G.R. No. 183626 October 4, 2010
SURIGAO DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SURNECO), Petitioner,
vs.
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Respondent.
SO ORDERED.10
Schedule 2, Municipality of Hikdop
The over-recoveries were due to the following:
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA**
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division
Chief Justice
Footnotes
6 Also known as the Electric Power Industry Reforms Act of 2001 (EPIRA).
7 Rollo, pp. 196-212.
8 Id. at 204.
9 Id. at 134-140.
10 Id. at 139-140.
11 Id. at 156-158.
12 Id. at 159-195.
13 Id. at 76-105.
14 NEA Memo No. 1.
SURIGAO DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SURNECO), Petitioner,
vs.
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Decision dated April 17, 20082 and the Resolution dated June 25, 20083 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99781.
The antecedent facts and proceedings follow—
Petitioner Surigao Del Norte Electric Cooperative,
Inc. (SURNECO) is a rural electric cooperative organized and existing by
virtue of Presidential Decree No. 269.
On February 8, 1996, the Association of Mindanao
Rural Electric Cooperatives, as representative of SURNECO and of the
other 33 rural electric cooperatives in Mindanao, filed a petition
before the then Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) for the approval of the
formula for automatic cost adjustment and adoption of the National Power
Corporation (NPC) restructured rate adjustment to comply with Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7832.4
The case was docketed as ERB Case No. 96-49, and later consolidated
with identical petitions of other associations of electric cooperatives
in the Philippines.
The relevant provisions of R.A. No. 7832 for compliance are Sections 10 and 14, which provide—
Sec. 10. Rationalization of System Losses by Phasing
Out Pilferage Losses as a Component Thereof. – There is hereby
established a cap on the recoverable rate of system losses as follows:
x x x x
(b) For rural electric cooperatives:
(i) Twenty-two percent (22%) at the end of the first year following the effectivity of this Act;
(ii) Twenty percent (20%) at the end of the second year following the effectivity of this Act;
(iii) Eighteen percent (18%) at the end of the third year following the effectivity of this Act;
(iv) Sixteen percent (16%) at the end of the fourth year following the effectivity of this Act; and
(v) Fourteen percent (14%) at the end of the fifth year following the effectivity of this Act.
Provided, that the ERB is hereby authorized to
determine at the end of the fifth year following the effectivity of this
Act, and as often as is necessary, taking into account the viability of
rural electric cooperatives and the interest of consumers, whether the
caps herein or theretofore established shall be reduced further which
shall, in no case, be lower than nine percent (9%) and accordingly fix
the date of the effectivity of the new caps.
x x x x
Sec. 14. Rules and Regulations. – The ERB shall,
within thirty (30) working days after the conduct of hearings which must
commence within thirty (30) working days upon the effectivity of this
Act, issue the rules and regulation as may be necessary to ensure the
efficient and effective implementation of the provisions of this Act, to
include but not limited to, the development of methodologies for
computing the amount of electricity illegally used and the amount of
payment or deposit contemplated in Section 7 hereof as a result of the
presence of the prima facie evidence discovered.
Corollary thereto, Sections 4 and 5 of Rule IX of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 7832 provide—
Section 4. Caps on System Loss allowed to Rural
Electric Cooperatives. – The maximum rate of system loss that the
cooperative can pass on to its customers shall be as follows:
a. Twenty-two percent (22%) effective on February 1996 billing.
b. Twenty percent (20%) effective on February 1997 billing.
c. Eighteen percent (18%) effective on February 1998 billing.
d. Sixteen percent (16%) effective on February 1999 billing.
e. Fourteen percent (14%) effective on February 2000 billing.
Section 5. Automatic Cost Adjustment Formula. – Each
and every cooperative shall file with the ERB, on or before September
30, 1995, an application for approval of an amended Purchased Power
Adjustment Clause that would reflect the new system loss cap to be
included in its schedule of rates.
