EN BANC
G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitioners,
vs.
VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., respondent. x --------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 170657 August 15, 2007
HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, the METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitioners,
vs.
MENCORP TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC., respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The following conditions in 1969, as observed by this Court:
Vehicles have increased in number. Traffic congestion
has moved from bad to worse, from tolerable to critical. The number of
people who use the thoroughfares has multiplied x x x,1
have remained unchecked and have reverberated to this
day. Traffic jams continue to clog the streets of Metro Manila,
bringing vehicles to a standstill at main road arteries during rush hour
traffic and sapping people’s energies and patience in the process.
The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted
in the traffic congestion problem, questions the authority of the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to order the closure of
provincial bus terminals along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and
major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.
Specifically challenged are two Orders issued by
Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 26 in Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 and 03-106224.
The first assailed Order of September 8, 2005,2
which resolved a motion for reconsideration filed by herein
respondents, declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179, hereafter referred
to as the E.O., "unconstitutional as it constitutes an unreasonable
exercise of police power." The second assailed Order of November 23,
20053 denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The following facts are not disputed:
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the E.O. on February 10, 2003, "Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System," the pertinent portions of which read:
As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the
primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the
numerous buses plying the streets and the inefficient connectivity of
the different transport modes;5 and the MMDA had "recommended
a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now
located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and
convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities"6 which plan is referred to under the E.O. as the Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project (the Project).
The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project.
Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC),
the governing board and policymaking body of the MMDA, issued
Resolution No. 03-07 series of 20037
expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing the imperative to
integrate the different transport modes via the establishment of common
bus parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the bus
terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.8
On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc.
(Viron), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of public
transportation with a provincial bus operation,9 filed a petition for declaratory relief10 before the RTC11 of Manila.
In its petition which was docketed as Civil Case No.
03-105850, Viron alleged that the MMDA, through Chairman Fernando, was
"poised to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or tantamount
to closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole of
the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic regulation."12
This impending move, it stressed, would mean the closure of its bus
terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon City.
Alleging that the MMDA’s authority does not include
the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon their existing
bus terminals to thus deprive them of the use of their property, Viron
asked the court to construe the scope, extent and limitation of the
power of the MMDA to regulate traffic under R.A. No. 7924, "An Act
Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, Defining its
Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes."
Viron also asked for a ruling on whether the planned
closure of provincial bus terminals would contravene the Public Service
Act and related laws which mandate public utilities to provide and
maintain their own terminals as a requisite for the privilege of
operating as common carriers.13
Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp),
another provincial bus operator, later filed a similar petition for
declaratory relief14 against Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo and MMDA Chairman Fernando.
Mencorp asked the court to declare the E.O.
unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of
owners and operators of public land transportation units over their
respective terminals.
Averring that MMDA Chairman Fernando had begun to
implement a plan to close and eliminate all provincial bus terminals
along EDSA and in the whole of the metropolis and to transfer their
operations to common bus terminals,15
Mencorp prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the impending closure
of its bus terminals which it was leasing at the corner of EDSA and New
York Street in Cubao and at the intersection of Blumentritt, Laon Laan
and Halcon Streets in Quezon City. The petition was docketed as Civil
Case No. 03-106224 and was raffled to Branch 47 of the RTC of Manila.
Mencorp’s petition was consolidated on June 19, 2003 with Viron’s petition which was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, Manila.
Mencorp’s prayer for a TRO and/or writ of injunction
was denied as was its application for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction.16
In the Pre-Trial Order17
issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to whether 1)
the MMDA’s power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the power
to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly
established and existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a
common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act
and the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be
deprived of their real properties without due process of law should they
be required to use the common bus terminals.
Upon the agreement of the parties, they filed their respective position papers in lieu of hearings.
By Decision18
of January 24, 2005, the trial court sustained the constitutionality
and legality of the E.O. pursuant to R.A. No. 7924, which empowered the
MMDA to administer Metro Manila’s basic services including those of
transport and traffic management.
