EN BANC
G.R. No. L-53492 December 29, 1986PERNITO ARRASTRE SERVICES, INC., APOLONIO BACALLA, doing business under the style "Bacalla Arrastre Services," ARISTON AGUILAR, doing business under the style "Aguilar Arrastre Services," ROMEO CABRAS, doing business under the style "Cabras Arrastre Services;" GUERRERO DAJAO, doing business under the style "Dajao Arrastre Services," NIÑ;O TAMARRA, doing business under the style "Tamarra Arrastre Services," JESUS GARCIA, doing business under the style "Garcia Arrastre Services," FRANCISCO AGUIRRE, doing business under the style "Sto. Rosario Arrastre Services," TEOFILO ESTOCE, doing business under the style "E & C Arrastre Services," RAMON P. TECSON, doing business under the style "Tecson Arrastre Services," MARCELO A. CANSANCIO, doing business under the style "Tabunec Arrastre Service," SIMEON M. PACA, SR., doing business under the style "A. O. Paca Arrastre Service," ANDRES ROMARIZ, doing business under the style "F. Figueroa Arrastre Service," NILO SERVILA, doing business under the style "Servila Arrastre Services," RHODA F. BANCOY, doing business under the style "Tan Arrastre Services," FILOMENO PEPITO, doing business under the style "F. Pepito & Villacruses Arrastre Services," VICTORINO SY, doing business under the style "E. V. Sy Arrastre Services," and ROMEO GADIANO doing business under the style "Gadiano Arrastre Service," petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, and the UNITED SOUTH DOCKHANDLERS, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. L-54265 December 29, 1986
THE EASTERN LEYTE ARRASTRE SERVICE, represented by its Manager ANACORITO AURELIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch IV; THE PHILIPPINE PORT AUTHORITY (TACLOBAN PORT SERVICE), represented by its Port Manager BENIGNO V. MAGPALE, JR.; and THE INTERNATIONAL COPRA EXPORT CORPORATION (TACLOBAN BR.), represented by its Branch Manager CELEDONIO MUTIA, respondents.
G.R. NO. L-54394 December 29, 1986
FROILAN BASIO, BERNARDO SIPACO, BONIFACIO MARTINEZ, GLICERIO VALLE, FORTUNATO BASIO, GENARO ROSALES, REMARICO MENDIOLA, CAMILO COBILLA, ALIPIO REPOLLO, MANUEL SOLAJES, ANTONIO ROSALES, VICENTE BASIO, REYNALDO BETUIN, HERMINIO JACA, GERARDO DEMESA, CARLITO LACBAYO, GREGORIO MARTIN and REGINO BALLAIS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JOSE P. ARRO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch I; and BENIGNO MAGPALE, JR., in his official capacity as both Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority, Tacloban Port, and Manager, Philippine Ports Authority — Tacloban Arrastre Port Service, Inc., respondents.
No. L-54565 December 29, 1989
LEYTE INTEGRATED PORT SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, Metro Manila; PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, PMU Tacloban; and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, Tacloban Arrastre Ports Services, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
These
petitions which are resolved in a consolidated decision seek to
permanently restrain the Philippine Ports Authority from taking over the
arrastre and stevedoring operations in the port of Tacloban, Leyte. The
petitioners invoke the constitutional right to due process of law and
to non-impairment of contract.
The background of these cases is as follows:
In November, 1972, an Ad Hoc Committee on Waterfront
Services was created by the Government to study the problems of arrastre
and stevedoring operations in various ports in the Philippines. Among
the problems pinpointed were the proliferation of the oppressive "cabo
system" and the increase in the incidence of violence and thefts in the
ports. There was also recognized a need to streamline port operations,
ensure the smooth flow of water borne commerce in international and
domestic trade, and promote regional development through improved port
facilities.
On April 23, 1973, the Committee recommended the
integration of arrastre and stevedoring operations in each port so that
ultimately only one contractor would be authorized to service that port.
On May 8, 1975, the Bureau of Customs issued Memorandum Order No.
28-75, providing for the merger of all existing cargo-handling
contractors in each port.
