case digest

(WARRANTLESS ARREST)

People of the Philippines

                                                                           vs.      

Oscar Conde

[GR 113269, 10 April 2001]

FACTS:

           

On 25 May 1992 at about 8:00 A.M., Apollo Romero was home sitting by the window and drinking coffee when he saw 4 men in Santolan Street block the path of 2 Indian nationals (bombay) on a motorcycle. Oscar Conde y Lutoc poked a gun at the two Indians while his three companions (Alejandro Perez Jr. y Carsillar, Allan Atis y Abet, and another unidentified man) approached and stabbed the Indians. Atis took the goods which were being sold by the two Indians on installment. After the stabbing, the four men fled from the crime scene towards Mabolo Street. PO3 Rodencio Sevillano of the Intelligence and Investigation Division (IID) of the PNP, Kalookan City investigated the incident. On 30 May 1992, the police arrested Conde, Perez and Atis. Police recovered the weapons used in the robbery, when Felicidad Macabare, Conde's wife, went to the police station to talk to Conde. These weapons were discovered inside her bag after a routine inspection. Sevillano admitted, however, that they did not have a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the accused. Nor did they have a search warrant when they inspected Felicidad's bag and when they searched the house of a certain Jimmy where they found the stolen items. Conde, Perez and Atis were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. The accused entered pleas of not guilty. On 15 December 1993 the Regional Trial Court, Branch 129, Kalookan City found Conde, Atis and Perez guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties under the law, and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of each of the victims, Sukhdev Singh and Biant Singh, in the amount of P50,000.00. Conde, et. al. appealed. However, the counsel de parte for Perez, Atty. Jose M. Marquez, failed to file brief for Perez, prompting this Court to dismiss his appeal. The decision of the trial court became final and executory with respect to Perez. Hence the present appeal concerns only Atis and Conde, who filed their separate briefs.

ISSUE:

            Whether the illegal warrantless arrest, which was waived, is sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free of error.

RULING:

            The arrests of Conde, et. al. came after the lapse of 5 days from the time they were seen committing the crime. At the time they were arrested, the police were not armed with any warrants for their arrests. Section 5 of Rule 113, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 27 enumerates the instances when an arrest can be made without warrant, namely: (a) When, in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. None of the above circumstances is present herein. Conde, et. al. were merely walking along Tandang Sora Avenue and were not committing any crime. Neither can it be said that the crime had just been committed as 5 days had already passed from the time of the robbery with homicide. It cannot also be said that the arresting officers had probable cause based on personal knowledge, as PO3 Sevillano admitted that they learned about the suspects from Apollo Romero and certain unnamed informants. Further, the lapse of 5 days gave the police more than enough time to conduct surveillance of the appellants and apply for a warrant of arrest. Clearly, the rights of Conde, et. al., provided in Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution 28 were violated. Unfortunately, they did not assert their constitutional rights prior to their arraignment. This is fatal to their case. An accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the Information against him before his arraignment. When they entered their pleas on arraignment without invoking their rights to question any irregularity, which might have accompanied their arrests, they voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the judicial process. Any objection, defect, or irregularity attending their arrests should had been made before they entered their pleas. It is much too late for them to raise the question of their warrantless arrests. Their pleas to the information upon arraignment constitute clear waivers of their rights against unlawful restraint of liberty. Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings including those leading to the conviction of the appellants and his co-accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their culpability.

(PROHIBITION AGAINST IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT)

HARRISON MOTORS CORPORATION, petitioner

vs.

RACHEL A. NAVARRO

G.R. No. 132269, April 27, 2000

FACTS:

           

Sometime in June of 1987 Harrison Motors Corporation through its president, Renato Claros, sold two Isuzu Elf trucks to private respondent Rachel Navarro, owner of RN Freight Lines, a franchise holder operating and maintaining a fleet of cargo trucks all over Luzon. Petitioner, a known importer, assembler and manufacturer, assembled the two (2) trucks using the components parts. Prior to the sale, all the BIR Taxes and customs duties for the parts used on the two trucks had been paid for. Subsequently, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the Land Transportation Office entered a Memorandum of Agreement which provided that for purposes of registering vehicles, a Certificate of Payment should first be obtained from the BIR.