The trial court held that the E.O. was a valid
exercise of the police power of the State as it satisfied the two tests
of lawful subject matter and lawful means, hence, Viron’s and Mencorp’s
property rights must yield to police power.
On the separate motions for reconsideration of Viron
and Mencorp, the trial court, by Order of September 8, 2005, reversed
its Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable
exercise of police power"; that the authority of the MMDA under Section
(5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to order the closure
of Viron’s and Mencorp’s existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is
inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution of November 23, 2005.
Hence, this petition, which faults the trial court
for failing to rule that: (1) the requisites of declaratory relief are
not present, there being no justiciable controversy in Civil Case Nos.
03-105850 and 03-106224; and (2) the President has the authority to
undertake or cause the implementation of the Project.19
Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable
controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body
of the E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus
terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Viron and
Mencorp, they argue, failed to produce any letter or communication from
the Executive Department apprising them of an immediate plan to close
down their bus terminals.
And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an
administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the
MMDA and to make available for use government property along EDSA and
South Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation created by
the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing
officials, but not between third persons.
The petition fails.
It is true, as respondents have pointed out, that the
alleged deficiency of the consolidated petitions to meet the
requirement of justiciability was not among the issues defined for
resolution in the Pre-Trial Order of January 12, 2004. It is equally
true, however, that the question was repeatedly raised by petitioners in
their Answer to Viron’s petition,20 their Comment of April 29, 2003 opposing Mencorp’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO,21 and their Position Paper of August 23, 2004.22
In bringing their petitions before the trial court,
both respondents pleaded the existence of the essential requisites for
their respective petitions for declaratory relief,23 and refuted petitioners’ contention that a justiciable controversy was lacking.24 There can be no denying, therefore, that the issue was raised and discussed by the parties before the trial court.
The following are the essential requisites for a
declaratory relief petition: (a) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests
are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for
judicial determination.25
The requirement of the presence of a justiciable controversy is satisfied when an actual controversy or the ripening seeds thereof exist between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and the declaration sought will help in ending the controversy.26 A question becomes justiciable when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually contested.27
In the present cases, respondents’ resort to court
was prompted by the issuance of the E.O. The 4th Whereas clause of the
E.O. sets out in clear strokes the MMDA’s plan to "decongest traffic by eliminating
the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares
and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system to the
commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal
facilities x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2 of the E.O. thereafter lays down the
immediate establishment of common bus terminals for north- and
south-bound commuters. For this purpose, Section 8 directs the
Department of Budget and Management to allocate funds of not more than
one hundred million pesos (P100,000,000) to cover the
cost of the construction of the north and south terminals. And the E.O.
was made effective immediately.
The MMDA’s resolve to immediately implement the
Project, its denials to the contrary notwithstanding, is also evident
from telltale circumstances, foremost of which was the passage by the
MMC of Resolution No. 03-07, Series of 2003 expressing its full support
of the immediate implementation of the Project.
Notable from the 5th Whereas clause of the MMC
Resolution is the plan to "remove the bus terminals located along major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila and an urgent need to integrate the
different transport modes." The 7th Whereas clause proceeds to mention
the establishment of the North and South terminals.
As alleged in Viron’s petition, a diagram of the
GMA-MTS North Bus/Rail Terminal had been drawn up, and construction of
the terminal is already in progress. The MMDA, in its Answer28 and Position Paper,29 in fact affirmed that the government had begun to implement the Project.
It thus appears that the issue has already transcended the boundaries of what is merely conjectural or anticipatory.lawphil
Under the circumstances, for respondents to wait for
the actual issuance by the MMDA of an order for the closure of
respondents’ bus terminals would be foolhardy for, by then, the proper
action to bring would no longer be for declaratory relief which, under
Section 1, Rule 6330 of the Rules of Court, must be brought before there is a breach or violation of rights.
As for petitioners’ contention that the E.O. is a
mere administrative issuance which creates no relation with third
persons, it does not persuade. Suffice it to stress that to ensure the
success of the Project for which the concerned government agencies are
directed to coordinate their activities and resources, the existing bus
terminals owned, operated or leased by third persons like respondents
would have to be eliminated; and respondents would be forced to operate
from the common bus terminals.
