FINAL EXAMINATION IN POLITICAL LAW January 16, 2021

 

FINAL EXAMINATION IN POLITICAL LAW

January 16, 2021

 

1. Section 21 defines the procedure to be followed by the apprehending officers to ensure the integrity of the seized dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia. State in your own understanding the procedure to be followed and the consequence of not following the said procedure.

 

 

2. On July 7, 2008, 12 pastors and preachers from various churches filed a joint complaint-affidavit against the officers and publishers of seven men's magazines and tabloids. The complainants alleged that sometime during the period of September 2007 to July 2008, the identified magazines and tabloids, which were printed, published, distributed, circulated, and/or sold in the City of Manila, contained material which were "clearly scandalous, obscene, and pornographic within the meaning and in violation of Articles 200 and 201 of the Revised Penal Code and Ordinance No. 7780 of the City of Manila.

Questions

(A) The respondents claim that they cannot be charged under Article 200/201 and under the Manila Ordinance because they can be subjected to double jeopardy. Is this correct?

 (B) They also question the unconstitutionality of said ordinance. Is the said ordinance unconstitutional? What are the requisites for an ordinance to be valid?

(C) Despite the dismissal of the charge for violation of Ordinance No. 7780, petitioners did not move to withdraw the present action, adamant that the Ordinance "violates the constitutional guarantees to free speech and expression, violates the right to due process, and offends privacy rights." On April 26, 2016 and upon petitioners' motion, Criminal Case No. 13-30084 was ordered dismissed with prejudice. The petition was dismissed on what grounds? Explain each ground.

 (D) Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 7780, alleging that it defines the terms "obscene" and "pornography" in such a way that a very broad range of speech and expression are placed beyond the protection of the Constitution, thus violating the constitutional guarantee to free speech and expression.Specifically, petitioners take issue with the "expansive" language of Ordinance No. 7780 which, petitioners claim, paved the way for complainants, a group of pastors and preachers, to impose their view of what is "unfit to be seen or heard" and "violate[s] the proprieties of language and behavior. Rule on said challenge. (5) In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. Explain this statement as applied in the Madrilejos case.

 

3. Juan was seen handing an item to Maria along an alley. A police officer 10 meters away saw this and it being that Juan is a notorious drug pusher, he immediately arrested Juan and a charge of illegal pushing of shabu was filed against him. Juan denied the charge saying that he did not sell shabu, the evidence however showed that the item was really shabu. Question: If you were the defense counsel of Juan what grounds would you invoke under our constitution to acquit him from said charge? Explain.

 

4. Section 14, paragraph 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law,which provides that an accused's presence during a hazing is prima facie evidence of his or her participation, is being questions whether it violates constitutional presumption of innocence. The petitioners also say that said provision is a bill of attainder. Said provision in particular provides that that one's presence during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation as a principal, unless proven to have prevented or to have promptly reported the punishable acts to law enforcement authorities if they can, without peril to their person or their family. Question: (a)Is the Anti-hazing law unconstitutional? Is it a bill of attainder? What is a bill of attainder? What do you mean by the term “constitutional presumption of innocence? Is the law violative of said presumption? (b) Petitioner claims that Sections 3 and 4 of the Anti-hazing Law are unconstitutional, as they would allow for the conviction of persons for a crime committed by others, in violation of the res inter alios acta rule. What is your understanding of the res inter alios acta rule? She also argues that these provisions violate Article III, Sections 1 and 19 of the Constitution for constituting a cruel and unusual punishment, as she was charged as a principal, and penalized with reclusion perpetua, for a non-bailable offense. What is a “cruel and unusual punishment”? Cite some examples.  Is reclusion perpetua as a punishment “cruel”? Explain as to how the Supreme Court ruled on said claims.

 

5. Explain the following terms (a)“buy-bust”, (b)chain of custody rule ,(c) insulating witnesses (d) Sec. 5 and (e) Section 11 (f)  Strict Neutrality v. Benevolent Neutrality on religious freedom (g) Miller Test  on obscenity.

