the adoption of both provisions could be accomplished and ensured, when neither, if standing alone, could succeed on its own merits.

As applied to the initiative process, the one subject rule is essentially designed to prevent surprise and fraud on the electorate. It is meant to safeguard the integrity of the initiative process by ensuring that no unrelated riders are concealed within the terms of the proposed amendment. This in turn guarantees that the signatories are fully aware of the nature, scope and purpose of the proposed amendment.

Petitioners insist that the proposed changes embodied in their petition for initiative relate only to one subject matter, that is – the shift from presidential to a parliamentary system of government. According to petitioners, all of the other proposed changes are merely incidental to this main proposal and are reasonably germane and necessary thereto.⁸An examination of the text of the proposed changes reveals, however, that this is not the case.

The proposed changes to the Constitution cover other subjects that are beyond the main proposal espoused by the petitioners. Apart from a shift from the presidential to a parliamentary form of government, the proposed changes include the abolition of one House of Congress,⁹ and the convening of a constituent assembly to propose additional amendments to the Constitution.¹⁰ Also included within its terms is an omnibus declaration that those constitutional provisions under Articles VI and VII, which are inconsistent with the unicameral-parliamentary form of government, shall be deemed amended to conform thereto.

It is not difficult to see that while the proposed changes appear to relate only to a shift in the form of government, it actually seeks to affect other subjects that are not reasonably germane to the constitutional alteration that is purportedly sought. For one, a shift to a parliamentary system of government does not necessarily result in the adoption of a unicameral legislature. A parliamentary system can exist in many different "hybrid" forms of government, which may or may not embrace unicameralism.¹¹ In other words, the shift from presidential to parliamentary structure and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature is neither the cause nor effect of the other.

I also fail to see the relation of convening a constituent assembly with the proposed change in our system of government. As a subject matter, the convening of a constituent assembly to amend the Constitution presents a range of issues that is far removed from the subject of a shift in government. Besides, the constituent assembly is supposed to convene and propose amendments to the Constitution after the proposed change in the system of government has already taken place. This only goes to show that the convening of the constituent assembly is not necessary to effectuate a change to a parliamentary system of government.

The omnibus statement that all provisions under Articles VI and VII which are inconsistent with a unicameral-parliamentary system of government shall be deemed amended is equally bothersome. The statement does not specify what these inconsistencies and amendments may be, such that everyone is left to guess the provisions that could eventually be affected by the proposed changes. The subject and scope of these automatic amendments cannot even be spelled out with certainty. There is thus no reasonable measure of its impact on the other constitutional provisions.

The foregoing proposed changes cannot be the subject of a people's initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Taken together, the proposed changes indicate that the intendment is not simply to effect substantial amendments to the Constitution, but a revision thereof. The distinction between an amendment and revision was explained by Dean Vicente G. Sinco, as follows:

"Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the entire document. It may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.

The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect."¹²

The foregoing traditional exposition of the difference between amendment and revision has indeed guided us throughout our constitutional history. However, the distinction between the two terms is not, to my mind, as significant in the context of our past constitutions, as it should be now under the 1987 Constitution. The reason for this is apparent. Under our past constitutions, it was Congress alone, acting either as a constituent assembly or by calling out a constitutional convention, that exercised authority to either amend or revise the Constitution through the procedures therein described. Although the distinction between the two terms was theoretically recognized under both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the need to highlight the difference was not as material because it was only Congress that could effect constitutional changes by choosing between the two modalities.

However, it is different now under the 1987 Constitution. Apart from providing for the two modes of either Congress constituting itself as a constituent assembly or calling out for a constitutional convention, a third mode was introduced for proposing changes to the Constitution. This mode refers to the people's right to propose amendments to the fundamental law through the filing of a petition for initiative.

Otherwise stated, our experience of what constitutes amendment or revision under the past constitutions is not determinative of what the two terms mean now, as related to the exercise of the right to propose either amendments or revision. The changes introduced to both the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 could have indeed been deemed an amendment or revision, but the authority for effecting either would never have been questioned since the same belonged solely to Congress. In contrast, the 1987 Constitution clearly limits the right of the people to directly propose constitutional changes to amendments only. We must consequently not be swayed by examples of constitutional changes effected prior to the present fundamental law, in determining whether such changes are revisory or amendatory in nature.

In this regard, it should be noted that the distinction laid down by Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. Executive Secretary¹³ related to the procedure to be followed in ratifying a completely new charter proposed by a constitutional convention. The authority or right of the constitutional convention itself to effect such a revision was not put in issue in that case. As far as determining what constitutes "amendments" for the purpose of a people's initiative, therefore, we have neither relevant precedent nor prior experience. We must thus confine ourselves to Dean Sinco's basic articulation of the two terms.

It is clear from Dean Sinco's explanation that a revision may either be of the whole or only part of the Constitution. The part need not be a substantial part as a change may qualify as a revision even if it only involves some of the important provisions. For as long as the intention and plan to be carried out contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the Constitution "to determine which should be altered or suppressed, or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one," the proposed change may be deemed a revision and not merely an amendment.

Thus, it is not by the sheer number alone of the proposed changes that the same may be considered as either an amendment or revision. In so determining, another overriding factor is the "original intention and plan authorized to be carried out" by the proposed changes. If the same relates to a re-examination of the entire document to see which provisions remain relevant or if it has far-reaching effects on the entire document, then the same constitutes a revision and not a mere amendment of the Constitution.

From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that a combination of the quantitative and qualitative test is necessary in assessing what may be considered as an amendment or revision. It is not enough that we focus simply on the physical scope of the proposed changes, but also consider what it means in relation to the entire document. No clear demarcation line can be drawn to distinguish the two terms and each circumstance must be judged on the basis of its own peculiar conditions. The determination lies in assessing the impact that the proposed changes may have on the entire instrument, and not simply on an arithmetical appraisal of the specific provisions which it seeks to affect.

In McFadden v. Jordan,¹⁴ the California Supreme Court laid down the groundwork for the combination of quantitative and qualitative assessment of proposed constitutional changes, in order to determine whether the same is revisory or merely amendatory. In that case, the McFadden court found the proposed changes extensive since at least 15 of the 25 articles contained in the California Constitution would either be repealed in their entirety or substantially altered, and four new topics would be introduced. However, it went on to consider the qualitative effects that the proposed initiative measure would have on California's basic plan of government. It observed that the proposal would alter the checks and balances inherent in such plan, by delegating far-reaching and mixed powers to an independent commission created under the proposed measure. Consequently, the proposal in McFadden was not only deemed as broad and numerous in physical scope, but was also held as having a substantive effect on the fundamental governmental plan of the State of California.

The dual aspect of the amendment/revision analysis was reiterated by the California Supreme Court in Raven v. Deukmeijan.¹⁵ Proposition 115, as the initiative in that case was called, would vest in the United States Supreme Court all judicial interpretative powers of the California courts over fundamental criminal defense rights in that state. It was observed that although quantitatively, the proposition did "not seem so extensive as to change directly the substantial entirety of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions," the same, nonetheless, "would substantially alter the substance and integrity of the state Constitution as a document of independent force and effect." Quoting Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization,¹⁶ the Raven court said:

". . . apart from a measure effecting widespread deletions, additions and amendments involving many constitutional articles, 'even a relatively simple enactment may accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision also…[A]n enactment which purported to vest all judicial power in the Legislature would amount to a revision without regard either to the length or complexity of the measure or the number of existing articles or sections affected by such change.'" (Underscoring supplied and citations omitted)

Thus, in resolving the amendment/revision issue, the California Court examines both the quantitative and qualitative effects of a proposed measure on its constitutional scheme. Substantial changes in either respect could amount to a revision.¹⁷

I am persuaded that we can approach the present issue in the same manner. The experience of the courts in California is not far removed from the standards expounded on by Dean Sinco when he set out to differentiate between amendment and revision. It is actually consistent, not only with our traditional concept of the two terms, but also with the mindset of our constitutional framers when they referred to the disquisition of Justice Antonio in Javellana.¹⁸ We must thus consider whether the proposed changes in this case affect our Constitution in both its substantial physical entirety and in its basic plan of government.

The question posed is: do the proposed changes, regardless of whether these are simple or substantial, amount to a revision as to be excluded from the people's right to directly propose amendments to the fundamental law?

As indicated earlier, we may apply the quantitative/qualitative test in determining the nature of the proposed changes. These tests are consistent with Dean Sinco's traditional concept of amendment and revision when he explains that, quantitatively, revision "may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater part of it, or perhaps only some of its provisions." In any case, he continues, "the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out." Unmistakably, the latter statement refers to the qualitative effect of the proposed changes.

It may thus be conceded that, quantitatively, the changes espoused by the proponents in this case will affect only two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987 Constitution, namely, Article VI (Legislative Department) and Article VII (Executive Department), as well as provisions that will ensure the smooth transition from a presidential-bicameral system to a parliamentary-unicameral structure of government. The quantitative effect of the proposed changes is neither broad nor extensive and will not affect the substantial entirety of the 1987 Constitution.

However, it is my opinion that the proposed changes will have serious qualitative consequences on the Constitution. The initiative petition, if successful, will undoubtedly alter, not only our basic governmental plan, but also redefine our rights as citizens in relation to government. The proposed changes will set into motion a ripple effect that will strike at the very foundation of our basic constitutional plan. It is therefore an impermissible constitutional revision that may not be effected through a people's initiative.

Petitioners' main proposal pertains to the shifting of our form of government from the presidential to the parliamentary system. An examination of their proposal reveals that there will be a fusion of the executive and legislative departments into one parliament that will be elected on the basis of proportional representation. No term limits are set for the members of parliament except for those elected under the party-list system whose terms and number shall be provided by law. There will be a President who shall be the head of state, but the head of government is the Prime Minister. The latter and his cabinet shall be elected from among the members of parliament and shall be responsible to parliament for the program of government.

The preceding proposal indicates that, under the proposed system, the executive and legislature shall be one and the same, such that parliament will be the paramount governing institution. What this implies is that there will be no separation between the law-making and enforcement powers of the state, that are traditionally delineated between the executive and legislature in a presidential form of government. Necessarily, the checks and balances inherent in the fundamental plan of our U.S.-style presidential system will be eliminated. The workings of government shall instead be controlled by the internal political dynamics prevailing in the parliament.

Our present governmental system is built on the separation of powers among the three branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to the application of laws. This separation is intended to prevent a concentration of authority in one person or group that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of our republican institutions. In the words of Justice Laurel, the doctrine of separation of powers is intended to secure action, to forestall overaction, to prevent despotism and obtain efficiency.¹⁹

In the proposed parliamentary system, there is an obvious lack of formal institutional checks on the legislative and executive powers of the state, since both the Prime Minister and the members of his cabinet are drawn from parliament. There are no effective limits to what the Prime Minister and parliament can do, except the will of the parliamentary majority. This goes against the central principle of our present constitutional scheme that distributes the powers of government and provides for counteraction among the three branches. Although both the presidential and parliamentary systems are theoretically consistent with constitutional democracy, the underlying tenets and resulting governmental framework are nonetheless radically different.