It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an
adverse effect on respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would
mean, among other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or
rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim a deprivation of
their constitutional right to property without due process of law.
Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal
and substantial interest in the case such that [they have] sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of [the E.O.’s] enforcement."31
Consequently, the established rule that the constitutionality of a law
or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a
direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied by
respondents.
On to the merits of the case.
Respondents posit that the MMDA is devoid of
authority to order the elimination of their bus terminals under the E.O.
which, they argue, is unconstitutional because it violates both the
Constitution and the Public Service Act; and that neither is the MMDA
clothed with such authority under R.A. No. 7924.
Petitioners submit, however, that the real issue
concerns the President’s authority to undertake or to cause the
implementation of the Project. They assert that the authority of the
President is derived from E.O. No. 125, "Reorganizing the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications Defining its Powers and Functions and
for Other Purposes," her residual power and/or E.O. No. 292, otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987. They add that the E.O. is also
a valid exercise of the police power.
E.O. No. 125,32
which former President Corazon Aquino issued in the exercise of
legislative powers, reorganized the then Ministry (now Department) of
Transportation and Communications. Sections 4, 5, 6 and 22 of E.O. 125,
as amended by E.O. 125-A,33 read:
SECTION 4. Mandate. — The Ministry shall be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity of the Executive Branch of the government in the promotion, development and regulation of dependable and coordinated networks of transportation and
communication systems as well as in the fast, safe, efficient and
reliable postal, transportation and communications services.
To accomplish such mandate, the Ministry shall have the following objectives:
(a) Promote the development of dependable and coordinated networks of transportation and communications systems;
(b) Guide government and private investment in the development of the country’s intermodal transportation and communications systems in
a most practical, expeditious, and orderly fashion for maximum safety,
service, and cost effectiveness; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
x x x x
SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. — To accomplish its mandate, the Ministry shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) Formulate and recommend national policies and
guidelines for the preparation and implementation of integrated and
comprehensive transportation and communications systems at the national,
regional and local levels;
(b) Establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications,
and for this purpose, may call on any agency, corporation, or
organization, whether public or private, whose development programs
include transportation and communications as an integral part thereof,
to participate and assist in the preparation and implementation of such
program;
(c) Assess, review and provide direction to
transportation and communications research and development programs of
the government in coordination with other institutions concerned;
(d) Administer all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and communications; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
x x x x
SECTION 6. Authority and Responsibility. — The
authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the
Ministry and for the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Minister of Transportation and Communications,
hereinafter referred to as the Minister, who shall have supervision and
control over the Ministry and shall be appointed by the President.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SECTION 22. Implementing Authority of Minister. — The Minister shall issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of this Executive Order. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is readily apparent from the abovequoted
provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, that the President, then
possessed of and exercising legislative powers, mandated the DOTC to be the primary
policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating
and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of
transportation and communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC
includes the power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications.
As may be seen further, the Minister (now Secretary)
of the DOTC is vested with the authority and responsibility to exercise
the mandate given to the department. Accordingly, the DOTC Secretary
is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other
issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of
the law.
Since, under the law, the DOTC is authorized to
establish and administer programs and projects for transportation, it
follows that the President may exercise the same power and authority to
order the implementation of the Project, which admittedly is one for
transportation.
Such authority springs from the President’s power of
control over all executive departments as well as the obligation for the
faithful execution of the laws under Article VII, Section 17 of the
Constitution which provides:
SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.