The automatic cost adjustment of every electric cooperative shall be guided by the following formula:
Purchased Power Adjustment Clause
| (PPA) = | A B – (C + D) |
Where:
A = Cost of electricity purchased and generated for the previous month
B = Total Kwh purchased and generated for the previous month
C = The actual system loss but not to exceed the
maximum recoverable rate of system loss in Kwh plus actual company use
in kwhrs but not to exceed 1% of total kwhrs purchased and generated
D = kwh consumed by subsidized consumers
E = Applicable base cost of power equal to the amount incorporated into their basic rate per kwh.
In an Order5
dated February 19, 1997, the ERB granted SURNECO and other rural
electric cooperatives provisional authority to use and implement the
Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) formula pursuant to the mandatory
provisions of R.A. No. 7832 and its IRR, with a directive to submit
relevant and pertinent documents for the Board’s review, verification,
and confirmation.
In the meantime, the passage of R.A. No. 91366
led to the creation of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC),
replacing and succeeding the ERB. All pending cases before the ERB were
transferred to the ERC. ERB Case No. 96-49 was re-docketed as ERC Case
No. 2001-343.
In the Order dated June 17, 2003, the ERC clarified
ERB’s earlier policy regarding the PPA formula to be used by the
electric cooperatives, viz.—
After a careful evaluation of the records, the
Commission noted that the PPA formula which was approved by the ERB was
silent on whether the calculation of the cost of electricity purchased
and generated in the formula should be "gross" or "net" of the
discounts.
Let it be noted that the power cost is said to be at
"gross" if the discounts are not passed-on to the end-users whereas it
is said to be at "net" if the said discounts are passed-on to the
end-users.
To attain uniformity in the implementation of the PPA formula, the Commission has resolved that:
1. In the confirmation of past PPAs, the power cost shall still be based on "gross," and
2. In the confirmation of future PPAs, the power cost shall be based on "net."
The electric cooperatives filed their respective
motions for clarification and/or reconsideration. Hence, the ERC issued
an Order7
dated January 14, 2005, stating that the PPA was a cost-recovery
mechanism, not a revenue-generating scheme, so that the distribution
utilities or the electric cooperatives must recover from their customers
only the actual cost of purchased power. The ERC thus adopted a new PPA
policy, to wit—
A. The computation and confirmation of the PPA prior
to the Commission’s Order dated June 17, 2003 shall be based on the
approved PPA Formula;
B. The computation and confirmation of the PPA after
the Commission’s Order dated June 17, 2003 shall be based on the power
cost "net" of discount; and
C. If the approved PPA Formula is silent on the terms
of discount, the computation and confirmation of the PPA shall be based
on the power cost at "gross," subject to the submission of proofs that
said discounts are being extended to the end-users.8
Thereafter, the ERC continued its review,
verification, and confirmation of the electric cooperatives’
implementation of the PPA formula based on the available data and
information submitted by the latter.
On March 19, 2007, the ERC issued its assailed Order,9
mandating that the discounts earned by SURNECO from its power supplier
should be deducted from the computation of the power cost, disposing in
this wise ¾
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the
Commission hereby confirms the Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) of
Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SURNECO) for the period
February 1996 to July 2004 which resulted to an over-recovery amounting
to EIGHTEEN MILLION ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
NINETY FOUR PESOS (PhP18,188,794.00) equivalent to PhP0.0500/kwh. In
this connection, SURNECO is hereby directed to refund the amount of
PhP0.0500/kwh to its Main Island consumers starting the next billing
cycle from receipt of this Order until such time that the full amount
shall have been refunded.
The Commission likewise confirms the PPA of SURNECO
for its Hikdop Island consumers for the period February 1996 to July
2004 which resulted to an under-recovery amounting to TWO MILLION FOUR
HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FORTY FIVE PESOS (PhP2,478,045.00).
SURNECO is hereby authorized to collect from its Hikdop Island consumers
the amount of PhP0.0100/kwh starting the next billing cycle from
receipt of this Order until such time that the full amount shall have
been collected.