Consequently, the shift from presidential to parliamentary form of government cannot be regarded as anything but a drastic change. It will require a total overhaul of our governmental structure and involve a re-orientation in the cardinal doctrines that govern our constitutional set-up. As explained by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure.²⁰ It cannot, by any standard, be deemed as a mere constitutional amendment.

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should be altered.²¹ (Underscoring supplied)

The inclusion of a proposal to convene a constituent assembly likewise shows the intention of the proponents to effect even more far-reaching changes in our fundamental law. If the original intent were to simply shift the form of government to the parliamentary system, then there would have been no need for the calling out of a constituent assembly to propose further amendments to the Constitution. It should be noted that, once convened, a constituent assembly can do away and replace any constitutional provision which may not even have a bearing on the shift to a parliamentary system of government. The inclusion of such a proposal reveals the proponents' plan to consider all provisions of the constitution, either to determine which of its provisions should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.

Consequently, it is not true that only Articles VI and VII are covered by the alleged people's initiative. The proposal to convene a constituent assembly, which by its terms is mandatory, will practically jeopardize the future of the entire Constitution and place it on shaky grounds. The plan of the proponents, as reflected in their proposed changes, goes beyond the shifting of government from the presidential to the parliamentary system. Indeed, it could even extend to the "fundamental nature of our state as a democratic and republican state."

To say that the proposed changes will affect only the constitution of government is therefore a fallacy. To repeat, the combined effect of the proposed changes to Articles VI and VII and those pertaining to the Transitory Provisions under Article XVIII indubitably establish the intent and plan of the proponents to possibly affect even the constitutions of liberty and sovereignty. Indeed, no valid reason exists for authorizing further amendments or revisions to the Constitution if the intention of the proposed changes is truly what it purports to be.

There is no question here that only amendments to the Constitution may be undertaken through a people's initiative and not a revision, as textually reflected in the Constitution itself. This conclusion is inevitable especially from a comparative examination of Section 2 in relation to Sections 1 and 4 of Article XVII, which state:

SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

(2) A constitutional convention.

SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

x x x x

SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission of Elections of the sufficiency of the petition. (Underscoring supplied)

It is clear that the right of the people to directly propose changes to the Constitution is limited to amendments and does not include a revision thereof. Otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to provide for Section 2 to distinguish its scope from the rights vested in Congress under Section 1. The latter lucidly states that Congress may propose both amendments and a revision of the Constitution by either convening a constituent assembly or calling for a constitutional convention. Section 2, on the other hand, textually commits to the people the right to propose only amendments by direct action.

To hold, therefore, that Section 2 allows substantial amendments amounting to revision obliterates the clear distinction in scope between Sections 1 and 2. The intention, as may be seen from a cursory perusal of the above provisions, is to provide differing fields of application for the three modes of effecting changes to the Constitution. We need not even delve into the intent of the constitutional framers to see that the distinction in scope is definitely marked. We should thus apply these provisions with a discerning regard for this distinction. Again, McFadden²² is instructive:

". . . The differentiation required is not merely between two words; more accurately it is between two procedures and between their respective fields of application. Each procedure, if we follow elementary principles of statutory construction, must be understood to have a substantial field of application, not to be x x x a mere alternative procedure in the same field. Each of the two words, then, must be understood to denote, respectively, not only a procedure but also a field of application appropriate to its procedure. The people of this state have spoken; they made it clear when they adopted article XVIII and made amendment relatively simple but provided the formidable bulwark of a constitutional convention as a protection against improvident or hasty (or any other) revision, that they understood that there was a real difference between amendment and revision. We find nothing whatsoever in the language of the initiative amendment of 1911 (art. IV, § 1) to effect a breaking down of that difference. On the contrary, the distinction appears to be x x x scrupulously preserved by the express declaration in the amendment x x x that the power to propose and vote on "amendments to the Constitution" is reserved directly to the people in initiative proceedings, while leaving unmentioned the power and the procedure relative to constitutional revision, which revisional power and procedure, it will be remembered, had already been specifically treated in section 2 of article XVIII. Intervenors' contention--that any change less than a total one is but amendatory--would reduce to the rubble of absurdity the bulwark so carefully erected and preserved. Each situation involving the question of amendment, as contrasted with revision, of the Constitution must, we think, be resolved upon its own facts."

Thus, our people too have spoken when they overwhelmingly ratified the 1987 Constitution, with the provisions on amendments and revisions under Article XVII. The voice and will of our people cannot be any clearer when they limited people's initiative to mere amendments of the fundamental law and excluded revisions in its scope. In this regard, the task of the Court is to give effect to the people's voice, as expressed unequivocally through the Constitution.

Article XVII on amendments and revisions is called a "constitution of sovereignty" because it defines the constitutional meaning of "sovereignty of the people." It is through these provisions that the sovereign people have allowed the expression of their sovereign will and have canalized their powers which would otherwise be plenary. By approving these provisions, the sovereign people have decided to limit themselves and future generations in the exercise of their sovereign power.²³ They are thus bound by the constitution and are powerless, whatever their numbers, to change or thwart its mandates, except through the means prescribed by the Constitution itself.²⁴

It is thus misplaced to argue that the people may propose revisions to the Constitution through people's initiative because their representatives, whose power is merely delegated, may do so. While Section 1 of Article XVII may be considered as a provision delegating the sovereign powers of amendment and revision to Congress, Section 2, in contrast, is a self-limitation on that sovereign power. In the words of Cooley:

x x x Although by their constitutions the people have delegated the exercise of sovereign powers to the several departments, they have not thereby divested themselves of the sovereignty. They retain in their own hands, so far as they have thought it needful to do so, a power to control the governments they create, and the three departments are responsible to and subject to be ordered, directed, changed or abolished by them. But this control and direction must be exercised in the legitimate mode previously agreed upon. The voice of the people, acting in their sovereign capacity, can be of legal force only when expressed at the times and under the conditions which they themselves have prescribed and pointed out by the Constitution, or which, consistently with the Constitution, have been prescribed and pointed out for them by statute; and if by any portion of the people, however large, an attempt should be made to interfere with the regular working of the agencies of government at any other time or in any other mode than as allowed by existing law, either constitutional or statutory, it would be revolutionary in character, and must be resisted and repressed by the officers who, for the time being, represent legitimate government.²⁵ (Underscoring supplied)

Consequently, there is here no case of "the spring rising above its source." Nor is it one where the people's sovereign power has been relegated to a lesser plane than that of Congress. In choosing to exercise self-limitation, there is no absence or lack of even a fraction of the sovereign power of the people since self-limitation itself is an expression of that sovereign power. The people have chosen to delegate and limit their sovereign power by virtue of the Constitution and are bound by the parameters that they themselves have ordained. Otherwise, if the people choose to defy their self-imposed constitutional restraints, we will be faced with a revolutionary situation.²⁶

It has repeatedly been emphasized that ours is a democratic and republican state.²⁷ Even as we affirm, however, that aspect of direct democracy, we should not forget that, first and foremost, we are a constitutional democracy. To uphold direct democracy at the expense of the fundamental law is to sanction, not a constitutional, but an extra-constitutional recourse. This is clearly beyond the powers of the Court who, by sovereign mandate, is the guardian and keeper of the Constitution.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G.R. NO. 174153

RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ENRICO B. AUMENTADO TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), petitioners-intervenors,
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, petitioners-intervenors,
SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner-intervenor,
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) AND VICTORINO F. BALAIS,petitioners-intervenors,
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE AND CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., oppositors-intervenors,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., oppositor-intervenor,
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, oppositor-intervenor,
BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FROUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS,LEONARDO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, AND DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, oppositors-intervenors,
LORETA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, oppositors-intervenors,
LUWALHATI ANTONINO, oppositor-intervenor,
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F.ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS AND AMADO GAT INCION, oppositors-intervenors,
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR. AND SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCIRO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM, AND PANFILO M. LACSON, oppositors-intervenors,
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA AND PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, oppositors-intervenors,
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY AND CEBU CHAPTER, oppositors-intervenors,
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR AND RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, oppostors-intervenors,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., oppositor-intervenor;

G.R. NO. 174299

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. AND RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTED BY CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR. AND COMMISSIONERS RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR. ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO AND JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE, respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

CONCURRING OPINION

SANDOVAL–GUTIERREZ, J.:

Vox populi vox Dei -- the voice of the people is the voice of God. Caution should be exercised in choosing one's battlecry, lest it does more harm than good to one's cause. In its original context, the complete version of this Latin phrase means exactly the opposite of what it is frequently taken to mean. It originated from a holy man, the monk Alcuin, who advised Charlemagne, "nec audiendi qui solent dicere vox populi vox Dei quum tumultuositas vulgi semper insaniae proxima sit," meaning, "And those people should not be listened to who keep on saying, 'The voice of the people is the voice of God,' since the riotousness of the crowd is always very close to madness."¹ Perhaps, it is by providence that the true meaning of the Latin phrase is revealed upon petitioners and their allies – that they may reflect upon the sincerity and authenticity of their "people's initiative."

History has been a witness to countless iniquities committed in the name of God. Wars were waged, despotism tolerated and oppressions justified – all these transpired as man boasted of God's imprimatur. Today, petitioners and their allies hum the same rallying call, convincing this Court that the people's initiative is the "voice of the people" and, therefore, the "voice of God." After a thorough consideration of the petitions, I have come to realize that man, with his ingenuity and arrogance, has perfected the craft of imitating the voice of God. It is against this kind of genius that the Court must guard itself.

The facts of the case are undisputed.

In 1996, the Movement for People's Initiative sought to exercise the power of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter,

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

The exercise was thwarted by a petition for prohibition filed with this Court by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al., entitled "Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin, petitioners, v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents."² The case was docketed as G.R. No. 127325. On March 19, 1997, this Court rendered its Decision in favor of petitioners, holding that Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. No. 6735), An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned." A majority of eight (8) Justices fully concurred with this ruling, while five (5) subscribed to the opposite view. One (1) opined that there is no need to rule on the adequacy of R.A. No. 6735.