This constitutional provision is echoed in Section 1,
Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987. Notably, Section 38,
Chapter 37, Book IV of the same Code defines the President’s power of
supervision and control over the executive departments, viz:
SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative
Relationships. — Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in
other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies,
administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as
follows:
(1) Supervision and Control. — Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate;
direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts;
review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate
officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and
programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the
specific law governing the relationship of particular agencies the word
"control" shall encompass supervision and control as defined in this
paragraph. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, whenever a specific function is entrusted by
law or regulation to a subordinate, the President may act directly or
merely direct the performance of a duty.34
Respecting the President’s authority to order the
implementation of the Project in the exercise of the police power of the
State, suffice it to stress that the powers vested in the DOTC
Secretary to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated
programs for transportation and communications and to issue orders,
rules and regulations to implement such mandate (which, as previously
discussed, may also be exercised by the President) have been so
delegated for the good and welfare of the people. Hence, these powers
partake of the nature of police power.
Police power is the plenary power vested in the
legislature to make, ordain, and establish wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution, for
the good and welfare of the people.35
This power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people flows
from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex ─ the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
While police power rests primarily with the
legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact increasingly
being delegated.36 By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and administrative boards37
as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
governments under an express delegation by the Local Government Code of
1991.38
The authority of the President to order the
implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the designation of the
MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It
is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O.
No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is
authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject
of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to
establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the
authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary
implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development
and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized
to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of
the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the
authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
In another vein, the validity of the designation of
MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under
R.A. No. 7924.
To recall, R.A. No. 7924 declared the Metropolitan Manila area39
as a "special development and administrative region" and placed the
administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region under
the MMDA.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7924 specifically authorizes
the MMDA to perform "planning, monitoring and coordinative functions,
and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over
the delivery of metro-wide services," including transport and traffic
management.40 Section 5 of the same law enumerates the powers and functions of the MMDA as follows:
(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the
implementation of medium and long-term plans and programs for the
delivery of metro-wide services, land use and physical development
within Metropolitan Manila, consistent with national development
objectives and priorities;
(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the
implementation of medium-term investment programs for metro-wide
services which shall indicate sources and uses of funds for priority
programs and projects, and which shall include the packaging of projects
and presentation to funding institutions;
(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide
programs and projects for the delivery of specific services under its
jurisdiction, subject to the approval of the Council. For this purpose,
MMDA can create appropriate project management offices;
(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such
plans, programs and projects in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks and
adopt solutions to problems of implementation;
(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning
traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the
implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic
management, specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and
education. Upon request, it shall be extended assistance
and cooperation, including but not limited to, assignment of personnel,
by all other government agencies and offices concerned;
(f) Install and administer a single ticketing
system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of
violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether
moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke
drivers’ licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and
regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary
notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority shall impose all
traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic
operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers
of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of
non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain
authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the Authority
may impose; and
(g) Perform other related functions required to
achieve the objectives of the MMDA, including the undertaking of
delivery of basic services to the local government units, when deemed
necessary subject to prior coordination with and consent of the local
government unit concerned." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The scope of the function of MMDA as an administrative, coordinating and policy-setting body has been settled in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.41 In that case, the Court stressed:
Clearly, the scope of the MMDA’s function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport and traffic management
which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards
and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations,
infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of
the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport system
and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration
of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and
traffic education programs, including the institution of a single
ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this
service, the MMDA is expressly authorized to "to set the policies
concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of
all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may install and
administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and
penalties for all traffic violations.
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system
and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to ‘enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare’ of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a ‘development authority.’ It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating
with the various national government agencies, people’s organizations,
non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient
and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:
‘SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. — . . .
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters.’42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In light of the administrative nature of its powers
and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project
as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly
designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that
the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents’ terminals.
Even the MMDA’s claimed authority under the police power must necessarily fail in consonance with the above-quoted ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. and this Court’s subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin43 that the MMDA is not vested with police power.
Even assuming arguendo that police power was
delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the
two tests of a valid police power measure, viz: (1) the interest of the
public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class,
requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.44
Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly
grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes and the means.
As early as Calalang v. Williams,45
this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not merely a
private, concern. The Court therein held that public welfare underlies
the contested statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control traffic on
national roads.
Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46
this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the bottom of any
regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is,
to say the least, a menace to public safety."47
As such, measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of
the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular
traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power.
Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic
congestion is a public concern that needs to be addressed immediately.
Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt need to address the
worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the MMDA so
determined, is caused by the increasing volume of buses plying the major
thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of existing transport
systems. It is thus beyond cavil that the motivating force behind the
issuance of the E.O. is the interest of the public in general.
Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly
oppressive?
With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in
Metro Manila, the E.O. seeks to "eliminate[e] the bus terminals now
located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and provid[e] more
convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public
through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities x x x."48
Common carriers with terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro
Manila would thus be compelled to close down their existing bus
terminals and use the MMDA-designated common parking areas.
In Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc.,49 two city ordinances were passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Lucena, directing public utility vehicles to unload and load
passengers at the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, which was given the
exclusive franchise to operate a single common terminal. Declaring that
no other terminals shall be situated, constructed, maintained or
established inside or within the city of Lucena, the sanggunian declared as inoperable all temporary terminals therein.
The ordinances were challenged before this Court for being unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia,
the measures constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue
taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against monopolies.
Citing De la Cruz v. Paras50 and Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,51
this Court held that the assailed ordinances were characterized by
overbreadth, as they went beyond what was reasonably necessary to solve
the traffic problem in the city. And it found that the compulsory use of
the Lucena Grand Terminal was unduly oppressive because it would
subject its users to fees, rentals and charges.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an
equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised
within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due
deference to rights.
A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.
From the memorandum filed before this Court by
petitioner, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had
identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate
loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city
proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the
proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened.
If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to
load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the
terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals
could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which
are unable to meet the specifications.
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that
even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the
franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As in Lucena, this Court fails to see how the
prohibition against the existence of respondents’ terminals can be
considered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the
metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of respondents’ bus
terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally
harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a
case of transference from one site to another.
Less intrusive measures such as curbing the
proliferation of "colorum" buses, vans and taxis entering Metro Manila
and using the streets for parking and passenger pick-up points, as
respondents suggest, might even be more effective in easing the traffic
situation. So would the strict enforcement of traffic rules and the
removal of obstructions from major thoroughfares.
As to the alleged confiscatory character of the E.O.,
it need only to be stated that respondents’ certificates of public
convenience confer no property right, and are mere licenses or
privileges.52 As such, these must yield to legislation safeguarding the interest of the people.
Even then, for reasons which bear reiteration, the
MMDA cannot order the closure of respondents’ terminals not only because
no authority to implement the Project has been granted nor legislative
or police power been delegated to it, but also because the elimination
of the terminals does not satisfy the standards of a valid police power
measure.
Finally, an order for the closure of respondents’ terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act.
Paragraph (a), Section 13 of Chapter II of the Public
Service Act (now Section 5 of Executive Order No. 202, creating the
Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board or LFTRB) vested
the Public Service Commission (PSC, now the LTFRB) with "x x x
jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and their
franchises, equipment and other properties x x x."
Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC was empowered to "impose such conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require"53 in approving any franchise or privilege.
Further, Section 16 (g) and (h) of the Public Service Act54
provided that the Commission shall have the power, upon proper notice
and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act,
subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving
provisions to the contrary:
(g) To compel any public service to furnish safe, adequate, and proper service as regards the manner of furnishing the same as well as the maintenance of the necessary material and equipment.
(h) To require any public service to establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable extension of its existing facilities,
where in the judgment of said Commission, such extension is reasonable
and practicable and will furnish sufficient business to justify the
construction and maintenance of the same and when the financial
condition of the said public service reasonably warrants the original
expenditure required in making and operating such extension.(Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The establishment, as well as the maintenance of
vehicle parking areas or passenger terminals, is generally considered a
necessary service to be provided by provincial bus operators like
respondents, hence, the investments they have poured into the
acquisition or lease of suitable terminal sites. Eliminating the
terminals would thus run counter to the provisions of the Public Service
Act.