 

6. SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

‘SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. — The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. Question: (1) An accused committed murder using an unlicensed firearm. He was charged of two offenses, one under the revised penal code for murder and the other under P.D. 1866. Will there be no double jeopardy in this situation? Can a court convict him for the said two offenses? (2) There is such principle as the Agote doctrine. What is this principle and how would you apply said principle in the case at bar? Explain.

 

 

7. An Ordinance is passed "Prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: 1. Family: Scaridae (Mameng), 2. Epinephelus Fasciatus (Suno) 3. Cromileptes altivelis (Panther or Senorita), lobster below 200 grams and spawning), 4. Tridacna Gigas (Taklobo), 5. Pinctada Margaretefera (Mother Pearl, Oysters, Giant Clams and other species), 6. Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn-breeder size or mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green Grouper) and 8. Family: Balistidae (T[r]opical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of five (5) years in and coming from Palawan Waterspetitioners. Petitioners  contend that:

First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayor's permit could be granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue the permit.

Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan "altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method," the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering "into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion."

Question: Is the ordinance valid or not? Discuss vis-à-vis the first, second and third contentions.

 

8. An Ordinance is passed, with the pertinent provisions: (1)All public lands within Baguio townsite which are occupied by squatters who are duly registered as such at the time of the promulgation of this Ordinance such public lands not designated by city and national authorities for public use, shall be considered as embraced and comprising a City Government Housing Project; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That areas covered by Executive Orders or Presidential Proclamations but the city had made official representation for the lifting of such orders or proclamation shall be deemed to be part of the Baguio Townsite for the purposes of this ordinance;

Section 2.—Building permits shall have been deemed issued to all squatters as contemplated by this Ordinance, giving such squatters five years from the approval of this Ordinance to satisfactorily comply with city building specifications and payment of the corresponding city building permit fees;

Section 3.—All cases pending in court against squatters be dropped without prejudice to the full prosecution of all subsequent violations in relation to the provisions of existing city ordinances and/or resolutions.

Question: Is said ordinance valid? Explain.

 

9. Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. The case was raffled to Branch 25 of the said court.

The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines." On the other hand, defendant (herein respondent AMEX, Inc.) "is a corporation doing business in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other credit facilities and allied services with office address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City." The other defendants (herein respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX, and may be served with summons and other court processes at their office address.

The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The first dishonor happened when petitioner Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the United States some time in April 2000. The second dishonor occurred when petitioner Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there with other delegates from the Philippines to attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.

The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its balance covering the period of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo denied having received the corresponding statement of account. Further, he was allegedly wrongfully charged for late payment in June 2000. Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary cards were canceled by respondents on July 20, 2000.

Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and professional standing as a result of respondents' acts which were committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him, jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint. Further, they raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue. On the latter, respondents averred that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was presented when he executed the complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. To buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo.

Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case for Pre-Trial) and Motion for Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue) to which petitioner Saludo filed his Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue. He asserted that any allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded considering that he was the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court a quo to take judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress, he possessed all the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution including that of being a resident of his district. He was also a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since his admission to the Bar. His community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City only because he has an office thereat and the office messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any event, the community tax certificate is not determinative of one's residence.

In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the affirmative defenses interposed by respondents. It found the allegations of the complaint sufficient to constitute a cause of action against respondents. The court a quo likewise denied respondents' affirmative defense that venue was improperly laid. It reasoned, thus:

x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was and still is, the incumbent Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte with residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is enough to dispel any and all doubts about his actual residence. As a high-ranking government official of the province, his residence there can be taken judicial notice of. As such his personal, actual and physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode can never be in some other place but in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte. It is correctly stated by the plaintiff, citing the case of Core v. Core, 100 Phil. 321 that, "residence, for purposes of fixing venue of an action, is synonymous with domicile. This is defined as the permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on the facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. A person can have but one domicile at a time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. Venue could be at place of his residence.

 Questions: IN THIS case what is the residence of Saludo? What is his domicile? In election cases, is there a difference between domicile and residence? EXPLAIN.

 

10. Two ordinances were passed by the Cagayan De Oro Council.

(1)AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO.

(2)AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR:

QUESTION: ARE THESE ORDINANCES VALID? Explain.

 

End of the Examination