On motion for reconsideration, two (2) of the eight (8) Justices reconsidered their positions. One (1) filed an inhibition and the other one (1) joined the minority opinion. As a consequence, of the thirteen (13) Justices who participated in the deliberation, six (6) voted in favor of the majority opinion, while the other six (6) voted in favor of the minority opinion.³

A few months thereafter, or on September 23, 1997, the Court dismissed a similar case, entitled People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Commission on Elections⁴ on the ground that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed PIRMA's Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution "it appearing that that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of the Court in G.R. no. 127325 (Santiago v. COMELEC) promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997." Seven (7) Justices voted that there was no need to re-examine its ruling, as regards the issue of the sufficiency of R.A. No. 6735. Another Justice concurred, but on the different premise that the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for such re-examination. Five (5) Justice opined otherwise.

This time, another group known as Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP), have gathered signatures in support of the proposed amendments to the Constitution, which entail a change in the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, thus:

A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:

Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least one member.

(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof, except those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership coming from the parliamentary districts.

B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to read, as follows:

Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.

C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions," which shall read, as follows:

Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.

(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.

Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatium up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."

Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby be amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."

Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.

(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim Parliament from among themselves.

(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.

(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.

Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President."

(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. The duty elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President.

Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, and written on its upper right hand portion is the abstract of the proposed amendments, quoted as follows:

Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Article VI and VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of government from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government, in order to achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and economy in government; and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to another?

On August 25, 2006, Raul L. Lambino and Enrico B. Aumentado, herein petitioners, filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution.⁵ Five (5) days thereafter, they filed an Amended Petition alleging that they are filing the petition in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. They claimed that the signatures of registered voters appearing on the signature sheets, constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters, were verified by their respective city or municipal election officers.

Several organizations opposed the petition. ⁶

In a Resolution dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the petition, citing as basis this Court's ruling in Santiago, permanently enjoining it "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system."

Hence, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus praying that this Court set aside the COMELEC Resolution and direct the latter tocomply with Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 4 x x x

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.

I vote to dismiss the petition of Lambino, et al. in G.R. No. 174153 and grant the petition of Mar-len Abigail Binay, et al. in G.R. No. 174299. Here, petitioners pray that the COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners be required to show why they should not be punished for contempt⁷ of court for disregarding the permanent injunction issued by this Court in Santiago.

I
Respondent COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion

Without necessarily brushing aside the other important issues, I believe the resolution of the present petition hinges on this singular issue -- did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied Lambino, et al.'s petition for initiative to amend the Constitution on the basis of this Court's Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC?

In other words, regardless of how the other remaining issues are resolved, still, the ultimate yardstick is the attendance of "grave abuse of discretion" on the part of the COMELEC.

Jurisprudence teaches that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.⁸

The Resolution of respondent COMELEC denying due course to the petition for initiative on the basis of a case (Santiago) decided by this Court cannot, in any way, be characterized as "capricious or whimsical," "patent and gross," or "arbitrary and despotic." On the contrary, it was the most prudent course to take. It must be stressed that in Santiago, this Court permanently enjoins respondent COMELEC "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted." It being a fact that Congress has not enacted a sufficient law, respondent COMELEC has no alternative but to adhere to Santiago. Otherwise, it is vulnerable to a citation for contempt. As succinctly stated by Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban (then Associate Justice) in his Separate Opinion in the subsequent case of PIRMA vs. COMELEC:⁹

x x x I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decision's ratio decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion. Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the Comelec. Any other mode of action would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.

It need not be emphasized that in our judicial hierarchy, this Court reigns supreme. All courts, tribunals and administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions are obliged to conform to its pronouncements. It has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. In other words, there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings.¹⁰ As a warning to lower court judges who would not adhere to its rulings, this Court, in People v. Santos,¹¹ held:

Now, if a judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal views he must first think that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that any deviation from a principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants. And if despite of what is here said, a Judge still believes that he cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to place himself in the position that he could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and he has only one legal way to do that.

Clearly, respondent COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition of Lambino, et al. for it merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago.

Significantly, in PIRMA vs. COMELEC,¹² a unanimous Court implicitly recognized that its ruling in Santiago is the established doctrine and that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in invoking it, thus:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its resolution on June 10, 1997.

Indeed, I cannot characterize as a "grave abuse of discretion" the COMELEC's obedience and respect to the pronouncement of this Court in Santiago.

II
The doctrine of stare decisis
bars the re-examination of Santiago

It cannot be denied that in Santiago, a majority of the members of this Court or eight (8) Justices (as against five (5) Justices) concurred in declaring R.A. No. 6735 an insufficient law. When the motion for reconsideration was denied via an equally-divided Court or a 6-6 vote, it does not mean that the Decision was overturned. It only shows that the opposite view fails to muster enough votes to modify or reverse the majority ruling. Therefore, the original Decision was upheld.¹³ In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,¹⁴ this Court ruled that the denial of a motion or reconsideration signifies that the ground relied upon have been found, upon due deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of sufficient weight to warrant a modification of the judgment or final order.

With Santiago being the only impediment to the instant petition for initiative, petitioners persistently stress that the doctrine of stare decisis does not bar its re-examination.

I am not convinced. The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere translates "stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled."¹⁵ As used in our jurisprudence, it means that "once this Court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it would adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same as in the earlier controversy."¹⁶

There is considerable literature about whether this doctrine of stare decisis is a good or bad one, but the doctrine is usually justified by arguments which focus on the desirability of stability and certainty in the law and also by notions of justice and fairness. Justice Benjamin Cardozo in his treatise, The Nature of the Judicial Process stated:

It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another. 'If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts.¹⁷

That the doctrine of stare decisis is related to justice and fairness may be appreciated by considering the observation of American philosopher William K. Frankena as to what constitutes injustice:

The paradigm case of injustice is that in which there are two similar individuals in similar circumstances and one of them is treated better or worse than the other. In this case, the cry of injustice rightly goes up against the responsible agent or group; and unless that agent or group can establish that there is some relevant dissimilarity after all between the individuals concerned and their circumstances, he or they will be guilty as charged.¹⁸

Although the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent re-examining and, if need be, overruling prior decisions, "It is x x x a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if considered anew, might be decided differently by the current justices. This policy x x x 'is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.¹⁹ Accordingly, a party urging overruling a precedent faces a rightly onerous task, the difficulty of which is roughly proportional to a number of factors, including the age of the precedent, the nature and extent of public and private reliance on it, and its consistency or inconsistency with other related rules of law. Here, petitioners failed to discharge their task.

Santiago v. COMELEC was decided by this Court on March 19, 1997 or more than nine (9) years ago. During that span of time, the Filipino people, specifically the law practitioners, law professors, law students, the entire judiciary and litigants have recognized this Court's Decision as a precedent. In fact, the Santiago doctrine was applied by this Court in the subsequent case of PIRMA. Even the legislature has relied on said Decision, thus, several bills have been introduced in both Houses of Congress to cure the deficiency. I cannot fathom why it should be overturned or set aside merely on the basis of the petition of Lambino, et al. Indeed, this Court's conclusion in Santiago that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned remains a precedent and must be upheld.

III
The proposed constitutional changes constitute revisions and not mere amendments

Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the means for its amendment and revision. Thus:

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

(2) A Constitutional Convention.

Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered votes, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

At the outset, it must be underscored that initiative and referendum, as means by which the people can directly propose changes to the Constitution, were not provided for in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. Thus, under these two (2) Constitutions, there was no demand to draw the distinction between an amendment and a revision, both being governed by a uniform process. This is not so under our present Constitution. The distinction between an amendment and a revision becomes crucial because only amendments are allowed under the system of people's initiative. Revisions are within the exclusive domain of Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members, or of a Constitutional Convention.

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission is explicit that Section 2, Article XVII covers only amendments, thus:

The sponsor, Commissioner Suarez, is recognized.

MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.

May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. MAAMBONG: Madam President, will the distinguished proponent of the amendment yield to a few questions?

MR. DAVIDE: With pleasure, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG: My first question, Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line I refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision?"

MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision"

MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.²⁰

Considering that the initiative on the Constitution only permits amendments, it is imperative to examine whether petitioners' proposed changes partake of the nature of amendments, not revisions.

The petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC by Lambino, et al. sought to amend the following provisions of the 1987 Constitution: Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Article VI (The Legislative Department); Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII (The Executive Department). It further includes Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) for the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary form of government.

Succinctly, the proposals envision a change in the form of government, from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary; conversion of the present Congress of the Philippines to an Interim National Assembly; change in the terms of Members of Parliament; and the election of a Prime Minister who shall be vested with executive power.

Petitioners contend that the proposed changes are in the nature of amendments, hence, within the coverage of a "people's initiative."

I disagree.

The noted constitutionalist, Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, characterized an amendment and a revision to the Constitution as follows:

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the document to determine how and to what extent they should be altered.²¹

Obviously, both "revision" and amendment" connote change; any distinction between the two must be based upon the degree of change contemplated. In Kelly v. Laing,²² the Supreme Court of Michigan made the following comparison of the two terms:

"Revision" and "amendment" have the common characteristics of working changes in the charter, and are sometimes used in exactly the same sense but there is an essential difference between them.

"Revision" implies a reexamination of the whole law and a redraft without obligation to maintain the form, scheme, or structure of the old. As applied to fundamental law, such as a constitution or charter, it suggests a convention to examine the whole subject and to prepare and submit a new instrument whether the desired changes from the old are few or many. Amendment implies continuance of the general plan and purpose of the law, with corrections to better accomplish its purpose. Basically, revision suggests fundamental change, while amendment is a correction of detail.

Although there are some authorities which indicate that a change in a city's form of government may be accomplished by a process of "amendment," the cases which so hold seem to involve statutes which only distinguish between amendment and totally new charters.²³ However, as in Maine law, where the statute authorizing the changes distinguishes between "charter amendment" and "charter revision," it has been held that "(a) change in the form of government of a home rule city may be made only by revision of the city charter, not by its amendment."²⁴

In summary, it would seem that any major change in governmental form and scheme would probably be interpreted as a "revision" and should be achieved through the more thorough process of deliberation.

Although, at first glance, petitioners' proposed changes appear to cover isolated and specific provisions only, however, upon careful scrutiny, it becomes clear that the proposed changes will alter the very structure of our government and create multifarious ramifications. In other words, the proposed changes will have a "domino effect" or, more appropriately, "ripple effect" on other provisions of the Constitution.

At this juncture, it must be emphasized that the power reserved to the people to effect changes in the Constitution includes the power to amend anysection in such a manner that the proposed change, if approved, would "be complete within itself, relate to one subject and not substantially affect any other section or article of the Constitution or require further amendments to the Constitution to accomplish its purpose."²⁵ This is clearly not the case here.

Firstly, a shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government affects the well-enshrined doctrine of separation of powers of government, embodied in our Constitution, by providing for an Executive, Legislative and Judiciary Branches. In a Parliamentary form of government, the Executive Branch is to a certain degree, dependent on the direct or indirect support of the Parliament, as expressed through a "vote of confidence." To my mind, this doctrine of separation of powers is so interwoven in the fabric of our Constitution, that any change affecting such doctrine must necessarily be a revision.