To effect the gradual integration of the several
arrastre and stevedoring labor contractors then operating in the Port of
Tacloban, the Bureau of Customs decided to require the merger of the
thirty-six (36) existing labor contractors into four corporations, and
then to just one. Accordingly, four organizations were formed, namely:
(1) Tacloban Waterfront Labor and Arrastre Service Cooperative, Inc., or
TWALSCI which absorbed herein petitioner Eastern Leyte Arrastre
Service; (2) San Juanico Pumpboats and Motor Launches Stevedoring and
Delivery Service, Inc., (3) Sealand, Inc., and (4) Tacloban Port
Services, Inc.
On December 23, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 857
took effect as a result of which the powers, duties, and jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Customs with regard to arrastre and stevedoring
operations were transferred to and vested in the respondent Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA). Pursuant to said decree, PPA was authorized among
others, to "regulate the rates or charges for port services or port
related services so that, taking one year with another, such rates or
charges furnish adequate working capital and produce an adequate return
on the assets of the Authority" (PPA) [Sec. 20 (b) ] and "to levy dues,
rates, or charges for the use of the premises, works, appliances,
facilities, or for services provided by or belonging to the authority or
any other organization concerned with port operations." [Sec. 6(b)
(ix)].
Pursuant to said decree, respondent PPA imposed a ten
percent (10%) charge on the monthly gross earnings of the operators of
arrastre and stevedoring services.
Through its memorandum Order No. 21, series of 1977,
PPA also adopted as its own, the Bureau of Customs' policy of
integrating the operation of arrastre and stevedoring services in each
port. This policy was applied to the port of Tacloban where the four
arrastre/stevedoring operators, mentioned earlier, agreed to merge and
form one of the petitioners herein, the Leyte Integrated Port Services,
Inc. (LIPSI).
On January 31, 1978, PPA issued a temporary permit to petitioner LIPSI, subject to several conditions, one of which
7. That
this temporary permit is non-transferrable and shall remain valid until a
special permit shall be issued by PPA Manila, provided, however, that
the same may be revoked for violation of any of the conditions herein
set or justifiable cause(s) at the discretion of this Authority.
Meanwhile
on February 27, 1978, petitioner Pernito Arrastre Services, Inc. and
other arrastre operators filed with the then Court of First Instance of
Cebu an action for declaratory relief and mandamus against the PPA,
assailing the validity of the integration policy which would, in effect,
authorize only one arrastre operator in each port in the Philippines
and the authority of PPA to collect ten percent (10%) of the gross
arrastre and stevedoring charges paid to operators.
On March 31, 1978, the trial court issued a writ of injunction, prohibiting the PPPA, pendente lite,
from enforcing its policy of integration in the Cebu City port and
directing it to allow the petitioners to operate individually and
independently as arrastre and stevedoring contractors. However, with
respect to the collection of the ten percent (10%) charge by PPA, the
court ruled that it was going to presume its reasonableness in the
meantime since PPA was merely following the rate fixed by the Bureau of
Customs.
Not satisfied with the court's order, respondent PPA
filed a petition for certiorari before this Court as a result of which a
temporary restraining order was issued enjoining the trial court from
enforcing its order. We, however, subsequently allowed the trial court
to proceed with the case. consequently, the petitioners filed a
supplemental application for preliminary injunction seeking to stop
respondent PPA from collecting the aforestated ten percent (10%) charge.
The trial court denied the petitioners' supplemental application on the
ground that the reason relied upon does not appear to be indubitable.
Hence, petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari, G.R. No.
53492, with this Court.
Only July 22, 1980, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the PPA from collecting from petitioners the
ten percent (10%) of their gross income from arrastre operations.
On June 14, 1983, the Nasipit Integrated Arrastre
& Stevedoring, Inc. filed a motion for intervention asking that in
view of the restraining order issued by this Court, it should not be
required to pay ten percent (10%) of its gross earnings to PPA.
In the meantime, according to respondent PPA, in the
course of the operation of arrastre services by the petitioner LIPSI, it
noted a number of violations of the temporary permit. The violations
consisted of inefficiency in providing services due to failure to
acquire the needed cargo-handling equipment; inability to render night
work; permitting illegal operations by unlicenses individual labor
contractors or cabos whom petitioner was supposed to have absorbed by
the process of merger; employment of child labor; and non-remittance of
the government share of arrastre charges.