This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the
roadblocks thrown in the way of its efforts at solving the pestering
problem of traffic congestion in Metro Manila. These efforts are
commendable, to say the least, in the face of the abominable traffic
situation of our roads day in and day out. This Court can only
interpret, not change, the law, however. It needs only to be reiterated
that it is the DOTC ─ as the primary policy, planning,
programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative
entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and
communications ─ which has the power to establish and administer a transportation project like the Project subject of the case at bar.
No matter how noble the intentions of the MMDA may be
then, any plan, strategy or project which it is not authorized to
implement cannot pass muster.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisition, DENIED. E.O. No. 179 is declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires.
SO ORDERED.Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Luque v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-22545, November 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 408, 422.
2 Rollo, pp. 8-12.
3 Id. at 13.
4 Rollo, pp. 60-61.
5 4th Whereas Clause.
6 5th Whereas clause.
7 Rollo, pp. 194-195.
8 5th and 6th Whereas Clauses of MMDA Resolution No. 03-07, series of 2003. These clauses read:
WHEREAS, there is a need to remove the bus terminals
located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila and an urgent need to
integrate the different transport modes namely the buses, the rail-based
systems of the LRT, MRT and PNR in order to decongest traffic and
ensure efficient travel and comfort to the commuters;
WHEREAS, the Greater Manila Mass Transport System
Project aims to develop five (5) interim intermodal mass transport
terminals to integrate the different transport modes to serve the
commuting public in the northwest, north, east, south and southwest of
Metro Manila.
9 Viron’s authorized routes are from Metro Manila to Pangasinan, Nueva Ecija, Ilocos Sur and Abra and vice versa.
10 Rollo, pp. 64-75.11 Branch 26.
12 Rollo, pp. 67-68; pp. 4-5 of Viron’s Petition.
13 Rollo, p. 30.
14 Id. at 149-162.
15 Id. at 153; page 5 of Mencorp’s Petition.
16 Id. at 205-207.
17 Id. at 219-221.
18 Id. at 317-323.
19 Id. at 35.
20 Id. at 125-130; dated May 15, 2003.
21 Id. at 200-204.
22 Id. at 309-316.
23 Id. at 64-75 and 149-162; Viron’s petition dated February 21, 2003 and Mencorp’s petition dated March 25, 2003.
24 Id. at 135-148 and 222-249; Viron’s Reply dated June 17, 2003 and Viron’s Position Paper of March 16, 2004.
25 Republic v. Orbecido III,
G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 118; Board of Optometry
v. Colet, 328 Phil. 1187, 1205 (1996); Macasiano v. National Housing
Authority, G.R. No. 107921, July 1, 1993, 224 SCRA 236, 243.
26 International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines v. University of the Philippines, G.R. No. 521518, August 13, 1991, 200 SCRA 554, 569.
27 International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines v. University of the Philippines, supra.
28 Supra note 20 at 126; paragraph 11 thereof.29 Supra note 22 at 312.
30 Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. – Any person
interested under a deed, will, contract, or other written instrument,
whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and
for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphasis
supplied)
32 Dated January 30, 1987.
33
"Amending Executive Order No. 125, Entitled ‘Reorganizing the Ministry
of Transportation and Communications, Defining its Powers and Functions,
and For Other Purposes,’" dated April 13, 1987.
34 Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 534, 555.
35 Binay v. Domingo,
G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991, 201 SCRA508, 514; Presidential
Commission on Good Government v. Peña, G.R. No. L-77663, April 12, 1988,
159 SCRA 556, 574; Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660,
708.
36
In the early case of Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. v. The Public
Service Commission (70 Phil. 221,229 [1940]), this Court observed that
"with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward
the delegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward the
approval of the practice by the courts." (Underscoring supplied) Vide
also Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, G.R. No. L-76633, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 533, 544.
37 Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita,
G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005, 469 SCRA 1, 117; Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA) v. Bel-Air Village Association, 385
Phil. 586, 601.
