Topic: Right Against Self-Incrimination

Suarez vs Tingco

GR No. L-17113

May 22, 1961

FACTS

            Juanito Suarez petitioner for a writ of prohibition against the Honorable Damaso S. Tingco of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, to restrain him from compelling petitioner to testify in Civil Case No. 1058 of said court.

            It appears that a jeep, in which plaintiffs in the civil case were riding, had collided with an automobile driver by petitioner and as sequel thereto, Criminal Case No. 1458 was filed against petitioner in the Court of Batangas.

            On August 28, 1958, Civil Case NO. 1058 was also filed against petitioner to collect damages allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs as a result of his reckless negligence in the same incident involved in the criminal case. On the first day of trial of the civil case, plaintiffs therein required defendant Suarez (petitioner) to take the stand and testify as their first witness. Petitioner objected, averring that there was a pending criminal case (Criminal Case No. 1458) against him for the very acts upon which the civil action was based; that the purpose of plaintiffs was merely to fish for evidence to be utilized in the pending criminal suit, and that for him to be compelled to testify in the civil case was violative of the constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination.

ISSUE

            Whether the lower court err in directing the petitioner to testify in the civil case and does it violates his right against self incrimination?

RULING

            The lower court did not err in directing petitioner to take the witness stand. No legal impediment exists against a litigant calling any of the adverse parties to be his witness. In fact, Section 83, Rule 123of the Rules provides ---- A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile witness by leading questions, contradict and impeach him in all aspects as if he had been called by the adverse party, and the witness thus called may be contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also and may be cross-examined by the adverse party only upon the subject-matter of his examination in chief.

            True, an accused in a criminal case may not be compelled to testify, or to so much utter a word, even for his own defense. But while the constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination protects a person in all types of cases, be they criminal, civil, or administrative, said privilege in proceedings other than a criminal case against him who invokes it, is to answer incriminating considered an option of refusal question and not a prohibition of inquiry.

            Here petitioner was being directed to take the stand, not in a criminal case where he is not accused, but in an independent civil action which, although arising from the same facts involved in a criminal case pending before the same count, is still regarded by law as an “entirely separate and distinct action”, general by a corresponding different set of rules.

            The petitioner to prohibit the respondent judge from directing petitioner to take the witness stand and testify is denied, without prejudice to petitioner’s properly invoking the guaranty against self-incrimination when and as question are propounded to him on the stand. Cost against petitioner.

*Case Digest by Rose Mae L. Pango, JD-I, Andres Bonifacio College

Topic: Custodial Investigation

Republic of the Philippines vs  Cabanada

G.R. No. 221424

July 19, 2017

FACTS

            Cabanada worked as Victoria’s housemaid for several years; she has unrestricted access to all parts of the house including the master’s bedroom; on April 12, 2009, she was left alone at the house when the family went to Bulacan.

            On April 13, 2009, Victor discovered that the money was missing; and there was no sign of forced entry or of an intruder entering the house. Cabanada admitted to the police in the presence of Catherine (employer) that she stole the money and led them to her room where they recovered the P 16,000.00 cash and white leather wallet containing the master key of Victoria’s car. Thereafter, Cabanada was brought at the Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU) for further investigation. Cabanada apologized to Catherine, and admitted that she had some of the missing jewelry in the house of Mandaluyong City.

            The police went to her house and recovered the expensive watches and a pair of earrings with diamonds placed in a tool box.

            The court finds the accused Robelyn Cabanada Y Rosario guilty beying reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpertua.

ISSUE

            Whether Cabanada’s admissions were not obtained under custodial investigation as it was established that she was not yet arrested at that time.

RULING

            Cabanada was not under custodial investigation when she made the confession, without counsel to PO2 Cotoner that she took the missing amount of money. The prosecution established that the confession was elicited during the initial interview of the police after Catherine called to report the missing money and personal effects.

            The investigation was still a general inquiry of the crime and has not focused on a particular suspect. Also, she admitted the crime while at the residence of her employer, thus, she was not yet taken into custody or otherwise deprived of her freedom.

            Custodial investigation embodies what jurisprudence termed as “Miranda Rights”. The doctrine requires that: a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent, b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; and c) he has the right to talk to an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires. The said rights are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the State as would lead the accused to admit something false, no to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.

*Case Digest by Rose Mae L. Pango, JD-I, Andres Bonifacio College

Double Jeopardy Case

People of the Philippines v Lino Alejandro y Pimentel

GR No. 223099

January 11, 2018

FACTS

            Lino Alejandro y Pimentel is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape define and penalized under RPC.

            The accused appellant rape a 12-year old minor in two instances. AAA the minor testified that accused-appellant followed her, grabbed her, and brought her to the back of a school. There, accused-appellant removed AAA’s shorts and t-shirt, laid on top of her, and inserted his manhood into her. The second instance is two months later, accused-appellant went inside AAA’s house through a window one night, undressed himself and again do the same act. On both occasions, accused-appellant threatened to kill AAA is she told anybody what had happened.

            AAA eventually told her mother BBB about the incident. BBB brought her to the Municipal Health Office where she was examined by Dr. CCC. It was found out that there were deep healed, old and superficial lacerations in the hymen of AAA and concluded that these indicated positive sexual intercourse.

            The Order dated September 3, 2008 which was mistakenly captioned as Crim. Case No. 4979 instead of Crim. Cases Nos. Br. 20- 6096 & 6097 was erroneously attached by the Court employee to the records of another criminal case involving the same accused but different private complainant-victim entitled People of the Philippines versus Lino Alejandro.

            Accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration  arguing that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and can neither be withdrawn nor modified, because to do so would place an accused-appellant in double jeopardy.

ISSUE

            Whether or not the accused-appellant will be held in double jeopardy due to an err in court decision.

RULING

            Yes. In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable.

             The 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of the accused against double jeopardy, thus: Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order for double jeopardy to attach. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.

             Here, all the elements were present. There was a valid information for two counts of rape over which the RTC had jurisdiction and to which the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. After the trial, a judgment of acquittal was thereafter rendered. A judgment of acquittal was rendered based on the mistaken notion that the private complainant failed to testify; allegedly because of the mix-up of orders with a different case involving the same accused-appellant.

            However, does not change the fact that a judgment of acquittal had already been promulgated. Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation.

            Accused-appellant Lino Alejandro y Pimentel is hereby ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for another lawful cause.

*Case Digest by Rose Mae L. Pango, JD-I, Andres Bonifacio College