As a result, the respondent gave the petitioner
several written and verbal warnings to carry out the needed reforms in
its operations.
Meanwhile, on April 14, 1978, Jose M. Asturias, the
Executive Vice-President and General Manager of petitioner wrote
respondent PPA admitting petitioner's failure to comply with the
conditions of its temporary permit. A portion of said letter reads:
While there
has been an integration on paper, the conditions existing at the
Tacloban pier before the supposed integration remain the same. Labor
contractors still cling to their over-powering position as lords of the
lowly pier workers, getting a lion's share of the fees they collect and
paying their workers measly sums which provide the laborers a sub-human
level of existence at most. Moreover, the amounts they turn over to the
supposedly integrated corporation are so miniscule and barely enough to
pass the SSS, and ECC, the BIR and other governmental creditors,
including the PPA which gets 10% of the gross receipts. While they
verbally agree to integrate, they decline and refuse to relinquish
control of their respective contracts with the pertinent shipping
companies.
On April
26, 1979, respondent PPA issued Special Order No. 114-79 creating the
Philippine Ports Authority-Tacloban Arrastre Ports Services (PPA-TAPS)
within its worn Tacloban port unit and ordering a take-over by PPA-TAPS
of the entire arrastre and stevedoring services in the Port of Tacloban,
effective not later than June 1, 1979, petitioner LIPSI, as well all
port users were duly informed of the take-over by PPA-TAPS.
On June 1, 1979, PPA-TAPS tooks over the actual
management and operations of arrastre and stevedoring services in the
port of Tacloban. For this purpose, PPA-TAPS utilized the same dock
labor force that existed at the time of the cancellation of the permit
of petitioner LIPSI. According to respondent PPA, after such take-over,
the dockworkers where placed on regular payrolls; their social security
premiums were promptly paid and all illegal exactions from their pay
were stopped; they were issued free uniforms and hard hats for safety
and protection; and they organized a genuine labor organization, the
Tacloban Port Service Labor Union (TAPSLU) for the protection of their
rights.
As result of the take-over, respondent PPA sent a
notice to respondent International Copra Export Corporation (INTER-CO), a
corporation with a stevedoring contract with petitioner Eastern Leyte
Arrastre Service (Eastern Leyte) reiterating the fact that effective
June 1, 1979, PPA has taken over the cargo-handling operations in the
port of Tacloban and therefore, all transactions and payments relevant
to said cargo-handling operations should be coursed through the
management of the PPA at Tacloban. Consequently, INTERCO, in turn, sent a
formal letter to petitioner Eastern Leyte demanding a refund of the
payments it made for the services rendered by said petitioner on June 2
and 16, 1979.
On July 5, 1979, petitioner Eastern Leyte filed an
action with the then Court of First Instance of Leyte for injunction
with preliminary injunction, prohibition and damages seeking to restrain
respondent INTERCO from making any payment to respondent PPA-TAPS and
to prevent the latter from taking over the operations of petitioner,
alleging that the same was illegal, against public policy and an
impairment of the contract executed by and between petitioner and
INTERCO.
On August 16, 1979, the respondent judge issued a
writ or preliminary injunction against respondent PPA. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the latter alleging amount others, that
under Presidential Decree No. 857, it has the authority to take over the
operation of arrestre and stevedoring services to the exclusion of all
private contractors, including the petitioner.
On January 28, 1980, the respondent judge granted
respondent PPA's motion, stating that since there is no showing that
P.D. No. 857 is unconstitutional and in view of the well known
presumption of validity that every statute has in its favor, there is no
reason for not yielding to the motion of PPA to dissolve the writ of
preliminary injunction.
Petitioner Eastern Leyte filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, it filed this petition
in G.R. No. 54265.
On July 17, 1980, we issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the trial court from further proceeding with the trial
of the case and the respondent PPA from taking over the arrastre
operations of petitioner in the port of Tacloban.
