In administrative law,
a provision that allows a congressional resolution (passed by a
majority of congress, but not signed by the President) to nullify a
rulemaking or other action taken by an executive agency. At one time,
legislative veto provisions were relatively common, and went along with
many congressional delegations of power to administrative agencies (e.g.
congress would give the INS power to regulate immigration, but retain
the power to overrule any of their decisions by legislative veto). The
legislative veto was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
Since
it is clear that the [legislative veto] was not within any of the
express constitutional exceptions authorizing one House to act alone,
and equally clear that it was an exercise of legislative power, that
action was subject to the standards prescribed in Art. I. The bicameral
requirement, the Presentment Clauses, the President's veto, and
Congress' power to override a veto were intended to erect enduring
checks on each Branch and to protect the people from the improvident
exercise of power by mandating certain prescribed steps. To preserve
those checks, and maintain the separation of powers, the carefully
defined limits on the power of each Branch must not be eroded. To
accomplish what has been attempted by one House of Congress in this case
requires action in conformity with the express procedures of the
Constitution's prescription for legislative action: passage by a
majority of both Houses and presentment to the President.
The
[legislative veto] doubtless has been in many respects a convenient
shortcut; the "sharing" with the Executive by Congress of its authority
over aliens in this manner is, on its face, an appealing compromise. In
purely practical terms, it is obviously easier for action to be taken by
one House without submission to the President; but it is crystal clear
from the records of the Convention, contemporaneous writings, and
debates that the Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency. The
records of the Convention and debates in the states preceding
ratification underscore the common desire to define and limit the
exercise of the newly created federal powers affecting the states and
the people. There is unmistakable expression of a determination that
legislation by the national Congress be a step-by-step, deliberate and
deliberative process.
The legislative veto describes features of at least two different forms of government, monarchies and those based on the separation of powers, applied to the authority of the monarch in the first and to the authority of the legislature in the second.
In the case of monarchy, legislative veto describes the right
of the ruler to nullify the actions of a legislative body, for example,
the French monarch's claim to the right to veto actions of the National Assembly at the start of the French Revolution.[1]
In the case of representative governments that divide their executive and legislative functions, legislative veto
refers to the power of a legislature, or one house of a bicameral
legislature, to nullify an action of the executive authority. The
practice was common for several decades in the United States at the
federal level until ruled unconstitutional in 1983.[2]
In Germany, the term refers to the authority of the Federal Council (Bundesrat), which represents the German states, to nullify certain categories of legislation enacted by the Bundestag, the nation's bicameral legislature.[3]
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