In McFadden vs. Jordan,²⁶ the California Supreme Court ruled as follows:

It is thus clear that that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for that purpose x x x. Consequently, if the scope of the proposed initiative measure now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention. x x x.

Secondly, the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral form of government is not a mere amendment, but is in actuality a revision, as set forth in Adams v. Gunter²⁷:

The proposal here to amend Section I of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been in existence in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of government. It would not only radically change the whole pattern of the government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on government.

Thirdly, the proposed changes, on their face, signify revisions rather than amendments, especially, with the inclusion of the following "omnibus provision":

C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamnetary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions" which shall read, as follows:

x x x x x x x x x

Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President, with the exceptions of Section 1,2,3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended x x x x x x and all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and numbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14,unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary system of government x x x x x x .

x x x x x x x x x

Section 4. (1) x x x

(3) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the Interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution, consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.

The above provisions will necessarily result in a "ripple effect" on the other provisions of the Constitution to make them conform to the qualities of unicameral-parliamentary form of government. With one sweeping stroke, these proposed provisions automatically revise some provisions of the Constitution. In McFadden, the same practice was considered by the Court to be in the nature of substantial revision, necessitating a constitutional convention. I quote the pertinent portion of its ruling, thus:

There is in the measure itself, no attempt to enumerate the various and many articles and sections of our present Constitution which would be affected, replaced or repealed. It purports only to add one new article but its framers found it necessary to include the omnibus provision (subdivision (7) of section XII) that "If any section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of the constitution is in conflict with any of the provisions of this article, such section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase is to the extent of such conflict hereby repealed. x x x Consequently, if the scope of the proposed intitiative measure now before us is so broad that if such measure become law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention.²⁸

Undoubtedly, the changes proposed by the petitioners are not mere amendments which will only affect the Articles or Sections sought to be changed. Rather, they are in the nature of revisions which will affect considerable portions of the Constitution resulting in the alteration of our form of government. The proposed changes cannot be taken in isolation since these are connected or "interlocked" with the other provisions of our Constitution. Accordingly, it has been held that: "If the changes attempted are so sweeping that it is necessary to include the provisions interlocking them, then it is plain that the plan would constitute a recasting of the whole Constitution and this, we think, it was intended to be accomplished only by a convention under Section 2 which has not yet been disturbed."²⁹

I therefore conclude that since the proposed changes partake of the nature of a revision of the Constitution, then they cannot be the subject of an initiative. On this matter, Father Bernas expressed this insight:

But why limit initiative and referendum to simple amendments? The answer, which one can easily glean from the rather long deliberation on initiative and referendum in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is practicality. In other words, who is to formulate the revision or how is it to be formulated? Revision, as concretely being proposed now, is nothing less than a rebuilding of the Philippine constitutional structure. Who were involved in formulating the structure? What debates ensued? What records are there for future use in interpreting the provisions which may be found to be unclear?

In a deliberative body like Congress or a Constitutional Convention, decisions are reached after much purifying debate. And while the deliberations proceed, the public has the opportunity to get involved. It is only after the work of an authorized body has been completed that it is presented to the electorate for final judgment. Careful debate is important because the electorate tends to accept what is presented to it even sight unseen.³⁰

IV
R.A. No. 6735 is insufficient to implement the People's initiative

Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter,

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

On its face, Section 2 is not a self-executory provision. This means that an enabling law is imperative for its implementation. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6735 in order to breathe life into this constitutional provision. However, as previously narrated, this Court struck the law in Santiago for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.

The passage of time has done nothing to change the applicability of R.A. No. 6735. Congress neither amended it nor passed a new law to supply its deficiencies.

Notwithstanding so, this Court is being persuaded to take a 360-degree turn, enumerating three (3) justifications why R.A. No. 6735 must be considered a sufficient law, thus:

1) The text of R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to the right of people to initiate changes to the Constitution;

2) The legislative history of R.A. No. 6735 reveals the clear intent of the lawmakers to use it as instrument to implement the people's initiative; and

3) The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. No. 6735 demonstrate the legislative intent to use it as instrument to implement people's initiative.

I regret to say that the foregoing justifications are wanting.

A thorough reading of R.A. No. 6735 leads to the conclusion that it covers only initiatives on national and local legislation. Its references to initiatives on the Constitution are few, isolated and misplaced. Unlike in the initiatives on national and local legislation, where R.A. No. 6735 provides a detailed, logical, and exhaustive enumeration on their implementation,³¹ however, as regards initiative on the Constitution, the law merely:

(a) mentions the word "Constitution" in Section 2;³²

(b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3;³³

(c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people;³⁴

(d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition;³⁵ and

(e) provides the date for the effectivity of the approved proposition.³⁶

In other words, R.A. No. 6735 does not specify the procedure how initiative on the Constitution may be accomplished. This is not the enabling law contemplated by the Constitution. As pointed out by oppositor-intervenor Alternative Law Groups Inc., since the promulgation of the Decision in Santiago, various bills have been introduced in both Houses of Congress providing for a complete and adequate process for people's initiative, such as:

· Names, signatures and addresses of petitioners who shall be registered voters;

· A statement of the provision of the Constitution or any part thereof sought to be amended and the proposed amendment;

· The manner of initiation - in a congressional district through a petition by any individual, group, political party or coalition with members in the congressional district;

· The language used: the petition should be printed in English and translated in the local language;

· Signature stations to be provided for;

· Provisions pertaining to the need and manner of posting, that is, after the signatures shall have been verified by the Commission, the verified signatures shall be posted for at least thirty days in the respective municipal and city halls where the signatures were obtained;

· Provisions pertaining to protests allowed any protest as to the authenticity of the signatures to be filed with the COMELEC and decided within sixty (60) days from the filing of said protest.

None of the above necessary details is provided by R.A. No. 6735, thus, demonstrating its incompleteness and inadequacy.

V
Petitioners are not Proper Parties to
File the Petition for Initiative

VI
The Petition for Initiative Filed with the COMELEC Does not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution and R.A. No. 6735

I shall discuss the above issues together since they are interrelated and inseparable. The determination of whether petitioners are proper parties to file the petition for initiative in behalf of the alleged 6.3 million voters will require an examination of whether they have complied with the provisions of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

To reiterate, Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. (Underscoring supplied)

The mandate of the above constitutional provisions is definite and categorical. For a people's initiative to prosper, the following requisites must be present:

1. It is "the people" themselves who must "directly propose" "amendments" to the Constitution;

2. The proposed amendments must be contained in "a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters;" and

3. The required minimum of 12% of the total number of registered voters "must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters" of "every legislative district."

In this case, however, the above requisites are not present.

The petition for initiative was filed with the COMELEC by petitioners Lambino and Aumentado, two registered voters. As shown in the "Verification/Certification with Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping" contained in their petition, they alleged under oath that they have caused the preparation of the petition in their personal capacity as registered voters "and as representatives" of the supposed 6.3 million registered voters. This goes to show that the questioned petition was not initiated directly by the 6.3 million people who allegedly comprised at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, as required by Section 2. Moreover, nowhere in the petition itself could be found the signatures of the 6.3 million registered voters. Only the signatures of petitioners Lambino and Aumentado were affixed therein "as representatives" of those 6.3 million people. Certainly, that is not the petition for people's initiative contemplated by the Constitution.

Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no authority whatsoever to file the petition "as representatives" of the alleged 6.3 million registered voters. Such act of representation is constitutionally proscribed. To repeat, Section 2 strictly requires that amendments to the Constitution shall be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters." Obviously, the phrase "directly proposed by the people" excludes any person acting as representative or agent of the 12% of the total number of registered voters. The Constitution has bestowed upon the people the right to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Such right cannot be usurped by anyone under the guise of being the people's representative. Simply put, Section 2 does not recognize acts of representation. For it is only "the people" (comprising the minimum of 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein) who are the proper parties to initiate a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution. Verily, the petition filed with the COMELEC by herein petitioners Lambino and Aumentado is not a people's initiative. Necessarily, it must fail.

Cororarilly, the plea that this Court should "hear" and "heed" "the people's voice" is baseless and misleading. There is no people's voice to be heard and heeded as this petition for initiative is not truly theirs, but only of petitioners Lambino and Aumentado and their allies.

VII
The issues at bar are not political questions.

Lambino and Aumentado, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, vehemently argue that: (1) "the validity of the exercise of the right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution and their will, as expressed by the fact that over six million registered voters indicated their support of the Petition for initiative is a purely political question;" and (2) "[t]he power to propose amendments to the Constitution is a right explicitly bestowed upon the sovereign people. Hence, the determination by the people to exercise their right to propose amendments under the system of initiative is a sovereign act and falls squarely within the ambit of a political question."

The "political question doctrine" was first enunciated by the US Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden.³⁷ Faced with the difficult question of whether the Supreme Court was the appropriate institution to define the substantive content of republicanism, the US Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Roger B. Taney, concluded that "the sovereignty in every State resides in the people, as to how and whether they exercised it, was under the circumstances of the case, a political question to be settled by the political power." In other words, the responsibility of settling certain constitutional questions was left to the legislative and executive branches of the government.

The Luther case arose from the so-called "Dorr Rebellion" in the State of Rhode Island. Due to increased migration brought about by the Industrial Revolution, the urban population of Rhode Island increased. However, under the 1663 Royal Charter which served as the State Constitution, voting rights were largely limited to residents of the rural districts. This severe mal-apportionment of suffrage rights led to the "Dorr Rebellion." Despairing of obtaining remedies for their disenfranchisement from the state government, suffrage reformers invoked their rights under the American Declaration of Independence to "alter or abolish" the government and to institute a new one. The reformers proceeded to call for and hold an extralegal constitutional convention, drafted a new State Constitution, submitted the document for popular ratification, and held elections under it. The State government, however, refused to cede power, leading to an anomalous situation in that for a few months in 1842, there were two opposing state governments contending for legitimacy and possession of state of offices.

The Rhode Island militia, under the authority of martial law, entered and searched the house of Martin Luther, a Dorr supporter. He brought suit against Luther Borden, a militiaman. Before the US Supreme Court, Luther's counsel argued that since the State's archaic Constitution prevented a fair and peaceful address of grievances through democratic processes, the people of Rhode Island had instead chosen to exercise their inherent right in popular sovereignty of replacing what they saw as an oppressive government. The US Supreme Court deemed the controversy as non-justiciable and inappropriate for judicial resolution.

In Colgrove v. Green,³⁸ Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter, coined the phrase "political thicket" to describe situations where Federal courts should not intervene in political questions which they have neither the competence nor the commission to decide. In Colgrove, the US Supreme Court, with a narrow 4-3 vote branded the apportionment of legislative districts in Illinois "as a political question and that the invalidation of the districts might, in requiring statewide elections, create an evil greater than that sought to be remedied."