On June 16, 1988 the BIR, BOC and LTO entered into a tripartite MOA that prior to the registration in the LTO of any locally assembled motor vehicle using imported component parts, a Certificate of Payment should first be obtained from the BIR and BOC to prove that all existing taxes and customs duties have been paid. Government agents seized and detained the two trucks of Navarro after discovering that there were still unpaid taxes. Navarro ask for the receipts evidencing payment of BIR taxes and customs duties, however, Claros refused to comply. Wanting to secure the immediate release of the trucks, Navarro paid the assessed BIR taxes and customs duties and ask for reimbursement but Claros again refused.

ISSUE:

           

            Whether the two (2) Memorandum of Agreement impairs the contract of sale between petitioner and private respondent.

RULING:

            The Memorandum of Agreement does not impose any additional taxes which would unduly impair the contract of sale between the petitioner and private respondent. Instead, these administrative orders were passed to enforce payment of existing BIR taxes and customs duties at the time of importation. Clearly, petitioner’s contention is unmeritorious. What Sec 10 Art III of the Constitution prohibits is the passage of a law which enlarges, abridges or in any manner changes the intention of the contracting parties.

             Court of Appeals ordered Petitioner Harrison Motors Corporation to reimburse respondent Rachel Navarro.

(EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE)

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and GMA NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 132922.  April 21, 1998]

           

FACTS:

           

Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers and registered voters. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., appears to have the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Sec. 92 of B.P Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies to provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other political purposes. Petitioners challenge the validity of Sec. 92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for COMELEC Time.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.

(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just compensation.

                                                      

RULING:

           

Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state’s duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.

(PRE- ARRAIGNMENT DUTIES OF TRIAL JUDGE)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee

VS.

EDUARDO AGBAYANI y MENDOZA, accused-apellant

G.R NO 122770,  January 16, 1998

FACTS:

            Eduardo Agbayani was charged for raping his 14-year old daughter, Eden Agbayani at the sanctity of their rented room on July 19, 1994 and was found guilty of the crime of rape. A motion for a new trial was filed before the court by the new counsel of the accused assailing the irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused invoking the failure of the court to inform the accused of his right to choose his own counsel. He further alleged that his counsel de oficio was never prepared during all the scheduled hearings; worse, even waived the presence of appellant after the third witness for the prosecution was presented.  He also averred that the trial court uses its inherent power of contempt to intimidate private complainant.

ISSUE:

            Whether or not the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of the right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the judgment of conviction and to send the case back for a new trial.

RULING:

            It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome  by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has also been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to inform that accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was informed by the court of such right.

            Sec 19 of the Rules of Court provides that after a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause grants him further time. It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded. Only when so demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible error and a ground for new trial. Further, such right may be waived, expressly or impliedly. In the instant case, appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, he effectively waived such right. It is untenable to believe that the counsel who represented the appellant was not prepared during the trial as records showed he was able to cross-examine the complainant and there was no ground to claim he is incompetent to represent the appellant in court. The SC thereby affirmed the decision of the lower court finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

(UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner

Vs.

LEILA REYES JOHNSON, respondent

[GR 138881, 18 December 2000]

FACTS:

            Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a resident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American on 16 June 1968 and had since been working as a registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those with Alzheimer's disease, in convalescent homes in the United States. On 16 June 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her son's family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day, 26 June 1998. At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and explosives. When she frisked Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latter's abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying "Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon." She was directed to take Johnson to the nearest women's room for inspection. Ramirez took Johnson to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed outside. Inside the women's room, Johnson was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and Johnson gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked her "to bring out the thing under her girdle." Johnson brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the women's room. The confiscated packs contained a total of 580.2 grams of a substance which was fount by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." Embile took Johnson and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area of the NAIA, where Johnson's passport and ticket were taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal belongings were itemized. Johnson was charged for the possession of 3 plastic bages of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, weighing a total of 580.2 grams; a violation of §16 of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by RA 7659. On 14 May 1999, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, found Johnson guilty and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Johnson appealed.

ISSUE:

 Whether the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates her right against unreasonable search and seizure.

           

RULING:

 The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of tie 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed and person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx." The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from being accurate. The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against Johnson. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.