Accordingly, SURNECO is directed to:
a) Reflect the PPA refund/collection as a separate item in the bill using the phrase "Previous Years’ Adjustment on Power Cost";
b) Submit, within ten (10) days from its initial
implementation of the refund/collection, a sworn statement indicating
its compliance with the aforecited directive; and
c) Accomplish and submit a report in accordance with
the attached prescribed format, on or before the 30th day of January of
the succeeding year and every year thereafter until the amount shall
have been fully refunded/collected.
SURNECO filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the ERC in its Order11 dated May 29, 2007 on the ground that the motion did not raise any new matter which was not already passed upon by the ERC.
Aggrieved, SURNECO went to the CA via a petition for review,12
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction, seeking the annulment of the ERC Orders dated
March 19, 2007 and May 29, 2007.
In its Decision dated April 17, 2008, the CA denied SURNECO’s petition and affirmed the assailed Orders of the ERC.
On June 25, 2008, upon motion for reconsideration13 of SURNECO, the CA issued its Resolution denying the same.
Hence, this petition, with SURNECO ascribing error to
the CA and the ERC in: (1) disallowing its use of the multiplier scheme
to compute its system’s loss; (2) ordering it to deduct from the power
cost or refund to its consumers the discounts extended to it by its
power supplier, NPC; and (3) ordering it to refund alleged
over-recoveries arrived at by the ERC without giving SURNECO the
opportunity to be heard.
The petition should be denied.
First. SURNECO points out that the National
Electrification Administration (NEA), which used to be the government
authority charged by law with the power to fix rates of rural electric
cooperatives, entered into a loan agreement with the Asian Development
Bank (ADB). The proceeds of the loan were intended for use by qualified
rural electric cooperatives, SURNECO included, in their rehabilitation
and expansion projects. The loan agreement imposed a 15% system loss
cap, but provided a Power Cost Adjustment Clause authorizing
cooperatives to charge and show "system losses in excess of 15%" as a
separate item in their consumer’s bill. Thus, the cooperatives charged
their consumer-members "System Loss Levy" for system losses in excess of
the 15% cap.
SURNECO states that, in January 1984, it was
authorized by the NEA that all increases in the NPC power cost (in case
of NPC-connected cooperatives) shall be uniformly passed on to the
member-consumers using the 1.4 multiplier, which is divided into 1.3 as
allowance for 23% system loss and 0.1 as provision for the corresponding
increase in operating expenses to partly offset the effects of
inflation.14 Subsequently, the NEA, through NEA Memorandum No. 1-A dated March 30, 1992, revised the aforesaid issuance as follows—
Pursuant to NEA Board Resolution No. 98, Series of 1991, x x x, the revised cooperatives’ multiplier will be as follows:
1.2 – Rural Electric Cooperatives (RECs) with system loss of 15% and below;
1.3 – RECs with system loss ranging from 16% to 22%;
1.4 – RECs with system loss of 23% and above.
SURNECO posits that, per NEA Memorandum No. 1-A, the
NEA had authorized it to adopt a multiplier scheme as the method to
recover system loss. It claims that this cannot be abrogated, revoked,
or superseded by any order, resolution, or issuance by the ERC
prescribing a certain formula to implement the caps of recoverable rate
of system loss under R.A. No. 7832 without violating the non-impairment
clause15 of the Constitution.
We disagree. SURNECO cannot insist on using the
multiplier scheme even after the imposition of the system loss caps
under Section 10 of R.A. No. 7832. The law took effect on January 17,
1995. Perusing Section 10, and also Section 11,16
providing for the application of the caps as of the date of the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7832, readily shows that the imposition of the
caps was self-executory and did not require the issuance of any enabling
set of rules or any action by the then ERB, now ERC. Thus, the caps
should have been applied as of January 17, 1995 when R.A. No. 7832 took
effect.