While this Court has adopted the use of Frankfurter's "political thicket," nonetheless, it has sought to come up with a definition of the term "political question." Thus, in Vera v. Avelino,³⁹ this Court ruled that properly, political questions are "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." In Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco,⁴⁰ the Court held that the term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

In Aquino v. Enrile,⁴¹ this Court adopted the following guidelines laid down in Baker v. Carr⁴² in determining whether a question before it is political, rather than judicial in nature, to wit:

1) there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or

2) there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or

3) there is the sheer impossibility of deciding the matter without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or

4) there is the sheer impossibility of the Court's undertaking an independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due the coordinate branches of government; or

5) there is an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or

6) there exists the potentiality of embarrassment arising from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.

None of the foregoing standards is present in the issues raised before this Court. Accordingly, the issues are justiciable. What is at stake here is the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the issues raised before this Court are political in nature, it is not precluded from resolving them under its expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it by Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, following Daza v. Singson.⁴³ As pointed out in Marcos v. Manglapus,⁴⁴ the present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial power which the Court, under previous charters, would have normally and ordinarily left to the political departments to decide.

CONCLUSION

In fine, considering the political scenario in our country today, it is my view that the so-called people's initiative to amend our Constitution from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary is actually not an initiative of the people, but an initiative of some of our politicians. It has not been shown by petitioners, during the oral arguments in this case, that the 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their signatures understood what they signed. In fact, petitioners admitted that the Constitutional provisions sought to be amended and the proposed amendments were not explained to all those registered voters. Indeed, there will be no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether they really understood what petitioners and their group asked them to sign.

Let us not repeat the mistake committed by this Court in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary.⁴⁵ The Court then ruled that "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect," although it had notice that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified by the people in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. The Court concluded, among others, that the viva voce voting in the Citizens' Assemblies "was and is null and void ab initio." That was during martial law when perhaps majority of the justices were scared of the dictator. Luckily at present, we are not under a martial law regime. There is, therefore, no reason why this Court should allow itself to be used as a legitimizing authority by the so-called people's initiative for those who want to perpetuate themselves in power.

At this point, I can say without fear that there is nothing wrong with our present government structure. Consequent1y, we must not change it. America has a presidential type of government. Yet, it thrives ideally and has become a super power. It is then safe to conclude that what we should change are some of the people running the government, NOT the SYSTEM.

According to petitioners, the proposed amendment would effect a more efficient, more economical and more responsive government.

Is there hope that a new breed of politicians, more qualified and capable, may be elected as members and leaders of the unicameral-parliament? Or will the present members of the Lower House continue to hold their respective positions with limitless terms?

Will the new government be more responsive to the needs of the poor and the marginalized? Will it be able to provide homes for the homeless, food for the hungry, jobs for the jobless and protection for the weak?

This is a defining moment in our history. The issue posed before us is crucial with transcendental significance. And history will judge us on how we resolve this issue – shall we allow the revision of our Constitution, of which we are duty bound to guard and revere, on the basis of a doubtful people's initiative?

Amending the Constitution involving a change of government system or structure is a herculean task affecting the entire Filipino people and the future generations. Let us, therefore, entrust this duty to more knowledgeable people elected as members of a Constitutional Convention.

Yes, the voice of the people is the voice of God. But under the circumstances in this case, the voice of God is not audible.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174299.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G.R. No. 174153

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. No. 174299

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

I am convinced beyond cavil that the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) did not commit an abuse of its discretion in dismissing the amended petition before it. The proposals of petitioners incorporated in said amended petition are for the revision of the 1987 Constitution. Further, the amended petition before the respondent COMELEC is insufficient in substance.

The Antecedents

On August 25, 2006, petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed with the COMELEC a petition entitled "IN THE MATTER OF PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE 1987 CONSTITUTION THROUGH A PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE: A SHIFT FROM A BICAMERAL PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT BY AMENDING ARTICLES VI AND VII; AND PROVIDING TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL TO THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM." The case was docketed as EM (LD)-06-01. On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed an amended petition. For brevity, it is referred to as the petition for initiative.

Petitioners alleged therein, inter alia, that they filed their petition in their own behalf and together with those who have affixed their signatures to the signature sheets appended thereto who are Filipino citizens, residents and registered voters of the Philippines, and they constitute at least twelve percent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three percent (3%) of all the registered voters therein.

Petitioners further alleged therein that the filing of the petition for initiative is based on their constitutional right to propose amendments to the 1987 Constitution by way of people's initiative, as recognized in Section 2, Article XVII thereof, which provides:

SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right."

According to petitioners, while the above provision states that "(T)he Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right," the provisions of Section 5(b) and (c), along with Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) 6735,¹are sufficient enabling details for the people's exercise of the power. The said sections of RA 6735 state:

Sec. 5. Requirements. – (a) To exercise the power x x x

(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;

c.2. the proposition;

c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;

c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.

x x x x

Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.

They also alleged that the COMELEC has the authority, mandate and obligation to give due course to the petition for initiative, in compliance with the constitutional directive for the COMELEC to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."²

Petitioners incorporated in their petition for initiative the changes they proposed to be incorporated in the 1987 Constitution and prayed that the COMELEC issue an order:

1. Finding the Petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;

2. Directing the publication of the Petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation; and

3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days after the Certification by this Honorable Commission of the sufficiency of this Petition, to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.

Petitioners pray for such other reliefs deemed just and equitable in the premises.

The Ruling of the respondent COMELEC

On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC promulgated the assailed Resolution denying due course and dismissing the petition for initiative. The COMELEC ruled that:

We agree with the petitioners that this Commission has the solemn Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of, as in this case, initiative.

This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other provisions of the Constitution particularly on initiative.

Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

"Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may, likewise, be directly proposed by the people through initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right."

The aforequoted provision of the Constitution being a non-self-executory provision needed an enabling law for its implementation. Thus, in order to breathe life into the constitutional right of the people under a system of initiative to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolution, Congress enacted RA 6735.

However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Santiago v. Commission on Elections struck down the said law for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned

The Supreme Court, likewise, declared that this Commission should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the required minimum per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein, still the Petition cannot be given due course since the Supreme Court categorically declared RA 6735 as inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental importance of the right of the people under a system of initiative. However, neither can we turn a blind eye to the pronouncement of the High Court that in the absence of a valid enabling law, this right of the people remains nothing but an "empty right," and that this Commission is permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (Citations omitted.)

Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to this Court on a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The Petitioners' Case

In support of their petition, petitioners alleged, inter alia, that:

I.

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, BECAUSE THE CITED SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 CANNOT BE CONSIDERED THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC, CONSIDERING THAT UPON ITS RECONSIDERATION AND FINAL VOTING ON 10 JUNE 1997, NO MAJORITY VOTE WAS SECURED TO DECLARE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 AS INADEQUATE, INCOMPLETE AND INSUFFICIENT IN STANDARD.

II.

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 AND EXISTING APPROPRIATION OF THE COMELEC PROVIDE FOR SUFFICIENT DETAILS AND AUTHORITY FOR THE EXERCISE OF PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE, THUS, EXISTING LAWS TAKEN TOGETHER ARE ADEQUATE AND COMPLETE.

III.

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND IN REFUSING TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, THEREBY VIOLATING AN EXPRESS CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AND DISREGARDING AND CONTRAVENING THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE.

A.

THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PETITION FOR INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS.

1.

THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED TO GIVE THE PEOPLE THE POWER TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS AND THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES ARE NOW GIVING VIBRANT LIFE TO THIS CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

2.

PRIOR TO THE QUESTIONED SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO EXERCISE THE SOVEREIGN POWER OF INITIATIVE AND RECALL HAS BEEN INVARIABLY UPHELD

3.

THE EXERCISE OF THE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS IS A POLITICAL QUESTION WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED SOLELY BY THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE.

4.

BY SIGNING THE SIGNATURE SHEETS ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE DULY VERIFIED BY THE ELECTION OFFICERS, THE PEOPLE HAVE CHOSEN TO PERFORM THIS SACRED EXERCISE OF THEIR SOVEREIGN POWER.

B.

THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PETITION FOR INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS

C.

THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION ISSUED IN SANTIAGO V. COMELEC ONLY APPLIES TO THE DELFIN PETITION.

1.

IT IS THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION AND NOT OTHER STATEMENTS IN THE BODY OF THE DECISION THAT GOVERNS THE RIGHTS IN CONTROVERSY.

IV.

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FAILED OR NEGLECTED TO ACT OR PERFORM A DUTY MANDATED BY LAW.

A.

THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE COMELEC IS TO SET THE INITIATIVE FOR PLEBISCITE.³

Petitioners Failed to Allege and Demonstrate All the Essential
Facts To Establish the Right to a Writ of Certiorari

Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

A writ for certiorari may issue only when the following requirements are set out in the petition and established:

(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;

(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. x x x⁴

The Court has invariably defined "grave abuse of discretion," thus:

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions.⁵

There is thus grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.⁶ The only question involved is jurisdiction, either the lack or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion warrants the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari only when the same is grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility. A writ of certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.⁷ An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, which error is reversible only by an appeal.⁸

In the present case, it appears from the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC that it denied the petition for initiative solely in obedience to the mandate of this Court in Santiago v. Commission on Elections.⁹ In said case, the Court En Banc permanently enjoined the COMELEC from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system. When the COMELEC denied the petition for initiative, there was as yet no valid law enacted by Congress to provide for the implementation of the system.

It is a travesty for the Court to declare the act of the COMELEC in denying due course to the petition for initiative as "capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." In fact, in so doing, the COMELEC merely followed or applied, as it ought to do, the Court's ruling in Santiago to the effect that Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system of initiative is a non self-executory provision and requires an enabling law for its implementation. In relation thereto, RA 6735 was found by the Court to be "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the constitutional provision on initiative. Consequently, the COMELEC was "permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system." The decision of the Court En Banc interpreting RA 6735 forms part of the legal system of the Philippines.¹⁰ And no doctrine or principle laid down by the Court En Banc may be modified or reversed except by the Court En Banc,¹¹ certainly not by the COMELEC. Until the Court En Banc modifies or reverses its decision, the COMELEC is bound to follow the same.¹² As succinctly held in Fulkerson v. Thompson:¹³

Whatever was before the Court, and is disposed of, is considered as finally settled. The inferior court is bound by the judgment or decree as the law of the case, and must carry it into execution according to the mandate. The inferior court cannot vary it, or judicially examine it for any other purpose than execution. It can give no other or further relief as to any matter decided by the Supreme Court even where there is error apparent; or in any manner intermeddle with it further than to execute the mandate and settle such matters as have been remanded, not adjudicated by the Supreme Court….

