*Case digest by Chrysmae B. Flora, JD-I, Andres Bonifacio College – School of Law 2019-2020

Topic: Double Jeopardy

People of the Philippines vs. Honorable Rafael M. Declaro

and Edgar Ibabao

G.R. No. L-64362, February 9, 1989

Ponente: Gancayco, J.:

Facts:

The case is a result of a traffic accident in Aklan. Edgar Ibabao was charged for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence by certain Crispin Cananam as the offended party. Three months later, an information for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against the same accused (Edgar Ibabao) by an Eduardo Salido. The second case arose from the same incident.

          Upon arraignment for the first case, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Then the case was set for its first hearing on January 19, 1983. However, both the offended party and the fiscal failed to appear despite notice. The counsel for the accused moved for dismissal for lack of interest on the part of the prosecution after the accused has given his express consent to his counsel. The motion was thereby grated.

Issue:

          Can an order of dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused after arraignment for the failure of the prosecution to appear on the first day of hearing be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense? (Whether or not there was double jeopardy)

Ruling:

          No. The dismissal with consent of the accused results a waiver on his right against double jeopardy. Thus, dismissal of a case with the express consent of the accused will not bar another prosecution for the same offense or appeal by the prosecution from such dismissal. It must be noted, the consent to be effected, must be express, and this excludes mere silence or failure of the accused to object to the dismissal (People v. Ylagan). The accused expressly consented when his counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case, thus it must take effect. So, applying it to the case at bar, he cannot question or invoke double jeopardy on the second charge against him for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.

          To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.

          Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.

The accused was duly notified that the case was set for hearing on January 19, 1983. On said date of hearing, neither complainant nor the fiscal appeared despite due notice. This was the first date of hearing after arraignment. The court a quo should not have dismissed the case and should have instead reset the case to another date to give the prosecution another day in court.

Double jeopardy will apply even if the dismissal is made with the express consent of the accused, only if it is predicated on either of two grounds, i.e., insufficient of the evidence or denial of the right to speedy trial. In both cases, the dismissal will have the effect of acquittal. Since the dismissal in this case does not fall under either of these two instances and it was made with the express consent of the accused, it would not thereby be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.