Indeed, under NEA Memorandum No. 1-A, the use of the
multiplier scheme allows the recovery of system losses even beyond the
caps mandated in R.A. No. 7832, which is intended to gradually phase out
pilferage losses as a component of the recoverable system losses by the
distributing utilities such as SURNECO. However, it is totally
repugnant to and incompatible with the system loss caps established in
R.A. No. 7832, and is repealed by Section 1617
of the law. As between NEA Memorandum No. 1-A, a mere administrative
issuance, and R.A. No. 7832, a legislative enactment, the latter must
prevail.18
Second. The ERC was merely implementing the system
loss caps in R.A. No. 7832 when it reviewed and confirmed SURNECO’S PPA
charges, and ordered the refund of the amount collected in excess of the
allowable system loss caps through its continued use of the multiplier
scheme. As the ERC held in its March 19, 2007 Order—
On January 14, 2005, the Commission issued an Order
adopting a new PPA policy as follows: (a) the computation and
confirmation of the PPA prior to the Commission’s Order dated June 17,
2003 shall be based on the approved PPA Formula; (b) the computation and
confirmation of the PPA after the Commission’s Order dated June 17,
2003 shall be based on the power cost "net" of discount; and (c) if the
approved PPA Formula is silent in terms of discount, the computation and
confirmation of the PPA shall be based on the power cost at "gross"
reduced by the amount of discounts extended to customers, subject to the
submission of proofs that said discounts are indeed being extended to
customers.
However, the Commission deemed it appropriate to
clarify its PPA confirmation process particularly on the treatment of
the Prompt Payment Discount (PPD) granted to distribution utilities
(DUs) by their power suppliers, to wit:
I. The over-or-under recovery will be determined by
comparing the allowable power cost with the actual revenue billed to
end-users.
II. Calculation of the DU’s allowable power cost as prescribed in the PPA formula:
a. If the PPA formula explicitly provides the manner
by which discounts availed from the power supplier/s shall be treated,
the allowable power cost will be computed based on the specific
provision of the formula, which may either be at "net" or "gross"; and
b. If the PPA formula is silent in terms of
discounts, the allowable power cost will be computed at "net" of
discounts availed from the power supplier/s, if there be any.
III. Calculation of DU’s actual revenues/actual amount billed to end-users.
a. On actual PPA computed at net of discounts availed from power supplier/s:
a.1. If a DU bills at net of discounts availed from
the power supplier/s (i.e., gross power cost minus discounts from power
supplier/s) and the DU is not extending discounts to end-users, the
actual revenue should be equal to the allowable power cost; and
a.2. If a DU bills at net of discounts availed from
the power supplier/s (i.e., gross power cost minus discounts from power
supplier/s) and the DU is extending discounts to end-users, the discount
extended to end-users shall be added back to the actual revenue.
b. On actual PPA computed at gross:
b.1. If a DU bills at gross (i.e., gross power cost
not reduced by discounts from power supplier/s) and the DU is extending
discounts to end-users, the actual revenue shall be calculated as: gross
power revenue less discounts extended to end-users. The result shall
then be compared to the allowable power cost; and
b.2. If a DU bills at gross (i.e., gross power cost
not reduced by discounts from power supplier/s) and the DU is not
extending discounts to end-users, the actual revenue shall be taken as
is which shall be compared to the allowable power cost.
IV. In the calculation of the DU’s actual revenues,
the amount of discounts extended to end-users shall, in no case, be
higher than the discounts availed by the DU from its power supplier/s.
The foregoing clarification was intended to ensure that only the actual costs of purchased power are recovered by the DUs.
In the meantime, SURNECO submitted reports on its
monthly implementation of the PPA covering the period January 1998 to
July 2004 and attended the conferences conducted by the Commission on
December 11, 2003 and May 4, 2005 relative thereto.
The Commission evaluated SURNECO’s monthly PPA
implementation covering the period February 1996 to July 2004, which
disclosed the following:
Schedule 1, Main Island| Period Covered | Over (Under) Recoveries (In PhP) |
Over (Under) Recoveries (In kWh) |
| February 1996 to December 1998 |
20,737,074 | 0.2077 |
| January 1999 to July 2004 |
(2,548,280) | (0.0097) |
| TOTAL | 18,188,794 | 0.0500 |
| February 1996 to December 1998 PPA Plus Basic Cha[r]ge |
70,235 | 0.3190 |
| January 1999 to July 2004 |
(2,548,280) | (0.0097) |
| TOTAL | (2,478,045) | (0.0100) |
1. For the period February 1996 to December 1998,
SURNECO’s PPA computation included the power cost and the corresponding
kWh purchased from Hikdop end-users. The Commission excluded those
months which SURNECO did not impose variable charges to Hikdop end-user
which resulted to a total net over-recovery of PhP21,245,034.00; and
2. SURNECO’s basic charge for Hikdop end-users were
beyond the approved basic charge for the period February 1996 to
September 1998 resulting to a net over-recovery of PhP128,489.00.