The principles above stated are, we think, conclusively established by the authority of adjudged cases. And any further departure from them would inevitably mar the harmony of the whole judiciary system, bring its parts into conflict, and produce therein disorganization, disorder, and incalculable mischief and confusion. Besides, any rule allowing the inferior courts to disregard the adjudications of the Supreme Court, or to refuse or omit to carry them into execution would be repugnant to the principles established by the constitution, and therefore void.¹⁴

At this point, it is well to recall the factual context of Santiago as well as the pronouncement made by the Court therein. Like petitioners in the instant case, in Santiago, Atty. Jesus Delfin, the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), et al., invoked Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution as they filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, By People's Initiative" (the Delfin petition). They asked the COMELEC to issue an order fixing the time and date for signature gathering all over the country; causing the necessary publications of said order and their petition in newspapers of general and local circulation and instructing municipal election registrars in all regions all over the country and to assist petitioners in establishing signing stations. Acting thereon, the COMELEC issued the order prayed for.

Senator Miriam Santiago, et al. forthwith filed with this Court a petition for prohibition to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing its order. The Court, speaking through Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice), granted the petition as it declared:

1. RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned";

2. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300¹⁵ invalid insofar as it prescribed rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution because the COMELEC is without authority to promulgate the rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative; and

3. The Delfin petition insufficient as it did not contain the required number of signatures of registered voters.

The Court concluded in Santiago that "the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system." The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING RA 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the Delfin petition (UND-96-037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on December 18, 1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.¹⁶

The Court reiterated its ruling in Santiago in another petition which was filed with the Court by PIRMA and the spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa (who were parties in Santiago) docketed as PIRMA v. Commission on Elections.¹⁷ The said petitioners, undaunted by Santiago and claiming to have gathered 5,793,213 signatures, filed a petition with the COMELEC praying, inter alia, that COMELEC officers be ordered to verify all the signatures collected in behalf of the petition and, after due hearing, that it (COMELEC) declare the petition sufficient for the purpose of scheduling a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Like the Delfin petition in Santiago, the PIRMA petition proposed to submit to the people in a plebiscite the amendment to the Constitution on the lifting of the term limits of elected officials.

The opinion of the minority that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in PIRMA has no basis. The COMELEC, in its Resolution dated July 8, 1997, dismissed the PIRMA petition citing the permanent restraining order issued against it by the Court in Santiago. PIRMA and the spouses Pedrosa forthwith elevated the matter to the Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over, and thereby dismissing, their petition for initiative to amend the Constitution.

The Court dismissed outright, by a unanimous vote, the petition filed by PIRMA and the spouses Albert Pedrosa. The Court declared that the COMELEC merely complied with the dispositions in the decision of the Court in Santiago and, hence, cannot be held to have committed a grave abuse of its discretion in dismissing the petition before it:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.

The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the second issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other members of the Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., voted that there was no need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need for re-examination of said second issue since the case a bar is not the proper vehicle for that purpose. Five (5) other members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno, Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was need for such a re-examination. x x x

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.¹⁸ (Underscoring supplied.)

In the present case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) takes the side of petitioners and argues that the COMELEC should not have applied the ruling in Santiago to the petition for initiative because the permanent injunction therein referred only to the Delfin petition. The OSG buttresses this argument by pointing out that the Temporary Restraining Order dated December 18, 1996 that was made permanent in the dispositive portion referred only to the Delfin petition.

The OSG's attempt to isolate the dispositive portion from the body of the Court's decision in Santiago is futile. It bears stressing that the dispositive portion must not be read separately but in connection with the other portions of the decision of which it forms a part. To get to the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted to but the same must be considered in its entirety. Hence, a resolution or ruling may and does appear in other parts of the decision and not merely in the fallo thereof.¹⁹

The pronouncement in the body of the decision in Santiago permanently enjoining the COMELEC "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system" is thus as much a part of the Court's decision as its dispositive portion. The ruling of this Court is of the nature of an in rem judgment barring any and all Filipinos from filing a petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted. Clearly, the COMELEC, in denying due course to the present petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution conformably with the Court's ruling in Santiago did not commit grave abuse of discretion. On the contrary, its actuation is in keeping with the salutary principle of hierarchy of courts. For the Court to find the COMELEC to have abused its discretion when it dismissed the amended petition based on the ruling of this Court in Santiago would be sheer judicial apostasy.

As eloquently put by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings."²⁰ This truism applies with equal force to the COMELEC as a quasi-judicial body for, after all, judicial decisions applying or interpreting laws or the Constitution "assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those duty bound to enforce obedience thereto."²¹

Petitioners Cannot Ascribe
Grave Abuse of Discretion on
the COMELEC Based on the
Minority Opinion in Santiago

It is elementary that the opinion of the majority of the members of the Court, not the opinion of the minority, prevails. As a corollary, the decision of the majority cannot be modified or reversed by the minority of the members of the Court.

However, to eschew the binding effect of Santiago, petitioners argue, albeit unconvincingly, that the Court's declaration therein on the inadequacy, incompleteness and insufficiency of RA 6735 to implement the system of initiative to propose constitutional amendments did not constitute the majority opinion. This contention is utterly baseless.

Santiago was concurred in, without any reservation, by eight Justices,²² or the majority of the members of the Court, who actually took part in the deliberations thereon. On the other hand, five Justices,²³ while voting for the dismissal of the Delfin petition on the ground of insufficiency, dissented from the majority opinion as they maintained the view that RA 6735 was sufficient to implement the system of initiative.

Given that a clear majority of the members of the Court, eight Justices, concurred in the decision in Santiago, the pronouncement therein that RA 6735 is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned" constitutes a definitive ruling on the matter.

In the Resolution dated June 10, 1997, the motions for reconsideration of the Santiago decision were denied with finality as only six Justices, or less than the majority, voted to grant the same. The Resolution expressly stated that the motion for reconsideration failed "to persuade the requisite majority of the Court to modify or reverse the Decision of 19 March 1977."²⁴ In fine, the pronouncement in Santiago as embodied in the Decision of March 19, 1997 remains the definitive ruling on the matter.

It bears stressing that in PIRMA, petitioners prayed for the Court to resolve the issue posed by them and to re-examine its ruling as regards RA 6735. By a vote of seven members of the Court, including Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Justice Jose C. Vitug, the Court voted that there was no need to resolve the issue. Five members of the Court opined that there was a need for the re-examination of said ruling. Thus, the pronouncement of the Court in Santiago remains the law of the case and binding on petitioners.

If, as now claimed by the minorty, there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in Santiago, the Court should have resolved to set aside its original resolution dismissing the petition and to grant the motion for reconsideration and the petition. But the Court did not. The Court positively and unequivocally declared that the COMELEC merely followed the ruling of the Court in Santiago in dismissing the petition before it. No less than Senior Justice Reynato S. Puno concurred with the resolution of the Court. It behooved Justice Puno to dissent from the ruling of the Court on the motion for reconsideration of petitioners precisely on the ground that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in Santiago. He did not. Neither did Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, who was a member of the Court.

That RA 6735 has failed to validly implement the people's right to directly propose constitutional amendments through the system of initiative had already been conclusively settled in Santiago as well as in PIRMA. Heeding these decisions, several lawmakers, including no less than Solicitor General Antonio Eduardo Nachura when he was then a member of the House of Representatives,²⁵ have filed separate bills to implement the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

In the present Thirteenth (13^th) Congress, at least seven (7) bills are pending. In the Senate, the three (3) pending bills are: Senate Bill No. 119 entitled An Act Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the Constitution introduced by Senator Luisa "Loi" P. Ejercito Estrada; Senate Bill No. 2189 entitled An Act Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the Constitution introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago; and Senate Bill No. 2247 entitled An Act Providing for a System of People's Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution introduced by Senator Richard Gordon.

In the House of Representatives, there are at least four (4) pending bills: House Bill No. 05281 filed by Representative Carmen Cari, House Bill No. 05017 filed by Representative Imee Marcos, House Bill No. 05025 filed by Representative Roberto Cajes, and House Bill No. 05026 filed by Representative Edgardo Chatto. These House bills are similarly entitled An Act Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the Constitution.

The respective explanatory notes of the said Senate and House bills uniformly recognize that there is, to date, no law to govern the process by which constitutional amendments are introduced by the people directly through the system of initiative. Ten (10) years after Santiago and absent the occurrence of any compelling supervening event, i.e., passage of a law to implement the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, that would warrant the re-examination of the ruling therein, it behooves the Court to apply to the present case the salutary and well-recognized doctrine of stare decisis. As earlier shown, Congress and other government agencies have, in fact, abided by Santiago. The Court can do no less with respect to its own ruling.

Contrary to the stance taken by petitioners, the validity or constitutionality of a law cannot be made to depend on the individual opinions of the members who compose it – the Supreme Court, as an institution, has already determined RA 6735 to be "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned" and therefore the same remains to be so regardless of any change in the Court's composition.²⁶ Indeed, it is vital that there be stability in the courts in adhering to decisions deliberately made after ample consideration. Parties should not be encouraged to seek re-examination of determined principles and speculate on fluctuation of the law with every change in the expounders of it.²⁷

Proposals to Revise the Constitution,
As in the Case of the Petitioners'
Proposal to Change the Form of
Government, Cannot be Effected
Through the System of Initiative,
Which by Express Provision of
Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution, is Limited to Amendments

Even granting arguendo the Court, in the present case, abandons its pronouncement in Santiago and declares RA 6735, taken together with other extant laws, sufficient to implement the system of initiative, still, the amended petition for initiative cannot prosper. Despite the denomination of their petition, the proposals of petitioners to change the form of government from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government are actually for the revision of the Constitution.

Petitioners propose to "amend" Articles VI and VII of the Constitution in this manner:

A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:

"Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least one member.

"(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof, except those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership coming from the parliamentary districts."

B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to read, as follows:

"Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.

C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions," which shall read as follows:

Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.,

(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.

Section 2. "Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "House of Congress," "Senator[s] or "Member[s] of the House of Representatives" and "House of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that any and all references therein to "Member[s] of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member[s] of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."

Section 3. "Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that any and all references therein to "Member[s] of Congress," "Senator[s]" or "Member[s] of the House of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and of "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."

Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.

(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its session for the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim Parliament from among themselves.

(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.

(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.

"Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President."

(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. [Thereafter, the Vice-President, as Member of Parliament, shall immediately convene the Parliament and shall initially preside over its session for the purpose of electing the Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of all its members, from among themselves.] The duly-elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President.²⁸

Petitioners claim that the required number of signatures of registered voters have been complied with, i.e., the signatories to the petition constitute twelve percent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three percent (3%) of all the registered voters therein. Certifications allegedly executed by the respective COMELEC Election Registrars of each municipality and city verifying these signatures were attached to the petition for initiative. The verification was allegedly done on the basis of the list of registered voters contained in the official COMELEC list used in the immediately preceding election.