On February 18, 1980, a similar petition was filed by
Froilan Basio and other labor contractors with the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, questioning the PPA-TAPS' take-over of the port of
Tacloban and alleging that the same constituted an impairment of the
contract between petitioners and the owners of motor launches and
between petitioners and respondent PPA. As evidence of the latter
allegation, the petitioners attached to their petition a copy of the
"Memorandum" of the Leyte-Samar Labor Union and Benigno Magpale, Inc.,
the manager of the PPA-PMU of Tacloban whereby the latter agreed to
remit ten percent (10%) of the gross income derived from the port users
serviced by the Leyte-Samar Labor Union for the period July 1 to 31,
1979 to the petitioners as labor contractors.
Initially, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order. However, instead of deciding the petition on the
merits, it called the parties to a series of conferences to find means
and ways whereby the petitioners as labor contractors and the workers
under them could be absorbed under the new set-up. The respondent PPA
submitted its "Compliance," binding itself to absorb the aforementioned
labor contractors and workers. It assured them that whoever would be the
winning bidder of the arrastre service, he must utilize the services of
the labor force who are all members of the waterfront union.
In view of this "Compliance" submitted by PPA, the trial court dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
alleging that the decision of the trial court had no evidence to support
itself and that trial should have been conducted because there were
allegations raised by both sides which needed conducted because there
were allegations raised by both sides which needed to be clarified and
settled. They also sought the issuance of a restraining order against
the PPA. The motion, however, was denied by said court. Thus, instead of
waiting for the trial court on the ground that the same violated the
petitioners' right to due process of law.
On August 5, 1980, LIPSI filed a petition for
certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction, G.R. No. 54565,
questioning the validity and constitutionality of portions of P.D. 505
and P.D. 857 (Sec. 6(a) (v) on the ground that said provisions from
which the PPA derives its authority to take-over the port of Leyte
violate the petitioner's right to due process of the port of Leyte
violate the petitioners right to due process of law. In the alternative,
it asked that we define and clarify the extent of PPA's authority to
take-over the port services of all ports in the country as well as to
grant the same to an exclusive contractor, firm, or corporation.
On August 26, 1980, we issued a resolution consolidating the four petitions.
On September 30, 1980, TAPSLU filed a motion to intervene in the case of LIPSI v. PPA, et al.,
alleging that it has a legal interest in the matters in issue as it
constitutes the entire labor force of the stevedoring and arrastre
services turned over by this Court to petitioner LIPSI.
The main thrust of the issues raised in these
consolidated petitions is whether or not the respondent PPA's take-over
through PPA-TAPS of arrastre operations in the port of Tacloban, Leyte
is a valid exercise of police power and does not violate the
constitutional right of the petitioners to non-impairment of contracts.
Petitioner
Eastern Leyte contends that PPA's take over constitutes an impairment of
the contract executed by and between itself and respondent INTERCO,
which cannot be justified because a valid impairment of contract is only
be justified because a valid impairment of contract is only applicable
to franchises issued by the government to operators of public utilities
which involved public interest, public welfare, public health, and
public safety. Petitioners Froilan Basio, et al., while assailing the
procedural aspect of the proceedings in the trial court, also content
the PPA's take over constitutes an impairment o f contract and a
deprivation of property without due process of law. Petitioner LIPSI
goes further and challenges the constitutionality of the repealed
portion of P.D. 505 1 and Section 6(a) (v) of P.D. 857 2 as
being violative not only of the due process and non-impairment clauses
of the Constitution but also of the right to free enterprise by creating
the dangerous blanket of a monopoly in restraint of trade, which
creation is subject to the respondent PP's whims and caprices.
Petitioner Pernito Arrastre questions the validity of the ten percent
(10%) charge imposed by PPA.
In the case of Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation v. Lazaro
(124 SCRA 494, 512, 513 and 519), we have already underscored the fact
that the arrastre operations in the various ports in the Philippines are
affected with public interest. We ruled:
The
streamlining of the stevedoring activities in the various ports of the
Philippines was undertaken by PPA to implement LOI No. 1005-A. The
public interest, public welfare, and public policy sought to be
subserved by said LOI are clearly set forth in its whereas clauses ...
