due process on student expulsion from school

In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,48 the Court held that Guzman v. National University,49 not Ang Tibay, is the authority on the procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases. In Guzman, we laid down the minimum standards in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, as follows:

It bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and crossexamination is not, contrary to petitioners’ view, an essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.50

These standards render the petitioners’ arguments totally without merit.

In De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,51 where we affirmed the petitioning university’s right to exclude students from the rolls of their respective schools52 for their involvement in a fraternity mauling incident, we rejected the argument that there is a denial of due process when students are not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them in school disciplinary proceedings. We reject the same argument in this case.

We are likewise not moved by the petitioners’ argument that they were not given the opportunity to examine the neophytes’ written statements and the security officer’s incident report.53 These documents are admissible in school disciplinary proceedings, and may amount to substantial evidence to support a decision in these proceedings. In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,54 where the private respondents were students dismissed from their law school after participating in hazing activities, we held:

Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners’ February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. [Emphasis ours.]55

Since disciplinary proceedings may be summary, the insistence that a "formal inquiry" on the accusation against Kim should have been conducted lacks legal basis. It has no factual basis as well. While the petitioners state that Mr. and Mrs. Go were "never given an opportunity to assist Kim,"56 the records show that the respondents gave them two (2) notices, dated December 19, 2001 and January 8, 2002, for conferences on January 8, 2002 and January 15, 2002.57 The notices clearly state: "Dear Mr./Mrs. Go, We would like to seek your help in correcting Kim’s problem on: Discipline & Conduct Offense: Membership in Fraternity."58 Thus, the respondents had given them ample opportunity to assist their son in his disciplinary case.

The records also show that, without any explanation, both parents failed to attend the January 8, 2002 conference while Mr. Go did not bother to go to the January 15, 2002 conference. "Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot [thereafter] complain of deprivation of due process."59

Through the notices, the respondents duly informed the petitioners in writing that Kim had a disciplinary charge for fraternity membership. At the earlier November 23, 2001 Parents-Teachers Conference, Mr. Rosarda also informed Mrs. Go that the charge stemmed from the fraternity neophytes’ positive identification of Kim as a member; thus the petitioners fully knew of the nature of the evidence that stood against Kim.

The petitioners nevertheless argue that the respondents defectively observed the written notice rule because they had requested, and received, Kim’s written explanation at a time when the respondents had not yet issued the written notice of the accusation against him. The records indicate that while Kim’s denial and the first notice were both dated December 19, 2001, Kim had not yet received the notice at the time he made the requested written explanation.

We see no merit in this argument as the petitioners apparently hew to an erroneous view of administrative due process. Jurisprudence has clarified that administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in the strict judicial sense.60 The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.61 Thus, we are hard pressed to believe that Kim’s denial of his fraternity membership before formal notice was given worked against his interest in the disciplinary case. What matters for due process purpose is notice of what is to be explained, not the form in which the notice is given.

The raison d’etre of the written notice rule is to inform the student of the disciplinary charge against him and to enable him to suitably prepare a defense. The records show that as early as November 23, 2001, it was already made plain to the petitioners that the subject matter of the case against Kim was his alleged fraternity membership. Thus, by the time Mr. Rosarda spoke to Kim and asked for his written explanation in December 2001, Kim has had enough time to prepare his response to this plain charge. We also note that the information in the notice the respondents subsequently sent is no different from the information that they had earlier conveyed, albeit orally, to the petitioners: the simple unadorned statement that Kim stood accused of fraternity membership. Given these circumstances, we are not convinced that Kim’s right to explain his side as exercised in his written denial had been violated or diminished. The essence of due process, it bears repeating, is simply the opportunity to be heard.62

And Kim had been heard. His written explanation was received, indeed even solicited, by the respondents.1âwphi1 Thus, he cannot claim that he was denied the right to adduce evidence in his behalf. In fact, the petitioners were given further opportunity to produce additional evidence with the January 8, 2002 conference that they did not attend. We are also satisfied that the respondents had considered all the pieces of evidence and found these to be substantial. We note especially that the petitioners never imputed any motive on Kim’s co-students that would justify the claim that they uttered falsehood against him.

In Licup v. San Carlos University,63 the Court held that when a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right, and the court should not review the discretion of university authorities.64 In San Sebastian College v. Court of Appeals, et al.,65 we held that only when there is marked arbitrariness should the court interfere with the academic judgment of the school faculty and the proper authorities.66 In this case, we find that the respondents observed due process in Kim’s disciplinary case, consistent with our pronouncements in Guzman. No reason exists why the above principles in these cited cases cannot apply to this case. The respondents’ decision that Kim had violated a disciplinary rule and should be sanctioned must be respected.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 169391               October 10, 2012

GO, and Minor EMERSON CHESTER KIM B. GO, Petitioners,
vs.
COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, REV. FR. EDWIN LAO, REV. FR. JOSE RHOMMEL HERNANDEZ, ALBERT ROSARDA and MA. TERESA SURATOS, Respondents.