38
SEC. 16. General Welfare. ─ Every local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as
well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient
and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion
of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among
other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health
and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
39
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of the local government
units of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon,
Muntinlupa, Las Piñas, Marikina, Parañaque, Valenzuela, Malabon,
Navotas, Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. (Sec. 1 of R.A. 7924)
40 Section 3 of R.A. No. 7924 provides the scope of MMDA services :
SECTION 3. Scope of MMDA Services. — Metro-wide
services under the jurisdiction of the MMDA are those services which
have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or
entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said
services to be provided by the individual local government units (LGUs)
comprising Metropolitan Manila. These services shall include:
(a) Development planning which includes the
preparation of medium and long-term development plans; the development,
evaluation and packaging of projects; investments programming; and
coordination and monitoring of plan, program and project implementation.
(b) Transport and traffic management which include
the formulation, coordination, and monitoring of policies, standards,
programs and projects to rationalize the existing transport
operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares, and
promotion of safe and convenient movement of persons and goods;
provision for the mass transport system and the institution of a system
to regulate road users; administration and implementation of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic
education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing
system in Metropolitan Manila.
(c) Solid waste disposal and management which include
formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and
projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise
include the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and
related facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs
intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste.
(d) Flood control and sewerage management which
include the formulation and implementation of policies, standards,
programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage and
sewerage system.
(e) Urban renewal, zoning, and land use planning, and
shelter services which include the formulation, adoption and
implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations, programs
and projects to rationalize and optimize urban land use and provide
direction to urban growth and expansion, the rehabilitation and
development of slum and blighted areas, the development of shelter and
housing facilities and the provision of necessary social services
thereof.
(f) Health and sanitation, urban protection and
pollution control which include the formulation and implementation of
policies, rules and regulations, standards, programs and projects for
the promotion and safeguarding of the health and sanitation of the
region and for the enhancement of ecological balance and the prevention,
control and abatement of environmental pollution.
(g) Public safety which includes the formulation and
implementation of programs and policies and procedures to achieve public
safety, especially preparedness for preventive or rescue operations
during times of calamities and disasters such as conflagrations,
earthquakes, flood and tidal waves, and coordination and mobilization of
resources and the implementation of contingency plans for the
rehabilitation and relief operations in coordination with national
agencies concerned.
41 Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) v. Bel-Air Village Association, supra note 37.
42 Supra at 607-608.
43 G.R. No. 130230, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 176, 185.
44 Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc.,
G.R. No. 148339, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 174, 185; Chavez v.
Romulo, supra note 34 at 563; Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, G.R.
No. L-38429, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 182, 191.
45 70 Phil. 726, 733 (1940).46 Supra note 1.
47 Supra at 423.
48 5th Whereas Clause.
49 Supra note 44.
50 G.R. No. L-42571-72,
July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 569. In this case, the Court declared as
unconstitutional an ordinance passed by the Municipality of Bocaue,
Bulacan, which prohibited the operation of all night clubs, cabarets and
dance halls within its jurisdiction for the protection of public
morals. Stating that the ordinance on its face was overbroad, the Court
held that the purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than an absolute prohibition.
51 G.R. No. L-77372,
April 29, 1988, 160 SCRA 848. The case involved a resolution issued by
the Professional Regulation Commission, which prohibited examinees from
attending review classes and receiving handout materials, tips, and the
like three days before the date of examination in order to preserve the
integrity and purity of the licensure examinations in accountancy. The
measure was declared by this Court not only to be unreasonable and
violative of academic freedom, but also to be more sweeping than what
was necessary.
52 Luque v. Villegas, supra note 1 at 418.53 Commonwealth Act No. 146, Chapter II, Section 16 (b).
54 The present provision of Section 5(k) of E.O. No. 202 reads:
k. To formulate, promulgate, administer, implement and enforce rules and regulations on land transportation public utilities, standards of measurements and/or design, and rules and regulations requiring operators of any public land transportation service to equip, install and provide in their utilities and in their stations such devices, equipment facilities and operating procedures and techniques as may promote safety, protection, comfort and convenience to persons and property in their charges as well as the safety of persons and property within their areas of
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