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, there is reasonable relation between the
undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the statutory
attempt to avoid it. "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations." (See Alalayan v. National Power Corporation,
24 SCRA 172; and Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owners Association v.
City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849). These considerations were considered by the
respondent judge when he issued his questioned order dated September 1,
1980...
xxx xxx xxx
The Manila
South Harbor is public property owned by the State. The operations of
the premiere port of the country, including stavedoring work, are
affected iwth public interest. Stevedoring services are subject to
regulation and control for the public good and in the interest of
general welfare.
Undoubtedly,
therefore, the State in the exercise of its police power through its
agency, the PPA, has the power to revoke the temporary permits of
petitioners, assuming the existence of valid temporary permits, and take
over the operations of the port of Tacloban whenever the need to
promote the public interest and welfare both if the stevedoring industry
and the workers therein justifies such take over. This Court has
already ruled that the statute which gives PPA the authority to
implement the take over cannot be assailed on the constitutional grounds
raised by the petitioners may have acquired on the basis of the
temporary permits earlier given them must yield to the State's valid
exercised of police power. As we have ruled in Bautista v. Juinio (127 SCRA 329, 338):
4. In
the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power,
especially so where the assailed governmental action deals with the use
of one's property, the latter is accorded much leeway. That is settled
law. what is more, it is good law. Due process, therefore, cannot
validly be invoked. As stressed in the cited Ermita-Malate Hotel
decision (127 Phil. 306, 315), "To hold otherwise would be to unduly
restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable
of powers, extending, as its goes "to all the great public needs ...
Neither can petitioners argue that their right to non-impairment of contract had been violated. In the same case of Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation v. Lazaro (supra, p.
519), we held that the subvservience of the contract clause to the
police power enacting public regulations intended for the general
welfare of the community has been settled by this Court.
Furthermore, the records will bear out the fact that
only petitioner LIPSI has a temporary permit issued by PPA. The rest of
the petitioners where either merely allowed or tolerated to operate in
the port of Tacloban. However, even on the assumption that tall of them
were able to secure temporary permits from PPA, still, this does not
vest any property right on them and hence, petitioners cannot allege a
violation of their right to non-deprivation of property without due
process of law.
In the case of Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation v. Lazaro, (supra, pp. 520-521), we ruled:
The
contention of petitioners Anglo-Fil, et al., that due process was
violated resulting to a confiscatory effect on private property is
likewise without merit.
In the first place, the petitioners were operating merely on "hold-over" permits ...
Clearly, all hold-over permits were by nature
temporary and subject to subsequent policy guidelines as may be
implemented by PPA. Such should have served as sufficient notice to
petitioners that, at any time, their authorities may be terminated.
Whether or not the petitioner would be issued a PTO
depended on the sound discretion of PPA and on the policies, rules and
regulations that the latter may implement in accordance with the
statutory grant of power. Petitioners. therefore, cannot be said to have
been deprived of property without due process of law because, it this
respect, what they should have taken cognizance of the fact that since
they have no vested right to operate in the South Harbor, their permits
can be withdrawn anytime the public welfare deems it best to do so.
As to the
contention of petitioner Pernito Arrastre that ten percent (10%) is
execessive for regulatory purposes and that the power to regulate does
not include the power to impose fees for revenue purposes, we likewise
find the same unmeritorious.
It is within the sound discretion of the PPA to
impose a reasonable charge or rate on arrastre and stevedoring operators
which it deems to above most appropriate and advantageous to the
government under the circumstances In the case of Anglo-Fil trading Corporation v. Lazaro, supra (pp.
522-523), we held that the award of PPA to Ocean Terminal Services,
Inc. (OTSI) of the stevedoring contract is not violate of the Anti-Graft
Law since said contract, for one, embodied sufficient consideration
which is the payment by OTSI to the government of ten percent (10%) of
its gross income. We ruled:
Neither is
the management contract violative of the Anti-Graft Law. It is a
contract executed in pursuance to law and the instructions of the
President to carry out government objectives to promote public interest.
The act did not cause "undue injury" to the petitioners who as
explained earlier had no vested property rights entitled to protection.