The proposition, as formulated by petitioners, to be submitted to the Filipino people in a plebiscite to be called for the said purpose reads:

DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?²⁹

According to petitioners, the proposed amendment of Articles VI and VII would effect a more efficient, more economical and more responsive government. The parliamentary system would allegedly ensure harmony between the legislative and executive branches of government, promote greater consensus, and provide faster and more decisive governmental action.

Sections 1 and 2 of Article XVII pertinently read:

Article XVII

SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

(2) A constitutional convention.

SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

It can be readily gleaned that the above provisions set forth different modes and procedures for proposals for the amendment and revision of the Constitution:

1. Under Section 1, Article XVII, any amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution may be proposed by –

a. Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

b. A constitutional convention.

2. Under Section 2, Article XVII, amendments to the Constitution may be likewise directly proposed by the people through initiative.

The framers of the Constitution deliberately adopted the terms "amendment" and "revision" and provided for their respective modes and procedures for effecting changes of the Constitution fully cognizant of the distinction between the two concepts. Commissioner Jose E. Suarez, the Chairman of the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions, explained:

MR. SUAREZ. One more point, and we will be through.

We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is, "amendment." However, the Committee finally agreed to use the terms – "amendment" or "revision" when our attention was called by the honorable Vice-President to the substantial difference in the connotation and significance between the said terms. As a result of our research, we came up with the observations made in the famous – or notorious – Javellana doctrine, particularly the decision rendered by Honorable Justice Makasiar, wherein he made the following distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of an existing Constitution: "Revision" may involve a rewriting of the whole Constitution. On the other hand, the act of amending a constitution envisages a change of specific provisions only. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times.

The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental Charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts.

So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two terms should be employed in the formulation of the Article governing amendments or revisions to the new Constitution.³⁰

Further, the framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted the term "revision" in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution because it was their intention to reserve the power to propose a revision of the Constitution to Congress or the constitutional convention. Stated in another manner, it was their manifest intent that revision thereof shall not be undertaken through the system of initiative. Instead, the revision of the Constitution shall be done either by Congress or by a constitutional convention.

It is significant to note that, originally, the provision on the system of initiative was included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions. The original draft provided:

SEC. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:

(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

(b) by a constitutional convention; or

(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article __ Section __ of the Constitution.³¹

However, after deliberations and interpellations, the members of the Commission agreed to remove the provision on the system of initiative from Section 1 and, instead, put it under a separate provision, Section 2. It was explained that the removal of the provision on initiative from the other "traditional modes" of changing the Constitution was precisely to limit the former (system of initiative) to amendments to the Constitution. It was emphasized that the system of initiative should not extend to revision.

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.

May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x³²

The intention to exclude "revision" of the Constitution as a mode that may be undertaken through the system of initiative was reiterated and made clear by Commissioner Suarez in response to a suggestion of Commissioner Felicitas Aquino:

MR. SUAREZ. Section 2 must be interpreted together with the provisions of Section 4, except that in Section 4, as it is presently drafted, there is no take-off date for the 60-day and 90-day periods.

MS. AQUINO. Yes. In other words, Section 2 is another alternative mode of proposing amendments to the Constitution which would further require the process of submitting it in a plebiscite, in which case it is not self-executing.

MR. SUAREZ. No, not unless we settle and determine the take-off period.

MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?

MR SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense conveyed by the Committee.

MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned by the Committee.³³

Then Commissioner Hilario P. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice) also made the clarification with respect to the observation of Commissioner Regalado Maambong:

MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?

MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."³⁴

After several amendments, the Commission voted in favor of the following wording of Section 2:

AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.

Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII as eventually worded read:

Article XVII

SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(3) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

(4) A constitutional convention.

SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

The final text of Article XVII on Amendments or Revisions clearly makes a substantial differentiation not only between the two terms but also between two procedures and their respective fields of application. Ineluctably, the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII as a mode of effecting changes in the Constitution is strictly limited to amendments – not to a revision – thereof.

As opined earlier, the framers of the Constitution, in providing for "amendment" and "revision" as different modes of changing the fundamental law, were cognizant of the distinction between the two terms. They particularly relied on the distinction made by Justice Felix Antonio in his concurring opinion in Javellana v. Executive Secretary,³⁵ the controversial decision which gave imprimatur to the 1973 Constitution of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, as follows:

There is clearly a distinction between revision and amendment of an existing constitution. Revision may involve a rewriting of the whole constitution. The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts of the existing constitution of the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times. The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts.³⁶

Other elucidation on the distinction between "amendment" and "revision" is enlightening. For example, Dean Vicente G. Sinco, an eminent authority on political law, distinguished the two terms in this manner:

Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the entire document. It may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revisions may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.

The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seemed obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.³⁷

In the United States, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Wheeler v. Board of Trustees³⁸ had the occasion to make the distinction between the two terms with respect to Ga.L. 1945, an instrument which "amended" the 1877 Constitution of Georgia. It explained the term "amendment:"

"Amendment" of a statute implies its survival and not destruction. It repeals or changes some provision, or adds something thereto. A law is amended when it is in whole or in part permitted to remain, and something is added to or taken from it, or it is in some way changed or altered to make it more complete or perfect, or to fit it the better to accomplish the object or purpose for which it was made, or some other object or purpose.³⁹

On the other hand, the term "revision" was explained by the said US appellate court:

x x x When a house is completely demolished and another is erected on the same location, do you have a changed, repaired and altered house, or do you have a new house? Some of the materials contained in the old house may be used again, some of the rooms may be constructed the same, but this does not alter the fact that you have altogether another or a new house. We conclude that the instrument as contained in Ga.L. 1945, pp. 8 to 89, inclusive, is not an amendment to the constitution of 1877; but on the contrary it is a completely revised or new constitution.⁴⁰

Fairly recently, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, a member of the Constitutional Commission, expounded on the distinction between the two terms thus:

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplate a re-examination of the entire document – or of provisions of the document (which have overall implications for the entire document or for the fundamental philosophical underpinnings of the document) – to determine how and to what extent it should be altered. Thus, for instance, a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its overall impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution.

It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not the quantum of change in the document. Rather, it is the fundamental qualitative alteration that effects revision. Hence, I must reject the puerile argument that the use of the plural form of "amendments" means that a revision can be achieved by the introduction of a multiplicity of amendments!⁴¹

Given that revision necessarily entails a more complex, substantial and far-reaching effects on the Constitution, the framers thereof wisely withheld the said mode from the system of initiative. It should be recalled that it took the framers of the present Constitution four months from June 2, 1986 until October 15, 1986 to come up with the draft Constitution which, as described by the venerable Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma, the President of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, "gradually and painstakingly took shape through the crucible of sustained sometimes passionate and often exhilarating debates that intersected all dimensions of the national life."⁴²

Evidently, the framers of the Constitution believed that a revision thereof should, in like manner, be a product of the same extensive and intensive study and debates. Consequently, while providing for a system of initiative where the people would directly propose amendments to the Constitution, they entrusted the formidable task of its revision to a deliberative body, the Congress or Constituent Assembly.

The Constitution is the fundamental law of the state, containing the principles upon which the government is founded, and regulating the division of sovereign powers, directing to what persons each of those powers is to be confided and the manner in which it is to be exercised.⁴³ The Philippines has followed the American constitutional legal system in the sense that the term constitution is given a more restricted meaning, i.e., as a written organic instrument, under which governmental powers are both conferred and circumscribed.⁴⁴

The Constitution received its force from the express will of the people. An overwhelming 16,622,111, out of 21,785,216 votes cast during the plebiscite, or 76.30% ratified the present Constitution on February 2, 1987.⁴⁵ In expressing that will, the Filipino people have incorporated therein the method and manner by which the same can be amended and revised, and when the electorate have incorporated into the fundamental law the particular manner in which the same may be altered or changed, then any course which disregards that express will is a direct violation of the fundamental law.⁴⁶

Further, these provisions having been incorporated in the Constitution, where the validity of a constitutional amendment or revision depends upon whether such provisions have been complied with, such question presents for consideration and determination a judicial question, and the courts are the only tribunals vested with power under the Constitution to determine such question.⁴⁷

Earlier, it was mentioned that Article XVII, by the use of the terms "amendment" and "revision," clearly makes a differentiation not only between the two terms but also between two procedures and their respective fields of application. On this point, the case of McFadden v. Jordan⁴⁸ is instructive. In that case, a "purported initiative amendment" (referred to as the proposed measure) to the State Constitution of California, then being proposed to be submitted to the electors for ratification, was sought to be enjoined. The proposed measure, denominated as "California Bill of Rights," comprised a single new article with some 208 subsections which would repeal or substantially alter at least 15 of the 25 articles of the California State Constitution and add at least four new topics. Among the likely effects of the proposed measure were to curtail legislative and judicial functions, legalize gaming, completely revise the taxation system and reduce the powers of cities, counties and courts. The proposed measure also included diverse matters as ministers, mines, civic centers, liquor control and naturopaths.

The Supreme Court of California enjoined the submission of the proposed measure to the electors for ratification because it was not an "amendment" but a "revision" which could only be proposed by a convention. It held that from an examination of the proposed measure itself, considered in relation to the terms of the California State Constitution, it was clear that the proposed initiative enactment amounted substantially to an attempted revision, rather than amendment, thereof; and that inasmuch as the California State Constitution specifies (Article XVIII §2 thereof) that it may be revised by means of constitutional convention but does not provide for revision by initiative measure, the submission of the proposed measure to the electorate for ratification must be enjoined.

As piercingly enunciated by the California State Supreme Court in McFadden, the differentiation required (between amendment and revision) is not merely between two words; more accurately it is between two procedures and between their respective fields of application. Each procedure, if we follow elementary principles of statutory construction, must be understood to have a substantial field of application, not to be a mere alternative procedure in the same field. Each of the two words, then, must be understood to denote, respectively, not only a procedure but also a field of application appropriate to its procedure.⁴⁹

Provisions regulating the time and mode of effecting organic changes are in the nature of safety-valves – they must not be so adjusted as to discharge their peculiar function with too great facility, lest they become the ordinary escape-pipes of party passion; nor, on the other hand, must they discharge it with such difficulty that the force needed to induce action is sufficient also to explode the machine. Hence, the problem of the Constitution maker is, in this particular, one of the most difficult in our whole system, to reconcile the requisites for progress with the requisites for safety.⁵⁰

Like in McFadden, the present petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution is, despite its denomination, one for its revision. It purports to seek the amendment only of Articles VI and VII of the Constitution as well as to provide transitory provisions. However, as will be shown shortly, the amendment of these two provisions will necessarily affect other numerous provisions of the Constitution particularly those pertaining to the specific powers of Congress and the President. These powers would have to be transferred to the Parliament and the Prime Minister and/or President, as the case may be. More than one hundred (100) sections will be affected or altered thereby:

1. Section 19 of Article III (Bill of Rights) on the power of Congress to impose the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes;

2. Section 2 of Article V (Suffrage) on the power of Congress to provide for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting;

3. All 32 Sections of Article VI on the Legislative Department;

4. All 23 Sections of Article VII on the Executive Department;

5. The following Sections of Article VIII (Judicial Department):

- Section 2 on power of Congress to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts;

- Section 7 on the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts;

- Section 8 on the composition of Judicial Bar Council (JBC) which includes representatives of Congress as ex officio members and on the power of the President to appoint the regular members of the JBC;

- Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts;

- Section 16 on duty of Supreme Court to make annual report to the President and Congress.