SURNECO’s under recoveries for the period January 1999 to June 2004 were due to the following:
1. For the period August 2001 to June 2004, SURNECO
erroneously deducted the Power Act Reduction Adjustments (PARA) in the
total purchased power cost of its PPA computation resulting to an
under-recovery of PhP1,377,763.00;
2. SURNECO’s power cost and kWh computation includes Dummy Load resulting to an under recovery amounting to PhP226,196.00; and
3. The new grossed-up factor scheme adopted by the
Commission which provided a true-up mechanism to allow the DUs to
recover the actual costs of purchased power.19
In directing SURNECO to refund its over-recoveries
based on PPA policies, which only ensured that the PPA mechanism remains
a purely cost-recovery mechanism and not a revenue-generating scheme
for the electric cooperatives, the ERC merely exercised its authority to
regulate and approve the rates imposed by the electric cooperatives on
their consumers. The ERC simply performed its mandate to protect the
public interest imbued in those rates.
It is beyond cavil that the State, in the exercise of
police power, can regulate the rates imposed by a public utility such
as SURNECO. As we held in Republic of the Philippines v. Manila Electric
Company20—
The regulation of rates to be charged by public
utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes
prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are
a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public
purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris
privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to
promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by
the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is
continued, the same is subject to public regulation.
Likewise, SURNECO cannot validly assert that the caps
set by R.A. No. 7832 are arbitrary, or that they violate the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution for allegedly traversing the
loan agreement between NEA and ADB. Striking down a legislative
enactment, or any of its provisions, can be done only by way of a direct
action, not through a collateral attack, and more so, not for the first
time on appeal in order to avoid compliance. The challenge to the law’s
constitutionality should also be raised at the earliest opportunity.21
Even assuming, merely for argument’s sake, that the
ERC issuances violated the NEA and ADB covenant, the contract had to
yield to the greater authority of the State’s exercise of police power.
It has long been settled that police power legislation, adopted by the
State to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order,
safety, and general welfare of the people prevail not only over future
contracts but even over those already in existence, for all private
contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by
the State to promote public welfare.22
SURNECO also avers that the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) removed the alleged arbitrary caps in R.A.
No. 7832. We differ. The EPIRA allows the caps to remain until replaced
by the caps to be determined by the ERC, pursuant to its delegated
authority under Section 4323
of R.A. No. 9136 to prescribe new system loss caps, based on technical
parameters such as load density, sales mix, cost of service, delivery
voltage, and other technical considerations it may promulgate.
Third. We also disagree with SURNECO in its
insistence that the PPA confirmation policies constituted an amendment
to the IRR of R.A. No. 7832 and must, therefore, comply with the
publication requirement for the effectivity of administrative issuances.
The PPA formula provided in the IRR of R.A. No. 7832
was only a model to be used as a guide by the electric cooperatives in
proposing their own PPA formula for approval by the then ERB. Sections 4
and 5, Rule IX of the IRR directed the electric cooperatives to apply
for approval of such formula with the ERB so that the system loss caps
under the law would be incorporated in their computation of power cost
adjustments. The IRR did not provide for a specific formula; therefore,
there was nothing in the IRR that was amended or could have been amended
relative to the PPA formula. The IRR left to the ERB, now the ERC, the
authority to approve and oversee the implementation of the electric
cooperatives’ PPA formula in the exercise of its rate-making power over
them.1avvphi1
We likewise differ from SURNECO’s stance that it was
denied due process when the ERC issued its questioned Orders.