There is no undue injury to the government nor any unwarranted benefit
to OTSI considering that the contract carried sufficient consideration
for PPA which is the payment by OTSI of ten percent (10%) of its gross
income, something which petitioner OTSI is loathe to pay. the
rationalization and effective utilization of port facilities is to the
advantage of the Government. Furthermore, the discretion in choosing the
stevedoring contractor for the South Harbor, Port of Manila, belongs to
the PPA. As long as standards are set in determining the contractor and
such standards are reasonable and related to the purpose for which they
are used, the courts should not inquire into the wisdom of PPA's choice
...
We have
found the ten percent (10%) share of the government in the earnings from
stevedoring and arrastre service as reasonable consideration for the
use of government premises, works, facilities, and services, not to
mention the supervision inherent in the upgrading and improvement of
port operations, of which said services are an integral part.
Finally, in the matter of whether the take over by
the PPA violates the prohibition against monopolies in restraint of
trade, we hold that in industries affected with public interest, a
regulated monopoly is not necessarily proscribed, if such is deemed
necessary in order to protect and promote public interest. In the case
of Philippine Ports Authority v. Mendoza, (138 SCRA 496, 509-510), we ruled:
Private
monopolies are not necessarily prohibited. The use of the word "regulate
" in the constitution indicates that some monopolies, properly
regulated, are allowed ... " Competition can best regulate a free
economy. Like all basis beliefs, however, that principle must
accommodate hare practical experience. There are areas where for special
reasons the force of competition, when left wholly free, might operate
too destructively to safeguard the public interest. Public utilities are
an instance of that consideration." (Oleck, Modern Corporation Law,
Vol. IV, p. 197).<äre||anº•1àw> By their very
nature, certain public services or public utilities such as those which
supply water, electricity, transportation, telegraph, etc. must be given
exclusive franchises if public interest is to be served. Such exclusive
franchises are not violative of the law against monopolies (Anglo-Fil
Trading Corporation v. Lazaro, supra).
In there case at bar, the area affected is
maritime transportation in the port of Cebu/ The operations there,
particularly arrastre and stevedoring, affect not only the City of Cebu,
the principal port in the South, but also the economy of the whole
country as well. Any prolonged disjunction of the services being
rendered there will prejudice not only inter-island and international
trade and commerce. Operations in said port are therefore imbvued with
public interest and are subject to regulation and control for the public
good and welfare. PPA's policy of integration through compulsory merger
may not even be in this instance considered as promoting a monopoly
because the fact of the matter is that while the sole operator permitted
by PPA to engage in the arrastre and stevedoring operations in the port
of Cebu is only USDI, actually USDI is comprised of the eleven (11)
port services contractors that previously used said ports but decided to
merge and ultimately constituted themselves as USDI,
In these
present cases, as stated by respondent PPA, when PPA-TAPS took over
arrastre operations, it also absorbed the entire labor force that
existed at the time of the cancellation of LIPSI's permit. Hence, it can
be safely said that PPA-TAPS is also composed of all the labor
contractors and the workers under them which have been integrated t
develop and improve the planning, growth, financing, construction,
maintenance and operation of ports throughout the country and make them
responsive to the needs of their individual localities.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitioner
in G.R. Nos. 53492, 54265, 54394 and 54565 are hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The temporary restraining orders dated July 17, 1980, July
22, 1980, August 5, 1980 and August 21, 1980 are DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Fernan, J., took no part.
Teehankee, C.J., reserves his vote.
xxx xxx xxx
e. To recommend
to the President, whenever the national interest demands it, that the
State, through an agency the Authority may designate, take over the
administration and operation of a specific port district or portion
thereof;f. To approve specific application of any person, firm or entity to operate, administer and establish an individual Port/Industrial Zone Authority in a particular area
xxx xxx xxx
2 Sec. 6. Corporate Powers and Duties. —a) The corporate duties of the Authority shall be:
xxx xxx xxx
(v) To provide
services (whether on its own, by contracts, or otherwise) within the
Port Districts and the approaches thereof, including but not limited to —— berthing, towing, mooring, moving, slipping, or docking any vessel;
— loading or discharging any vessel ;
— sorting, weighing, measuring, storing, warehousing, or otherwise handling goods.
xxx xxx xxx
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