6. The following Sections of Article IX (Constitutional Commissions);

- (B) Section 3 on duty of Civil Service Commission to make annual report to the President and Congress;

- (B) Section 5 on power of Congress to provide by law for the standardization of compensation of government officials;

- (B) Section 8 which provides in part that "no public officer shall accept, without the consent of Congress, any present, emolument, etc. x x x"

- (C) Section 1 on the power of the President to appoint the Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on Elections with the consent of the Commission on Appointments;

- (C) Section 2 (7) on the power of the COMELEC to recommend to Congress measures to minimize election spending x x x;

- (C) Section 2 (8) on the duty of the COMELEC to recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action x x x;

- (C) Section 2 (9) on the duty of the COMELEC to submit to the President and Congress a report on the conduct of election, plebiscite, etc.;

- (C) Section 5 on the power of the President, with the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC, to grant pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and regulations;

- (C) Section 7 which recognizes as valid votes cast in favor of organization registered under party-list system;

- (C) Section 8 on political parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system;

- (D) Section 1 (2) on the power of the President to appoint the Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) with the consent of the Commission of Appointments;

- Section 4 on duty of the COA to make annual report to the President and Congress.

7. The following Sections of Article X (Local Government):

- Section 3 on the power of Congress to enact a local government code;

- Section 4 on the power of the President to exercise general supervision over local government units (LGUs);

- Section 5 on the power of LGUs to create their own sources of income x x x, subject to such guidelines as Congress may provide;

- Section 11 on the power of Congress to create special metropolitan political subdivisions;

- Section 14 on the power of the President to provide for regional development councils x x x;

- Section 16 on the power of the President to exercise general supervision over autonomous regions;

- Section 18 on the power of Congress to enact organic act for each autonomous region as well as the power of the President to appoint the representatives to the regional consultative commission;

- Section 19 on the duty of the first Congress elected under the Constitution to pass the organic act for autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.

8. The following Sections of Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers):

- Section 2 on the impeachable officers (President, Vice-President, etc.);

- Section 3 on impeachment proceedings (exclusive power of the House to initiate complaint and sole power of the Senate to try and decide impeachment cases);

- Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the Ombudsman and his deputies;

- Section 16 which provides in part that "x x x no loans or guaranty shall be granted to the President, Vice-President, etc.

- Section 17 on mandatory disclosure of assets and liabilities by public officials including the President, Vice-President, etc.

9. The following Sections of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony):

- Section 2 on the power of Congress to allow, by law, small-scale utilization of natural resources and power of the President to enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations and duty to notify Congress of every contract;

- Section 3 on the power of Congress to determine size of lands of public domain;

- Section 4 on the power of Congress to determine specific limits of forest lands;

- Section 5 on the power of Congress to provide for applicability of customary laws;

- Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish an independent economic and planning agency to be headed by the President;

- Section 10 on the power of Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens or domestic corporations(at least 60% Filipino-owned) certain areas of investment;

- Section 11 on the sole power of Congress to grant franchise for public utilities;

- Section 15 on the power of Congress to create an agency to promote viability of cooperatives;

- Section 16 which provides that Congress shall not, except by general law, form private corporations;

- Section 17 on the salaries of the President, Vice-President, etc. and the power of Congress to adjust the same;

- Section 20 on the power of Congress to establish central monetary authority.

10. The following Sections of Article XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights):

- Section 1 on the mandate of Congress to give highest priority to enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of people x x x

- Section 4 on the power of Congress to prescribe retention limits in agrarian reform;

- Section 18 (6) on the duty of the Commission on Human Rights to recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights;

- Section 19 on the power of Congress to provide for other cases to fall within the jurisdiction of the Commission on Human Rights.

11. The following Sections of Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, etc.):

- Section 4 on the power of Congress to increase Filipino equity participation in educational institutions;

- Section 6 which provides that subject to law and as Congress may provide, the Government shall sustain the use of Filipino as medium of official communication;

- Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish a national language commission;

- Section 11 on the power of Congress to provide for incentives to promote scientific research.

12. The following Sections of Article XVI (General Provisions):

- Section 2 on the power of Congress to adopt new name for the country, new national anthem, etc.;

- Section 5 (7) on the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff which may be extended by the President in times of war or national emergency declared by Congress;

- Section 11 on the power of Congress to regulate or prohibit monopolies in mass media;

- Section 12 on the power of Congress to create consultative body to advise the President on indigenous cultural communities.

13. The following Sections of Article XVII (Amendments or Revisions):

- Section 1 on the amendment or revision of Constitution by Congress;

- Section 2 on the duty of Congress to provide for the implementation of the system of initiative;

- Section 3 on the power of Congress to call constitutional convention to amend or revise the Constitution.

14. All 27 Sections of Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions).

The foregoing enumeration negates the claim that "the big bulk of the 1987 Constitution will not be affected."⁵¹Petitioners' proposition, while purportedly seeking to amend only Articles VI and VII of the Constitution and providing transitory provisions, will, in fact, affect, alter, replace or repeal other numerous articles and sections thereof. More than the quantitative effects, however, the revisory character of petitioners' proposition is apparent from the qualitative effects it will have on the fundamental law.

I am not impervious to the commentary of Dean Vicente G. Sinco that the revision of a constitution, in its strict sense, refers to a consideration of the entire constitution and the procedure for effecting such change; while amendment refers only to particular provisions to be added to or to be altered in a constitution.⁵²

For clarity and accuracy, however, it is necessary to reiterate below Dean Sinco's more comprehensive differentiation of the terms:

Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the entire document. It may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revisions may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.

The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seemed obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.⁵³

A change in the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, following the above distinction, entails a revision of the Constitution as it will involve "alteration of different portions of the entire document" and "may result in the rewriting of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions."

More importantly, such shift in the form of government will, without doubt, fundamentally change the basic plan and substance of the present Constitution. The tripartite system ordained by our fundamental law divides governmental powers into three distinct but co-equal branches: the legislative, executive and judicial. Legislative power, vested in Congress which is a bicameral body consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate, is the power to make laws and to alter them at discretion. Executive power, vested in the President who is directly elected by the people, is the power to see that the laws are duly executed and enforced. Judicial power, vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts, is the power to construe and apply the law when controversies arise concerning what has been done or omitted under it. This separation of powers furnishes a system of checks and balances which guards against the establishment of an arbitrary or tyrannical government.

Under a unicameral-parliamentary system, however, the tripartite separation of power is dissolved as there is a fusion between the executive and legislative powers. Essentially, the President becomes a mere "symbolic head of State" while the Prime Minister becomes the head of government who is elected, not by direct vote of the people, but by the members of the Parliament. The Parliament is a unicameral body whose members are elected by legislative districts. The Prime Minister, as head of government, does not have a fixed term of office and may only be removed by a vote of confidence of the Parliament. Under this form of government, the system of checks and balances is emasculated.

Considering the encompassing scope and depth of the changes that would be effected, not to mention that the Constitution's basic plan and substance of a tripartite system of government and the principle of separation of powers underlying the same would be altered, if not entirely destroyed, there can be no other conclusion than that the proposition of petitioners Lambino, et al. would constitute a revision of the Constitution rather than an amendment or "such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed."⁵⁴ As has been shown, the effect of the adoption of the petitioners' proposition, rather than to "within the lines of the original instrument" constitute "an improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed," is to "substantially alter the purpose and to attain objectives clearly beyond the lines of the Constitution as now cast."⁵⁵

To paraphrase McFadden, petitioners' contention that any change less than a total one is amendatory would reduce to the rubble of absurdity the bulwark so carefully erected and preserved. A case might, conceivably, be presented where the question would be occasion to undertake to define with nicety the line of demarcation; but we have no case or occasion here.

As succinctly by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, "a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its overall impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution. It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not the quantum of change in the document. Rather, it is the fundamental qualitative alteration that effects revision."⁵⁶

The petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution filed by petitioners Lambino, et al., being in truth and in fact a proposal for the revision thereof, is barred from the system of initiative upon any legally permissible construction of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

The Petition for Initiative on
Amendments to the Constitution
is, on its Face, Insufficient in
Form and Substance

Again, even granting arguendo RA 6735 is declared sufficient to implement the system of initiative and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, as it prescribed rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is valid, still, the petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution must be dismissed for being insufficient in form and substance.

Section 5 of RA 6735 requires that a petition for initiative on the Constitution must state the following:

1. Contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;

2. The proposition;

3. The reason or reasons therefor;

4. That it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;

5. Signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

6. An abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.

Section 7 thereof requires that the signatures be verified in this wise:

SEC. 7. Verification of Signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.

The law mandates upon the election registrar to personally verify the signatures. This is a solemn and important duty imposed on the election registrar which he cannot delegate to any other person, even to barangay officials. Hence, a verification of signatures made by persons other than the election registrars has no legal effect.

In patent violation of the law, several certifications submitted by petitioners showed that the verification of signatures was made, not by the election registrars, but by barangay officials. For example, the certification of the election officer in Lumbatan, Lanao del Sur reads in full:

LOCAL ELECTION OFFICER'S CERTIFICATION⁵⁷

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that based on the verifications made by the Barangay Officials in this City/Municipality, as attested to by two (2) witnesses from the same Barangays, which is part of the 2^nd Legislative District of the Province of Lanao del Sur, the names appearing on the attached signature sheets relative to the proposed initiative on Amendments to the 1987 Constitution, are those of bonafide resident of the said Barangays and correspond to the names found in the official list of registered voters of the Commission on Elections and/or voters' affidavit and/or voters' identification cards.

It is further certified that the total number of signatures of the registered voters for the City/Municipality of LUMBATAN, LANAO DEL SUR as appearing in the affixed signatures sheets is ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (1,180).

April 2, 2006

IBRAHIM M. MACADATO
Election Officer