Administrative due process simply requires an opportunity to explain
one’s side or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.24
It means being given the opportunity to be heard before judgment, and
for this purpose, a formal trial-type hearing is not even essential. It
is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable chance to
demonstrate their respective positions and to present evidence in
support thereof.25
Verily, the PPA confirmation necessitated a review of
the electric cooperatives’ monthly documentary submissions to
substantiate their PPA charges. The cooperatives were duly informed of
the need for other required supporting documents and were allowed to
submit them accordingly. In fact, hearings were conducted. Moreover, the
ERC conducted exit conferences with the electric cooperatives’
representatives, SURNECO included, to discuss preliminary figures and to
double-check these figures for inaccuracies, if there were any. In
addition, after the issuance of the ERC Orders, the electric
cooperatives were allowed to file their respective motions for
reconsideration. It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that SURNECO was not
denied due process.
Finally, the core of the issues raised is factual in
character. It needs only to be reiterated that factual findings of
administrative bodies on technical matters within their area of
expertise should be accorded not only respect but even finality if they
are supported by substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or
preponderant,26
more so if affirmed by the CA. Absent any grave abuse of discretion on
the part of ERC, we must sustain its findings. Hence, its assailed
Orders, following the rule of non-interference on matters addressed to
the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming their special technical knowledge and
training, must be upheld.27
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
April 17, 2008 and the Resolution dated June 25, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99781 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA**
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
| MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO*** Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONAChief Justice
Footnotes
* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio per Special Order No. 897 dated September 28, 2010.
** In lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio per Special Order No. 898 dated September 28, 2010.
*** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad per Special Order No. 903 dated September 28, 2010.
1 Rollo, pp. 30-61.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo (now a member of
this Court), with Associate Justices Arcangelita Romilla-Lontok and
Ricardo R. Rosario, concurring; id. at 10-22.
3 Id. at 24-27.
4
Otherwise referred to as the "Anti-Electricity and Electric
Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994," which took effect
on January 17, 1995.
5 Rollo, pp. 111-128.6 Also known as the Electric Power Industry Reforms Act of 2001 (EPIRA).
7 Rollo, pp. 196-212.
8 Id. at 204.
9 Id. at 134-140.
10 Id. at 139-140.
11 Id. at 156-158.
12 Id. at 159-195.
13 Id. at 76-105.
14 NEA Memo No. 1.
15 CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 10. "No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."
16
Sec. 11. Area of Coverage. – The caps provided in Section 10 of this
Act shall apply only to the area of coverage of private electric
utilities and rural electric cooperatives as of the date of the
effectivity of this Act.
17
Sec. 16. Repealing Clauses. – x x x. All other laws, ordinances, rules,
regulations, and other issuances or parts thereof, which are
inconsistent with this Act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
18 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, G.R. Nos. 167274-75, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 160, 178.
19 Rollo, pp.135-139.
20 440 Phil. 389, 397, citing Munn v. People of the State of Illinois, 94 U.S.113, 126 (1877).
21 Philippine National Bank v. Palma, 503 Phil. 917, 932 (2005).
22 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009, 582 SCRA 254, 276, citing Ortigas & Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 615, 623 (2000).
23 Sec. 43. Functions of the ERC. – x x x.
f. x x x. To achieve this objective and to ensure the
complete removal of cross subsidies, the cap on the recoverable rate of
system losses prescribed in Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7832, is
hereby amended and shall be replaced by caps which shall be determined
by the ERC based on load density, sales mix, cost of service, delivery
voltage and other technical considerations it may promulgate. x x x.
24
Rene Ventenilla Puse v. Ligaya delos Santos-Puse, G.R. No. 183678,
March 5, 2010, citing Alcala v. Villar, 461 Phil. 617, 626 (2003).
25
Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, G.R. No. 152048,
April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 110, 124, citing Autobus Workers’ Union v. NLRC,
353 Phil. 419, 430 (1998).
26 Republic of the Philippines v. Manila Electric Company, supra note 20, at 399.
27
Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 159417, January 25, 2007, 512 SCRA 684, 698, citing First Lepanto
Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 657, 664 (1996).
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